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  Preface
Prefaces usually portray the PhD project as a struggle with many ups and 
downs. To me, this thesis seems more like the natural outcome of a gradu-
al process, the research activities having been an integral part of my job at 
the OTB Research Institute for the Built Environment. There, preparing the 
articles comprising this thesis was only one of my activities, alongside var-
ious contract research projects, the other articles that I have written or col-
laborated on, and my work for the Journal of Housing and the Built Environ-
ment.
My career at OTB began in 1998 when I joined it as a contract researcher. In 
the first two years at the institute, I carried out several local housing market 
surveys. In 2000, I took my first steps in the world of fundamental research 
and just kept on going. Along with Henny Coolen, I wrote an article on the 
application of the laddering method within housing preferences research. 
Then, together with Agnes Reitsma, I investigated the relationship between 
the welfare system and the housing system in the Netherlands and Belgium. 
Eventually, the latter project served as the basis and inspiration for this the-
sis. 
Professor Peter Boelhouwer, Professor Hugo Priemus, and Harry van der Hei-
jden were the supervisors of my PhD project. Although we did not meet very 
often, they were there whenever I needed them. They put me on the right 
track when I started the project and provided useful suggestions when I wrote 
my introductory and concluding chapters. Above all, I want to thank them for 
the great confidence they have always had in me. 
Furthermore, I am indebted to those with whom I co-authored some of the 
chapters of my thesis: Marja Elsinga (Chapter 5), Iñaki Heras Saizarbitoria 
and Aitziber Etxezarreta Etxarri (Chapter 6) and Cyrus Vakili-Zad (Chapter 7). 
Working with each of you was an inspiring experience and I sincerely hope to 
continue our collaboration in the future.
I also want to thank my colleagues in the OTB section ‘Housing Systems’. 
Due to the informal setting and the spirit of cooperation, working in this sec-
tion is a great pleasure. 
A few people deserve special mention. First of all, I want to thank Roland 
Goetgeluk, with whom I have shared an office during most of the PhD project. 
Roland helped me a lot with the statistical analyses, but I also have fond 
memories of our lengthy and sometimes surreal conversations on politics 
and life in general. I regularly joined Evert Meijers and Henk-Jan van Mossel 
for a game of tennis or squash, after which we often discussed the progress 
on our PhD projects (they were much faster than I was, at least in finishing 
up). And I am grateful to Nancy Smyth van Weesep for the language editing of 
Chapters 1 and 8 of this thesis. 
Last but certainly not least I want to thank my family. Blanca, Maite, Koos, 
Anneke, Jasper, Ruby, and Job – I could count on all of you for love and sup-
port. Although my PhD thesis was not a regular topic of conversation, you 
sometimes prodded me on by asking when I was planning to finish the 
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 1  Introduction
 1.1 Introduction
This thesis attempts to test the extent to which the divergence theories and 
typologies formulated by Esping-Andersen (1990) and Kemeny (1992 and 1995) 
constitute a valuable framework for explaining international differences in 
housing policies, housing outcomes, and housing market developments. Es-
ping-Andersen’s theory entails a typology of three welfare state regimes (so-
cial-democratic, conservative-corporatist, liberal), whereas the theoretical 
work of Kemeny distinguishes two types of rental system (unitary and dual-
ist). All six articles in this book use these theories and typologies (either one 
or both) as an explanatory framework. 
Since their formulation in the 1990s, both of these theories and typologies1 
have dominated the debate in international comparative housing research. 
Nevertheless, there were still significant gaps in knowledge concerning 
their explanatory power when I started this research project in 2002. At that 
time, most of the debate took place at a conceptual or theoretical level. The 
theories and typologies of Esping-Andersen and Kemeny had hardly been 
tested against empirical housing data. This thesis makes an attempt to 
fill this gap. Of course, I am not the only housing researcher who has tried 
to do so. After 2002, several others took up this challenge as well (Domburg-
De Rooij and Musterd, 2002; Matznetter, 2002; Hulse, 2003, Allen et al., 2004; 
Arbaci, 2007; Stamsø, 2008; Van Gent, 2009). All these scholars have linked 
Esping-Andersen’s welfare state regime typology to the housing system2. 
However, doing so they focused on particular countries or welfare regimes; 
alternatively, they focused on specific elements of the housing system such 
as segregation, urban restructuring, the market rental sector, or neighborhood 
regeneration. My approach is more comprehensive. In this thesis, I attempt 
to cover as many elements of the housing system as possible. Furthermore, 
by selecting a broad range of countries, I hope to do justice to the variation 
between countries and welfare state regimes. Thereby, I intend to offer an 
overall picture of the explanatory power of both of these divergence theories 
and typologies with regard to the field of housing. 
A second gap in international comparative welfare and housing research 
1 Throughout this thesis, I usually refer to the theoretical frameworks of Esping-Andersen and Kemeny with the 
term ‘theory and typology’. The typology specifies the characteristics by which welfare and housing systems differ 
from each other, while the theory explains how these differences have come into being. The theoretical parts of 
this thesis deal with both the theory and the typology, whereas the empirical parts of the study focus on testing 
the typologies.
2 Following Bourne (1981), I define a housing system as “… an imprecise, but nevertheless convenient expres-
sion encompassing the full range of interrelationships between all the actors (individual and corporate), housing 
units, and institutions involved in the production, consumption, and regulation of housing.”
[ 2 ]
around 2002 concerned the relative inattention to the Southern European EU 
countries, both in empirical research as well as in theory-building. In fact, 
these countries are not included in the empirical analyses that underlie the 
typologies of both Esping-Andersen and Kemeny. As a result of this gap, it is 
not clear how the Southern European EU countries fit into these typologies. 
Various researchers have reacted to this omission by formulating a separate 
Mediterranean welfare state regime. In housing research, Barlow and Duncan 
(1994) but especially Allen et al. (2004) did groundbreaking work by applying 
Esping-Andersen’s framework to Southern Europe. However, these research-
ers presented limited empirical evidence to support their arguments. In this 
book, I will therefore assess to what extent the specific characteristics of the 
Mediterranean welfare and housing systems express themselves in specific 
housing policies, housing outcomes, and housing market developments. 
Structure of this chapter
This introductory chapter starts with a discussion of the main trends in in-
ternational comparative housing research, with the aim of placing the frame-
works of Esping-Andersen and Kemeny in a broader perspective (Section 1.2). 
After that, both theories and typologies are described in more detail and the 
differences and similarities between them are discussed (Section 1.3). Section 
1.4 considers the objectives of the research, the research questions, data and 
methods, and the selection of countries. A short introduction to each of the 
articles included in the thesis is provided in Section 1.5. This last section also 
shows how the papers are embedded in other research that I have carried out 
in recent years. 
 1.2  Convergence and divergence in international 
comparative research
Different scholars apply different definitions of the term ‘comparative 
research’. Pickvance (2001) takes a very broad view, calling research 
comparative when data is gathered on two or more cases and an attempt 
is made to explain rather than merely describe (Pickvance, 2001). By 
implication, almost all scientific research is comparative. Przeworski and 
Teune (1970) apply a much narrower definition. They restrict comparative 
research to cross-country studies in which a societal characteristic is shown 
to have an effect on the variable or relationship of interest, for example 
when a characteristic of the national political system affects some aspect of 
electoral behavior (Przeworksi and Teune, 1970, as cited by Pickvance, 2001). 
The international comparative analyses (Chapters 3 to 5) that are presented 
in this book fit well within the latter definition. In these analyses, societal 
characteristics (notably, the nature of the national welfare system and/
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or housing system) are used to explain differences between countries with 
regard to measurable housing outcomes. Or, stated differently, the context 
is used to explain the content (Doling, 2010). Such a context-to-content 
approach is also used in Chapters 2, 6, and 7. However, since these chapters 
only look at the developments in one particular country, they are not 
internationally comparative. 
Universalistic and particularistic approaches
Within international comparative research, two polar opposites can be distin-
guished: a universalistic approach and a particularistic approach. Research-
ers adhering to the universalistic approach look for relations between varia-
bles in abstraction from the surrounding societies (Pickvance, 2001, p. 12). In 
the early post-war period, this was the predominant approach. Universalizing 
comparative analysis started from ‘surface-level’ similarities and implied that 
these could be explained by a ‘deeper-level’ common process or cause (Pick-
vance, 2001, p. 18). This search for constant factors or general laws capable of 
explaining social phenomena was grounded in the assumption that univer-
sal characteristics could be identified in social phenomena, independent of 
a specific context. One of the conclusions drawn on the basis of this type of 
research was that all industrial societies would undergo the same evolution-
ary process and ultimately converge. The universalistic approach, with its em-
phasis on the search for similarity and convergence, has been criticized for 
ignoring specific contexts, specific institutions, or specific politics (Hantrais, 
1999, p. 95). This critique relates to the fact that universalist theories are often 
based on an analysis of developments in one particular country, which means 
that they may not be representative for the situation in other countries (Van 
Kersbergen, 1995, p. 12). 
The particularistic approach is in many ways the opposite of the univer-
salistic approach. Proponents of the particularistic approach maintain that 
social reality can only be properly understood within its context. Thus, all 
research findings are conditioned by spatial and temporal factors, which 
means that they are not amenable to generalization (Hantrais, 1999, p. 93). 
In particularistic comparative research, the focus is on national uniqueness; 
the existence of truly universal concepts and values is rejected. All concepts 
are said to be irrevocably culture-specific with different meanings in different 
places and at different points in history (Sommerville, 2005). This implies that 
international comparisons have very limited added value. 
In the course of the past two decades, more and more researchers have 
tried to find a path between these two approaches. The resulting ‘middle way’ 
is an attempt to strike a balance between generalization and attention to dif-
ference. The aim is to identify general factors within social systems that can 
be interpreted with reference to specific societal contexts. Ultimately, this 
should lead to the development of theories of the middle range (Kemeny 
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and Lowe, 1998). While such theories acknowledge that social reality is con-
text-dependent, they also accord the context itself importance as an explan-
atory variable and an enabling tool, rather than dismissing it as a barrier to 
effective cross-national comparison (Hantrais, 1999, p. 94). Theories and stud-
ies that fall under this approach tend to use typologies derived from cultur-
al, ideological, or political theories as the basis for understanding differences 
between groups of societies (Kemeny and Lowe, 1998, p. 171). Research taking 
this ‘middle way’ is often said to take the ‘divergence approach’. 
Universalistic approaches
International comparative housing research started to develop in the 1960s. 
The first studies in the field tended to be rather descriptive and explorato-
ry. They described how things worked in foreign housing systems in order to 
assemble a general pool of knowledge (Oxley, 2001, p. 91). Most of the ear-
ly researchers adopted a universalistic (convergence) perspective. Donnison 
(1967), for instance, assumed that general economic and demographic devel-
opments would lead to an international convergence of housing policies, de-
spite the political and institutional differences between countries (logic of in-
dustrialization). 
The most influential and comprehensive convergence theory within inter-
national comparative housing research was couched in Harloe’s book The Peo-
ple’s Home (1995). There, Harloe used a neo-Marxist framework to explain the 
development of national housing systems. He argued that government inter-
vention in the housing sector depends on the profitability of housing to pri-
vate capital, with all countries eventually passing through the same phases 
of commodification, decommodification, and recommodification. In periods 
of low profitability for private investment, the state intervenes and provides 
social rented housing; this process is reversed once conditions favorable to 
profit-making are re-established. 
Based on this argument, Harloe discerned two basic models of social hous-
ing: a residual model and a mass model. The former describes social housing 
that has been produced through small-scale programs and that is destined 
for the poorest groups in society, which means that a stigma is attached to 
it. The latter model refers to large-scale building programs for social rented 
dwellings that are subsidized by the state. In this model, social rented dwell-
ings are destined not only for the poor but also for the middle classes, which 
implies that the level of stigma is considerably less. In Harloe’s view, the 
residual model should be considered the ‘normal’ housing model. The mass 
model only applies to periods of crisis and/or restructuring, when the market 
sector is temporarily unable to provide housing in a profit-oriented manner. 
The convergence approach is still influential. The most recent studies in the 
field stress that the pressures of globalization, international competition, and 
fiscal austerity will lead to an almost inevitable retreat of the welfare state 
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(see Genschel, 2004, for an overview of this new convergence approach). 
The ‘middle-range’ approach 
Harloe’s book may be seen as an exception to the mainstream trend. Since 
the 1990s, theory in international comparative welfare and housing research 
has been moving towards the middle-range approach (Kemeny and Lowe, 
1998). This is clearly illustrated by the fact that the most important theories 
in the field now use typologies to classify countries. 
Within international comparative welfare research, the divergence theory 
and typology of Esping-Andersen (1990) has acquired a rather dominant posi-
tion. According to Esping-Andersen, one should not speak of the welfare state, 
since different welfare states have different characteristics. He argues that 
there are three ideal typical welfare state regimes (liberal, conservative-cor-
poratist3, and social-democratic) that differ fundamentally from each other. 
Although Esping-Andersen’s work does not deal with housing, his theory and 
typology has nevertheless had a significant influence on international com-
parative housing research. The main features of the Esping-Andersen frame-
work are discussed in Subsection 1.3.2. 
The field of international comparative housing research also has its own 
divergence framework: Kemeny’s theory and typology of dualist versus uni-
tary rental systems. Kemeny states that the rental markets in societies with 
corporatist power structures (this concerns both the social-democratic and 
the conservative-corporatist welfare state regimes in the typology of Esp-
ing-Andersen) are organized in a fundamentally different way than the rent-
al markets of societies in which such corporatist power structures are absent 
(i.e., the liberal welfare state regimes). The main characteristics of Kemeny’s 
framework are discussed in Subsection 1.3.3. 
The role of theory
Despite the existence of the theories of Harloe and Kemeny, and the fact that 
Esping-Andersen’s welfare state regime theory and typology is often applied 
in international comparative housing research, various researchers argue that 
theorizing in this field remains neither extensive nor deep. Oxley states that 
housing is a field of activity, an area of policy and practice, and a complicated 
multifaceted phenomenon, but that it is not a discipline with its own theories 
(Oxley, 2001, p. 92). According to Kemeny (2001, p. 60), researchers in the field 
3 In the general welfare state literature, and also in the subsequent chapters of this thesis, the terms ‘corporatist’ 
and ‘conservative-corporatist’ are often used interchangeably to refer to this welfare regime type taken from the 
typology of Esping-Andersen. However, in this chapter, I consistently use the term ‘conservative-corporatist’ to 
clearly distinguish this regime type from what I call ‘labor-led corporatism’ (see Subsection 1.3.4) and ‘modern 
corporatism’ (see Subsection 8.2.1).
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of housing and welfare research are focused on detecting and describing ty-
pologies rather than on explaining or further developing them. 
To some extent, Oxley and Kemeny are right in my opinion. Few attempts 
at theorizing have been made; indeed, much of the international comparative 
housing research is still rather descriptive. At the same time, it should be 
noted that the theories and typologies that do exist, such as Kemeny’s rental 
system theory and typology, have barely been tested against empirical 
housing data. The same goes for the welfare state regime typology of Esping-
Andersen. 
This lack of theory testing might be as bad for theory-building as the lack 
of new theoretical insights. Following the empirical cycle, any theory needs 
to be systematically tested against empirical data in order to assess its appli-
cability and validity. Theories and typologies that don’t withstand the test 
should either be rejected or adapted and tested again. With this thesis, I hope 
to make a modest contribution to this process.
 1.3  The divergence theories and typologies of 
Esping-Andersen and Kemeny
 1.3.1  Introduction
This section briefly describes the divergence theories and typologies of Esping-
Andersen and Kemeny. These are the two theoretical frameworks that are applied 
and tested in subsequent chapters of this thesis. Applying a general welfare 
state regime theory and typology, such as that of Esping-Andersen, to the field of 
housing only makes sense if the housing system is seen as an integrated part of 
the welfare state. Opinions on this issue differ, however, as shown below. 
Housing and the welfare state
It is generally acknowledged that welfare states are supported by four pillars: 
social security and pensions; healthcare; education; and housing. Of these 
four, the position of housing is the least obvious. According to Harloe (1995), 
housing has different characteristics than healthcare, education, or income 
support. As a tradable commodity, housing occupies a central position in the 
capitalist economy. Consequently, a permanent large-scale decommodifica-
tion of housing will meet serious resistance from vested capitalist interests 
and is therefore unlikely (Harloe, 1995, p. 537). 
Kemeny (2001) also stresses the specific position of housing compared to 
the other welfare sectors. He argues that housing, unlike the other pillars, is 
characterized by a high capital intensity and, depending on the country con-
cerned, a strong private-sector involvement. While the other three pillars 
are often, though not always, provided by the state and paid for out of tax-
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ation, housing tends to be provided by the private sector. Some housing has 
been directly provided by the central or local government, some by non-prof-
it organizations that are regulated by the government. But this only serves a 
minority (generally less than half) of the population, and even then it is pro-
vided at a price charged to consumers that covers a much higher proportion 
of the costs than is the case in education and healthcare (Kemeny, 2001, p. 
55). It is for these reasons that Torgersen (1987) refers to housing as ‘the wob-
bly pillar under the welfare state’. 
Although Harloe and Kemeny both acknowledge the specific position of 
housing within the welfare state, they draw completely opposite conclusions 
from this observation. Harloe states that welfare regime types that are devel-
oped with reference to non-housing aspects of social policy are not useful 
in studying housing markets and policies comparatively (Harloe as cited by 
Kleinman, 1996, p. 179). This implies that he rejects the application of Esping-
Andersen’s theory and typology to the field of housing. 
Kemeny, on the other hand, sees the housing sector as a crucial part of 
the welfare state. According to him, the critical importance of housing is 
best illustrated by looking at some of its effects on other welfare sectors. For 
example, Kemeny argues that owner-occupation undermines support for a 
universal state-regulated health insurance and pension system (see Kemeny 
2001 and 2005, as well as Chapter 4 of this thesis, for an elaboration of this 
point). In addition, he also considers the influence of the dwelling type on the 
spatial and societal structure of a country (in Chapter 3 of this thesis this idea 
is further developed and tested). To stress the large influence of housing on 
society, Kemeny (1992, p. 79-80) states:
It is that housing manifests a high degree of ‘embeddedness’ in social structure. Its very 
pervasiveness in terms of influence on life styles, urban form, welfare, and patterns of 
household consumption make it at the same time central to understanding welfare yet 
conceptually elusive. It is this embeddedness that makes housing qualitatively different 
from, say, health or educational institutions. This is made clear if we consider how educa-
tion, for example, could be radically reorganised by breaking up large schools into neigh-
bourhood ones, or by combining schools with universities. The impact on social structure 
would be far less than, say, reorganising housing so that everyone lived in collectives, or 
high-rise flats, or multiple occupancy. 
The difference of opinion between Harloe and Kemeny might be attributed to 
their differing definitions of the welfare state. Harloe seems to take a rather 
narrow view of it as a set of public services operating outside (or largely out-
side) the market. This means that, as far as housing is concerned, he mainly 
focuses on the public or social rented sector. Kemeny’s definition covers not 
only the welfare services provided by the government; he also considers how 
the privately organized parts of the housing system, such as the owner-oc-
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cupancy sector, relate to the non-housing parts of the welfare state, assum-
ing that these relationships are strong (Malpass, 2008, p. 2). Such a broad ap-
proach is also advocated by Allen (2006). She prefers to speak of a welfare sys-
tem rather than of a welfare state because welfare services may also be pro-
vided by market parties or the family. A welfare system can be defined as a 
specific configuration of the state, the market, and the family that delivers 
welfare services to households and individuals (Allen, 2006, p. 265). Allen sees 
housing, irrespective of whether it is publicly or privately provided, as an im-
portant and integral part of such a welfare system. 
The vision that housing should be seen as an important element of the wel-
fare state or welfare system is also shared by other contemporary interna-
tional comparative housing researchers such as Groves et al. (2007) and Ron-
ald (2008). As the latter (p. 11) states:
Housing constitutes a welfare good in itself in terms of shelter, but it also forms the basis 
of how households use and share other welfare goods. It acts as a store of resources 
in terms of use, asset, and exchange, and spatially constitutes the point of exchange of 
goods and welfare services between family members. 
In this thesis, I concur with the broad definition of the welfare state and the 
welfare system outlined above. Accordingly, I consider housing an important 
element of such a state or system4. 
 1.3.2  The welfare state regime theory and typology of 
Esping-Andersen 
According to Esping-Andersen, modern welfare states differ from each other 
on three crucial dimensions: the extent of decommodification; the stratifica-
tion; and the way in which state activities are linked to the role of the market 
and the family in the provision of welfare. 
In pre-capitalist and pre-industrial times, society was largely decommod-
ified. The survival of civilians did not depend on labor contracts but on the 
family, the Church, and the feudal rulers (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 35). With 
the rise of capitalism these welfare providers became less important (through 
individualization, secularization) and the chances of survival became large-
ly dependent on the market. By selling their labor capacity, civilians could 
earn the money they needed to afford accommodation and food. This com-
modification of society also resulted in increased risks and insecurity. What 
happens to people who cannot sell their labor capacity, for example because 
of old age, sickness, or unemployment? Social policies at the state level were 
4 In this thesis, as in much of the literature, the terms ‘welfare state’ and ‘welfare system’ are used interchangeably.
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developed to diminish these risks. 
These policies resulted in state-induced decommodification; civilians 
received an unconditional right to certain services and facilities, independ-
ent of their labor market participation. There is a direct relationship between 
the level of state-induced decommodification and the extent of the welfare 
state; the more state-induced decommodification, the bigger the welfare 
state. Through its decommodifying welfare policies, the state also influences 
the social stratification in society (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 55). As far as this 
is concerned, there is both an economic effect (who gets what?) and a social 
effect (the receipt of certain welfare state services or benefits may be echoed 
in a particular social status).
The state is not the only provider of welfare services (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 
p. 21). Some of these services, for example health insurances, may be offered 
on a commercial basis, which means that they are commodified. Other welfare 
services, such as childcare and care for the elderly, can be provided by family 
or friends or private non-profit organisations, usually on a decommodified 
basis. According to Esping-Andersen, the distribution of welfare tasks between 
state, market, and family is related to the level of decommodification and 
the stratification. It is the particular configuration of these three aspects that 
determines the nature of the welfare state. In this regard, three configurations 
can be distinguished: the social-democratic welfare state regime; the 
conservative-corporatist welfare state regime; and the liberal welfare state 
regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 26). It should be noted that these are ‘ideal 
types’. There is no single pure case, and elements of all three regimes can be 
found in most countries (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 49). Table 1.1 shows the 
main features of the three welfare state regimes5. For a further description of 
these characteristics, the reader is referred to Chapters 2 and 3 of this book.
Esping-Andersen based his welfare state regime typology largely on an 
analysis of the social security and the pension system. He did not include 
housing in his analysis, even though it was one of the topics in his earlier 
work (Esping-Andersen, 1985). However, housing is not the only welfare state 
aspect that is absent from the typology. It also leaves out education, health-
care, and fiscal measures (Groves et al., 2007, p. 5). 
Background of the welfare state regimes
Esping-Andersen does not limit himself to presenting a typology of welfare 
state regimes. He has also developed a theory about the differences between 
the three regime types. These differences are not explained by the level of in-
dustrialization and economic development, since Western European coun-
5 The last column of this table presents the features of the Mediterranean welfare state regime. This regime is 
discussed in the last paragraph of this Subsection. 
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tries do not differ much from each other on these variables. Indeed, there is 
no singular factor that explains the variation among welfare states. Instead, 
one should look at interaction effects. The interaction between the follow-
ing three factors is of particular importance: the way in which laborers were 
mobilized; the coalitions between political parties; and the historical support 
among the population for the development of the welfare state (Esping-An-
dersen, 1990, p. 29). 
In the first phase of the industrialization process, the rural class still had 
a dominant position in society. At that time, the development of the welfare 
state largely depended on the support that social-democratic parties could 
acquire among the rural class. The potential for making coalitions was great-
est in economies that were dominated by relatively small family enterpris-
es in the agricultural sector, such as in Scandinavia. In both Sweden and Nor-
Table 1.1 A typology of welfare state regimes
Decommodification: 
extent to which a 
regime promotes an 
acceptable standard 
of living independent 
of one’s market value
Stratification: 
differences between 
groups of citizens 
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way, ‘red-green’ political coalitions came into being (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 
p. 30). These coalitions combined the development of a welfare state (‘red’ 
interest) with subsidies for the agricultural sector (‘green’ interest). Thus, 
social-democratic welfare regimes are constructed by working-class move-
ments creating alliances with other groups and classes while keeping con-
servative forces isolated, sidelined, and divided, thereby establishing hegemo-
ny (Kemeny, 2001, p. 59).
Such red-green coalitions were not found in Continental Europe (Germa-
ny, Italy, Austria). There, the agricultural sector was dominated by relative-
ly large landowners that mostly supported conservative political forces. The 
welfare states that developed there were the product of a coalition between 
Social Democracy and Christian Democracy (‘red-black’ coalition), often with 
a hegemonic position for the latter movement (Manow, 2009, p. 111). The red-
black coalitions developed a different kind of welfare state than the red-green 
coalitions and placed stronger emphasis on maintaining existing status dif-
ferences. In response, the diverse interest groups within society often creat-
ed their own welfare sub-system, which has led to a relatively large array of 
different welfare arrangements. Lastly, the Church played a relatively impor-
tant part in the provision of social services (hospitals, old-age homes, kinder-
gartens etc.), whereas such services tend to be provided by the state in the 
social-democratic Scandinavian countries. 
In the Anglo-Saxon countries, the political conditions and power structures 
were such that the welfare state has remained relatively limited since the 
onset6. According to Iversen and Soskice (2006), this is related to the majori-
tarian electoral system that is used in these countries. Such a system leads to 
a two-party constellation with a center-right and a center-left party. General-
ly speaking, the upper class votes right, the lower class left, but how does the 
middle class vote? If the left governs, the middle class would naturally fear 
that the government will tax both the upper and the middle classes for the 
exclusive benefit of the lower class. If a right party governs, redistribution will 
be marginal, and the middle and upper classes would hardly be taxed. There-
fore, in a two-party system, the middle class more often than not votes for 
the center-right (Manow, 2009, p. 104). This results in a welfare state with a 
relatively residual character.  
After World War II, the influence of the farmers decreased and the new 
middle class (‘white-collar workers’) started to occupy a key position in the 
political system. In principle, this new middle class did not need extensive 
welfare policies (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 31). However, in the Scandinavi-
an countries, social-democracy was able to commit the middle classes to the 
6 This applies somewhat less to the United Kingdom. Initially, the British welfare state had many social-demo-
cratic characteristics. Later on it developed more and more in the direction of the liberal model.
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welfare state by creating welfare services that were of such a high level that 
they were also attractive to this group. Such a commitment was lacking in the 
liberal welfare state regime, where the extent of the welfare state remained 
limited. In Continental Europe, conservative political forces made the mid-
dle classes loyal to a welfare state in which the welfare services were strongly 
connected to the occupational status of the citizen. 
In short, Esping-Andersen concludes that the development of European 
welfare states is characterized by a large degree of path dependency. Class-
coalitions that were forged in the past still make themselves felt in the cur-
rent welfare state. Moreover, these differences also shape future develop-
ments. As Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 33) writes: 
Middle-class welfare states, be they social democratic (as in Scandinavia) or corporatist 
(as in Germany), forge middle-class loyalties. In contrast, the liberal, residualist welfare 
states found in the United States, Canada and, increasingly, Britain, depend on the loyal-
ties of a numerically weak, and often politically residual, social stratum. In this sense, the 
class coalitions in which the three welfare-state regime-types were founded, explain not 
only their past evolution but also their future prospects.
Recent developments in the welfare state
Since the early 1980s, many welfare states have experienced a crisis. Chang-
ing external circumstances (low economic growth, de-industrialization, age-
ing populations) led to increasing recourse to welfare state services. Countries 
increasingly had to choose between economic growth and social justice. The 
calls for welfare state reform became louder and louder, especially from cent-
er-right and right-wing politicians who were inspired by the neo-liberal ideol-
ogy. As a consequence, many Western welfare states indeed started a reform 
process. The welfare state reforms were not only carried through for econom-
ic reasons; they were also the expression of changing insights with regard to 
the function of the welfare state. Alongside the undoubted benefits of a well-
developed welfare state, certain negative factors also became apparent: fraud, 
dependency, stigmatization, and the poverty trap. In order to avoid these neg-
ative factors as much as possible, an alternative philosophy was developed: 
that of the Enabling State. The goal of this approach is to empower people so 
that they can shape their own lives. In other words: the welfare state should 
be transformed from a safety net into a trampoline (Boelhouwer and Van der 
Heijden, 2005, p. 78). 
In most welfare states the reform process resulted in gradual adaptations 
rather than in radical changes. This is due to the fact that existing institu-
tions are not very open to change. Moreover, many politicians seem to be 
inclined to preserve at least the basic features of the welfare state. There 
are often strategic reasons for this: welfare states offer employment to large 
groups of people who tend to be united in powerful and well-organized lob-
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by groups (see also Pierson, 1996). According to Esping-Andersen, this is a risk 
because it makes the welfare state very inflexible: 
The vast popular majorities in favour of the welfare state that opinion polls and election 
results regularly identify are essentially conservative ones because they rely on, and wish 
to perpetuate, a benefit structure that was put in place more than a generation ago. The 
political problem today is how to forge coalitions for an alternative, post-industrial model 
of social citizenship and egalitarianism (Esping-Andersen, 1996, p. 267).
The restructuring outlined above does not yet lead to a clear convergence of 
the European welfare states. In a recently published thesis, Vrooman (2009) 
has used a categorical principal component analysis to test Esping-An-
dersen’s typology. No less than 54 variables that together present a fairly 
complete empirical operationalization of Esping-Andersen’s welfare state re-
gime types were included in the analysis, with all data referring to the ear-
ly and mid-1990s.7 The results of this analysis show that the welfare state re-
gimes that were identified by Esping-Andersen (based on data from the early 
1980s) still exist.8
The position of Southern Europe
In the original theory and typology of Esping-Andersen, the Mediterranean 
EU countries (with the exception of Italy, which was classified as a corporat-
ist welfare state regime) were left out of the picture. In reaction to this omis-
sion, several researchers (for example Barlow and Duncan, 1994; Ferrara, 1996) 
proposed formulating a ‘new’ welfare state regime for the Southern Europe-
an countries. In this thesis, that new regime type is called the ‘Mediterrane-
an welfare state regime’. Represented by Portugal (although strictly speaking 
not a Mediterranean country), Spain, Italy, Greece, and Malta (see also Vakili-
Zad, 2007) the Mediterranean regime distinguishes itself from the other types 
mainly by its strong degree of familialism. This implies that disproportionate-
ly many of the welfare tasks are carried out within the family and without 
much interference from the market or state (Barlow and Duncan, 1994, p. 30). 
The last column of Table 1.1 shows how the Mediterranean welfare state re-
gime compares to the three regimes distinguished by Esping-Andersen. For 
more information on the Mediterranean welfare state regime, the reader is re-
ferred to Chapters 3, 6, and 7 of this thesis. 
7 This analysis covered the following 11 countries: the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, France, Sweden, Den-
mark, Norway, UK, Canada, Australia, and the United States.
8 The question remains what the effects are of the restructuring measures that took place after the early and mid-
1990s.
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 1.3.3 The divergence theory and typology of Kemeny
The most influential exponent of the divergence approach in housing re-
search is surely Kemeny (1992, 1995). In Housing and Social Theory (1992), Ke-
meny developed a theoretical framework for international comparative hous-
ing research that is grounded in the dichotomy between collectivist and pri-
vatist ideologies. Kemeny associates advanced industrial homeownership-
dominated societies with an ideology of privatism and a residualization of 
welfare. Conversely, advanced industrial societies with a sizable rental sector 
are associated with an ideology of collectivism and a commitment to welfare 
provision. Thus, the tendencies towards collectivism or privatism in a society 
are closely aligned with the organization of the housing system. There are a 
number of ways in which this alignment will manifest itself, but two are cru-
cial: the social forms that emerge around the ownership of housing; and the 
spatial consequences of the dominance of one or more dwelling types (Ke-
meny, 1992, p. 125).  Kemeny expands and refines these ideas in From Public 
Housing to the Social Market (1995). There, analyzing the rental sector, he makes 
a distinction between unitary rental systems9 (collectivist ideology) and du-
alist rental systems (privatist ideology). In societies with a unitary rental sys-
tem, market rental and social rental dwellings are subject to similar regula-
tions, have more or less equal rent levels, and compete with each other on a 
single market. Societies with a dualist rental system, on the other hand, are 
characterized by a rental market in which the social rental and the market 
rental sector are strictly separate. In such societies, the social rental sector is 
usually relatively small, primarily destined for (very) low-income groups, and 
strongly controlled by the government. Table 1.2 presents the main differenc-
es between dualist rental systems and unitary rental systems. In Chapter 4 of 
this thesis, the background of these differences is discussed in more detail. 
Kemeny underpins his theory and typology with references to the rental 
markets of a limited number of countries, mainly Western European (in the 
9 The terms ‘unitary rental system’, ‘unitary rental market’, ‘integrated rental system’, and ‘integrated rental mar-
ket’ are often used interchangeably in the housing literature, as well in as by Kemeny (1995). However, in Kemeny 
et al. (2005), a distinction is introduced between unitary rental markets and integrated rental markets. There, the 
former are defined as markets in which barriers to non-profit providers competing on the rental market are re-
moved. Initially, such a rental market needs to be rather heavily regulated by the government in order to give the 
non-profit sector the opportunity to grow and develop. The term ‘integrated rental market’ is reserved for markets 
in which non-profit providers are sufficiently developed to be able to compete with the for-profit sector without a 
need for such government regulation. As such, an integrated rental market can be seen as the final stage in the 
development of a unitary rental market. In this thesis, this new pair of definitions is not used. The reason is that 
integrated rental markets as defined by Kemeny et al. (2005) have never existed in reality. Consequently, we use 
the terms ‘unitary rental market’ (or system) and ‘integrated rental market’ (or system) interchangeably through-
out this book. These terms refer to the theory and typology that was developed in Kemeny’s 1995 book.
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form of case studies). He does not refer to the rental markets of Southern 
European countries, however. 
 1.3.4 The relationship between the theories and typolo-
gies of Esping-Andersen and Kemeny
There are quite a few similarities between the frameworks of Esping-An-
dersen and Kemeny. Both explain how differences in power structures and 
class coalitions result in different welfare state arrangements. Esping-An-
dersen’s work actually served as the starting point for Kemeny’s thinking on 
rental systems. Nevertheless, there is one important difference between the 
two frameworks: the use of the concept ‘corporatism’.
According to Kemeny (1995), Esping-Andersen’s definition of corporatism 
is rather unusual, as it relates this concept to conservative elements, notably 
the preservation of status differentials in society and the preferential treat-
ment of the traditional family. Kemeny argues that the definition of corpo-
ratism is more neutral in the political sciences. There, “corporatism is a sys-
tem of co-operation and compromise between capital and labour, coordinat-
ed by the State” (Kemeny, 1995, pp. 65-66). He asserts that, when so defined, 
corporatism applies to conservative-corporatist as well as to social-democrat-
ic welfare state regimes. Citing political theorists such as Lijphart and Crep-
az (1991), Kemeny argues that power structures in the social-democratic wel-
Table 1.2 Features of dualist and unitary rental systems
Political structure




countries only, based 
on Kemeny, 2006)
Source: Based on Chapter 4 of the thesis
Non-corporatist Corporatist
Ideology Privatist
Safety net Housing for broad segments of the 
population
Collectivist
Size of the rental sector Relatively small Relatively large
Competition between 
social rental sector and 
market rental sector
No direct competition between the 
two rental sectors
Large differences in rent level 
between market rental dwellings 
(relatively expensive) and social 
rental dwellings (relatively cheap)
Large differences between a strongly 
subsidized and heavily regulated 
social rental sector and a market 
rental sector with few or no 
subsidies and regulation
Norway, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, 
Italy, United Kingdom
Austria, Sweden, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Switzerland, Germany, 
France
Direct competition between the two 
rental sectors
Relatively limited differences in rent 
level between social rental dwellings 
and market rental dwellings (rents are 
moderate in both sectors)
Relatively limited differences in 
regulation and subsidies between the 
social rental sector and the market 
rental sector
Dualist rental system Unitary rental system
Rent levels
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fare state regime are as corporatist (in fact, they are even more corporatist) 
as the power structures in the conservative-corporatist welfare state regime. 
(See Chapter 2 for more information on the differing views of Kemeny and 
Esping-Andersen on corporatism.)
Unlike Esping-Andersen, Kemeny thus only distinguishes two main types of 
societies: societies with corporatist power structures (corresponding to social-
democratic and conservative-corporatist welfare state regimes in the termi-
nology of Esping-Andersen); and societies without corporatist power struc-
tures (the liberal welfare state regime in the terminology of Esping-Andersen). 
Consequently, Kemeny prefers to see the social-democratic and the conserv-
ative-corporatist welfare state regime of Esping-Andersen as variants of a 
broader overarching corporatist regime rather than as separate regime types. 
By extension, he suggests making a distinction between ‘labor-led corporat-
ism’ and ‘capital-led corporatism’. There is a compromise between the inter-
ests of labor and the interests of capital in both types, but the particular pow-
er balance between these interests differs, with labor interests being dom-
inant in the first type and capitalist interest being dominant in the second 
type (Kemeny, 2006, p. 8). The differences between these two types of corpo-
ratism may also have some relevance for the organization of the housing sys-
tem. Kemeny assumes that the more clearly ‘labor-led’ corporatism is, the 
bigger the share of the non-profit sector and the greater its influence on the 
whole rental market will be (Kemeny, 2006, p. 14). 
However, regarding the organization of the rental market, the key variable 
is the mere presence of corporatist power structures. According to Kemeny, 
most corporatist societies tend toward a unitary rental system, as opposed 
to the non-corporatist societies that mainly have a dualist rental system.10 
Kemeny hypothesized that the rather complex constellation of forms of own-
ership that often characterizes the unitary rental system mirrors the interests 
that are – or at a crucial stage of the rental market formation have been – rep-
resented or advocated by various coalition members (Kemeny, 2006, p. 12). In 
polarized political systems with no corporatist structures, on the other hand, 
there is little interest in the compromise solutions presumed by the unitary 
rental system. With only two main political parties, there is less political sup-
port for different ownership forms within rental housing. Hence there is less 
space for the range of rental market actors that can arise when many inter-
ests must be taken into account. The result is the emergence of a dualist rent-
al system (Kemeny, 2006, p. 11).
10  However, there are various exceptions to this ‘rule’. For example countries like Norway, Finland, and Belgium 
have corporatist power structures but a rental market that is probably best characterized as a dualist rental sys-
tem. Especially the relationship between labor-led corporatism and unitary rental systems seems to be problem-
atic (Kemeny, 2006).
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 1.4 Research approach
 1.4.1 Objectives and gaps
The main objective of this thesis is to assess to what extent the divergence 
theories and typologies of Esping-Andersen and Kemeny offer a valuable 
framework for explaining international differences in housing policies, hous-
ing outcomes, and housing market developments. Particular attention is paid 
to the position of the Southern European EU countries because these coun-
tries are often ignored in international comparative housing research. This is 
illustrated by the fact there are no Southern European EU countries among 
the nations included in the empirical analyses that underpin the theories and 
typologies of Esping-Andersen and Kemeny11. In short, the thesis attempts to 
make a contribution to the filling of the following two gaps in the existing 
body of knowledge:
1. The lack of empirical testing of the theories and typologies of both Esping-
Andersen and Kemeny with regard to the field of housing;
2. The neglect of Southern European EU countries in international compara-
tive housing research, both in theoretical and empirical terms.
 1.4.2 Research questions
The objectives of the research project can be translated into the following 
three research questions:
1. To what extent does the divergence theory and typology of Esping-An-
dersen offer a valuable framework for analyzing the characteristics and the 
development in time of housing policies? Does the Esping-Andersen frame-
work need some adjustment to improve its explanatory power with regard to 
housing policy developments?
2. To what extent do the divergence theories and typologies of Esping-An-
dersen and Kemeny offer a good explanation for the differences between 
countries with regard to measurable housing outcomes (tenure, dwelling type, 
housing quality, characteristics of tenants, rent levels, housing satisfaction)?
3. How do the specific characteristics of the Mediterranean welfare and hou-
sing systems express themselves in the housing policies, the housing outco-
mes, and the functioning of the housing market?
11 With the exception of Italy, a country that is included in the Esping-Andersen theory and typology.
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Chapter 2 deals with the first research question. The second research ques-
tion is answered in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. Chapters 6 and 7 deal with the third 
research question12.
 1.4.3 Data and methods 
Different data sources and methods are used in the various chapters of this 
thesis. Chapter 2 is mainly based on an analysis of the literature and poli-
cy documents. The data that is analyzed in Chapters 3 to 5 comes from the 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP). In the ECHP survey, residents 
from 15 EU countries are interviewed about their work, economic situation, 
health, and housing situation. Since this is done uniformly across the EU-15, 
the ECHP is a suitable data source for international comparisons. The data is 
analyzed with various techniques such as descriptive statistics (data present-
ed in the form of tables and figures), bivariate association measures, cluster 
analysis, and multiple regression analysis. 
It should be noted that the ECHP is not an optimal data source for hous-
ing research. In particular cases, housing figures based on it have turned out 
to be unreliable. For some countries, the tenure distribution derived from the 
ECHP is slightly different from the tenure distribution in the ‘official’ statis-
tics. However, these limitations did not pose an insurmountable problem, as 
the statistical analyses presented in subsequent chapters of this thesis were 
mainly exploratory. 
Chapters 6 and 7 focus exclusively on the Spanish housing system (see Sub-
section 1.4.4 for the motivation). In these chapters, Spanish housing market 
data from different sources is presented in the form of tables and figures, and 
bivariate relationships are mapped in the form of graphs (Chapter 7). Fur-
thermore, relevant literature sources and policy documents (most of them in 
Spanish) were analyzed. 
 1.4.4 Selection of countries 
One of the most important decisions in international comparative research 
projects concerns the selection of countries. Since the main objective of this 
thesis is to test the explanatory power of the theories and typologies of Es-
ping-Andersen and Kemeny with regard to housing it seemed logical to in-
clude all the countries that feature in the empirical underpinning of these 
two typologies (see the first two lines of Table 1.3). However, for reasons of da-
ta availability and feasibility, the countries that were actually selected are not 
12 These chapters deal with Mediterranean housing policies and housing market developments. The housing 
outcomes of the Mediterranean welfare and housing systems are discussed in Chapters 3 and 5.
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entirely the same and vary per chapter, as explained below. 
In Chapter 2, in which Esping-Andersen’s typology is translated to the field 
of housing policy, the focus is exclusively on the Netherlands. (Yet the larger 
research project in which this chapter is embedded also includes Belgium; see 
Subsection 1.5.3.) It should be noted, however, that in later research projects 
we – colleagues at OTB and myself – have given a rather comprehensive over-
view of housing policies in different EU countries. So far, we have not related 
this overview to the typology of Esping-Andersen; this is definitely one of our 
ambitions for further research (see also Subsection 8.5.2). 
In Chapter 3, the welfare state typology of Esping-Andersen serves as the 
starting point for the analysis. Since the research in this chapter is based on 
analyses of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), only the Euro-
pean Union countries that feature in this typology could be selected. In addi-
tion to these 11 EU countries (see Table 1.3), Spain, Portugal, and Greece were 
selected as well. After all, one of the objectives of this research project is to 
assess the extent to which the theoretical framework of Esping-Andersen is 
relevant to Southern European housing systems.
In Chapter 4, the theoretical framework of Kemeny is subjected to an 
empirical test on the basis of ECHP data. For this purpose, six EU countries 
Table 1.3 Selection of countries 
Welfare state theory and typology of Esping-Andersen
Sources: based on Esping-Andersen, 1990; Kemeny, 2006
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand. Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, United States
Rental system theory and typology of Kemeny Austria, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Switzerland, Germany, Finland, Belgium, Japan, Ireland, 
France, Italy, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada, United States
Chapter 2 The Netherlands
Chapter 6 Spain
Chapter 3 Denmark, Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
France, Italy, Austria, Germany, United Kingdom, 
Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Greece
Chapter 4 Austria, Denmark, The Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, 
United Kingdom
Chapter 5 Two dualist rental systems: United Kingdom and 
Ireland)
Three unitary rental systems: Austria, the Nether-
lands, and Denmark 





that play an important role in Kemeny’s rental system theory and typology 
were selected. 
In Chapter 5, the selection of countries was also largely based on Kemeny’s 
rental system typology. The United Kingdom and Ireland were selected as 
representatives of the dualist rental systems, whereas Austria, the Nether-
lands, and Denmark feature as representatives of the unitary rental systems. 
In addition to these five dualist and unitary rental systems, three Southern 
European countries (not included in the rental system typology) were incor-
porated in the analysis as well. 
The subject of study in Chapters 6 and 7 is restricted to the Southern Euro-
pean housing system of Spain. This country was chosen because it has a very 
dynamic housing system and, along with Italy, it is the largest representative 
of the Mediterranean welfare and housing systems. In addition to this, some 
practical reasons (building on earlier research, speaking the language) made 
it logical to select Spain. 
 1.5 Introduction to the articles and relation with 
other work 
 1.5.1  Introduction
In the first part of this section, the six articles of the book are briefly summa-
rized and related to the objectives and the research questions of the thesis. 
The second part of this section embeds these articles within the broader body 
of international comparative housing research that I have carried out since 
I started working at the OTB Research Institute for the Built Environment in 
1998. 
 1.5.2 Introduction to the articles
Chapter 2 relates the theoretical framework of Esping-Andersen to the field of 
housing policy (research question 1).
Chapter 2:  Housing and the welfare state in the Netherlands: an applica  
tion of Esping-Andersen’s typology 
              (Housing, Theory and Society, 2003, 20 (1), pp. 58-71)
In this article, three ideal typical housing policy regimes (social-democratic, 
corporatist, liberal) are deductively derived from Esping-Andersen’s welfare 
state regime typology. Subsequently, this housing regime typology is used to 
interpret the changes in Dutch housing policies in the 1980s and 1990s. Based 
on the results of the analyses, an adaptation of the Esping-Andersen frame-
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work is finally proposed. 
Chapters 3 to 5 attempt to assess to what extent the theories and typologies 
of Esping-Andersen and Kemeny offer a good explanation for the differenc-
es between countries with regard to measurable housing outcomes (tenure, 
dwelling type, housing quality, characteristics of tenants, rent levels, housing 
satisfaction). 
Chapter 3:   Is there a connection between welfare state regime and 
dwelling type? An exploratory statistical analysis
              (Housing Studies, 2005, 20 (3), pp.475-495)
This article investigates whether respectively single-family dwellings and 
apartments have a different ‘function’ (different characteristics and a differ-
ent appreciation) in different welfare state regimes. As such, the article at-
tempts to test a hypothesis of Kemeny, who states that the proportion of sin-
gle-family dwellings as against apartments is strongly connected to the socio-
spatial organization of society and the features of the welfare system. 
Chapter 4:  Two types of rental system? An empirical exploratory test of 
Kemeny’s rental system typology
              (Urban Studies, 2009, 46 (1), pp. 45-61)
In this exploratory paper, Kemeny’s rental system typology (see Table 1.2) is 
tested against empirical housing data from the European Community House-
hold Panel (ECHP). Doing so, the paper looks at aspects such as housing qual-
ity, income distribution of tenants, and rent levels. Three presumed unitary 
rental systems and three presumed dualist rental systems are included in the 
analysis. 
Chapter 5:   Home ownership and housing satisfaction 
              (Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 2005, 20 (4), pp.   
              401-424) Co-author: Marja Elsinga
This paper explores the relationship between tenure and housing satisfac-
tion, corrected for housing quality and other relevant variables. Three types 
of countries were selected for analysis: countries with a dualist rental system; 
countries with a unitary rental system; and the Southern European EU coun-
tries. For each group of countries, a hypothesis was formulated and tested. 
This paper is a joint product of Marja Elsinga and myself. Marja wrote most of 
the theoretical framework of the paper, whereas I was responsible for carry-
ing out, and reporting on, the analysis of the ECHP data. 
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Chapters 6 and 7 show how the specific characteristics of the Mediterranean 
welfare and housing systems express themselves in the housing policies and 
the functioning of the housing market. In both chapters, this is illustrated by 
focusing on the Spanish case. 
Chapter 6:  Recent changes in Spanish housing policies: subsidized own-
er-occupancy dwellings as a new tenure sector?
              (Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 2005, 25 (1), pp.   
              125-138)
              Co-authors: Iñaki Heras Saizarbitoria and Aitziber Etxezarreta   
              Etxarri
This paper shows that the peculiar features of the Spanish housing system 
(preference for homeownership, affordability problems for lower- and middle-
income groups,) give rise to specific policy initiatives: subsidized homeowner-
ship dwellings rather than social rental dwellings. In principle, Spanish subsi-
dized owner-occupancy housing maintains its special status for a set number 
of years, during which time it cannot be sold against market prices. Howev-
er, in order to prevent speculation, some Spanish regions now consider sub-
sidized owner-occupancy housing as a separate and permanent tenure cat-
egory rather than as a temporal subsidy arrangement. The background and 
the possible implications of this new policy perspective are discussed. While 
I have written most of the text of this paper, my co-authors provided a sub-
stantial part of the information on Spanish housing policies. 
Chapter 7:   High vacancy rates and rising house prices: the Spanish paradox
              (Accepted in Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geografie)
              Co-author: Cyrus Vakili-Zad
Until very recently, Spain was characterized by strongly rising house prices 
as well as by a long-lasting high vacancy rate. Since at first sight, this contra-
dicts basic economic theory, we have called this ‘the Spanish paradox’. This 
paper explores this paradox from a welfare regime perspective. While the idea 
for the study was proposed by Cyrus Vakili-Zad, I have taken the lead in writ-
ing and developing the article. 
 1.5.3 Relation with other work
The articles included in this thesis are framed within the research program 
of the OTB theme group ‘Housing Institutions and Governance’, of which I am 
a member. The research of this group focuses on the institutions that consti-
tute housing systems, the way housing systems are governed, and the out-
comes of housing systems. Many research projects in the theme group are in-
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ternationally comparative. The OTB Research Institute for the Built Environ-
ment has a long tradition in international comparative housing research. It 
started in with a seminal book on housing policies in seven European coun-
tries (Boelhouwer and Van der Heijden, 1992). In the opinion of the theme 
group, comparing housing systems contributes to better understanding, to 
theory-building, and to societal debate on solutions for current housing prob-
lems. 
Table 1.4 gives an overview of the publications and papers that I have pro-
duced within the research program and that are directly related to the chap-
ters of this thesis. The table shows how the articles comprising the thesis are 
embedded in a broader body of international comparative research. This rela-
tionship is further amplified below. 
Chapter 2 is the spin-off of a research project that was started in 1999 by 
Agnes Reitsma and that I took over in 2000 when Agnes left OTB. The aim of 
this project was to investigate the relationship between the welfare system 
and the housing system in both the Netherlands and Belgium. Besides the 
article that is included in this thesis, the project resulted in a scientific book 
in Dutch, two Dutch articles, and a conference paper (see Table 1.4).
Chapter 3 was initially a conference paper but became the basis for Chapter 
3 and for a chapter in an edited volume. The latter contribution focuses not 
only on the relationship between welfare state regime and dwelling type but 
also on the relationship between welfare state regime and tenure. The book 
chapter has not been included in the thesis because of the considerable over-
lap with the content of Chapter 3. However, the main findings of that book 
chapter with regard to the relationship between welfare state regime and ten-
ure are summarized here in Chapter 8 (Subsection 8.3.1). 
Chapter 4 is an expanded developed version of a conference paper that I 
presented at the ENHR conference in Iceland in 2005. 
Chapter 5 is the spin-off of a research project that Marja Elsinga and I car-
ried out for the Dutch Council for Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environ-
ment (VROM-raad). The aim of this project was to gain insight into the mean-
ing of homeownership in different countries. Apart from generating Chap-
ter 5, this project also resulted in a Dutch report and a conference paper (see 
Table 1.4). 
Chapter 6 describes the specific characteristics of Spanish housing poli-
cies. In particular, it focuses on subsidized homeownership dwellings in the 
autonomous region Basque country. I wrote this article together with Iñaki 
Heras Saizarbitoria and Aitziber Etxezarreta Etxarri, two researchers from 
the Basque country. As country experts, they were of tremendous help when 
I carried out contract research on Spanish housing policies (see below). Ear-
lier versions of Chapter 6 have been published as a Dutch professional publi-
cation and a conference paper. My ‘Basque connection’ also made it possible 
to visit the Basque Institute of Competitiveness in San Sebastian as a guest 
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researcher (in January and April 2008) in order to carry out research on the 
regional development of the Basque country (together with Evert Meijers). The 
latter project resulted in several publications, among which an international 
journal article (Table 1.4). 
The idea for Chapter 7 was launched by Cyrus Vakili-Zad, who visited OTB 
in November 2005 to discuss the characteristics of the Mediterranean welfare 
and housing systems with me. During our discussions, we observed that var-
ious Mediterranean housing systems are characterized by both rising house 
prices and high vacancy rates, which is at odds with basic economic theo-
Table 1.4 Work in which the articles in this thesis are directly embedded 
2 • Hoekstra, J.S.C.M. and A.A. Reitsma (2002), De zorg voor het wonen. Volkshuisvesting en   
verzorgingsstaat in Nederland en België [The care for housing. Housing and the welfare   
state in the Netherlands and Belgium], Volkshuisvestingsbeleid en Woningmarkt 33, Delft:   
DUP Science.
• Hoekstra, J. (2002), Housing and the Welfare State in the Netherlands. An application of   
Esping-Andersen's theory, paper for the ENHR 2002 conference in Vienna, Austria. 
• Hoekstra, J. (2002), Over verschil en convergentie in beleid. Een vergelijking tussen de   
Nederlandse en Belgische (Vlaamse) volkshuisvesting [About difference and convergence in   
policies. A comparison between the Dutch and the Belgian housing system], Ruimte en   
Planning, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 304-317.
• Hoekstra, J. (2002), De zorg voor het wonen. Esping-Andersen’s theorie toegepast op de   
Nederlandse volkshuisvesting [The care for housing. Esping-Andersen’s theory applied to   
the Dutch housing system], Tijdschrift voor de Volkshuisvesting, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 58-64
3 • Hoekstra, J. and R. Goetgeluk (2003), Is there a connection between welfare state regime and      
dwelling type?, paper for the IAPS/ENHR/KTH 2003 conference ‘Methodologies in   
Housing Research’, Stockholm, Sweden. 
• Hoekstra, J.S.C.M. (2005), Connecting welfare state regimes, tenure categories and dwelling type. In 
Urban Vestbrø. D. Hürol Y. and N. Wilkinson (Eds.), Methodologies in housing research (pp. 
222-239), Gateshead, Tyna and Wear (UK): Urban International Press.
4 • Hoekstra, J. (2005) Rental Systems in the European Union. An empirical test of Kemeny's rental 
system typology, paper for the ENHR 2005 conference in Reykjavik, Iceland. 
5 • Elsinga, M. and J. Hoekstra (2004), De betekenis van eigenwoningbezit [The meaning of homeown-
ership], Den Haag: VROM-raad.
• Elsinga, M. and J. Hoekstra (2004), Homeownership and housing satisfaction: a study of the 
literature and an analysis of the European Community Household Panel. Paper for the ENHR 2004 
conference in Cambridge (UK). 
6 • Hoekstra, J. and I. Heras Saizarbitoria (2007), Recent changes in Spanish housing policies: 
subsidized owner-occupancy dwellings as a new tenure sector?, paper for the ENHR 2007 confer-
ence in Rotterdam, the Netherlands.
• Hoekstra, J. (2005), Een Spaanse gesubsidieerde koopwoning: een lot uit de loterij [Getting a 
Spanish subsidized homeownership dwelling: it is like winning the lottery] Tijdschrift voor de 
Volkshuisvesting, Vol. 11, No. 5, pp. 36-41.
• Meijers, E., J. Hoekstra and R. Aguado (2008), Strategic planning for city networks: The emergence of 
a Basque global city? International Planning Studies, Vol. 13, No.3, pp. 239-259.
7 • Hoekstra, J. and C.V. Vakili-Zad (2006), High vacancy rates and high house prices. A Mediterranean 
paradox, paper for the ENHR 2006 conference in Ljubljana, Slovenia.  
Related workChapter
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ry. We decided to write a joint conference paper about this topic, using Spain 
and Malta as case studies. Based on this conference paper, we eventually 
wrote two journal contributions: an article on Spain (Chapter 7 of this thesis) 
and one on Malta that is still under review by a journal at the time of writing. 
Related international comparative research on housing policies
Table 1.4 gives an overview of the publications in which the articles in this 
thesis are directly embedded. In addition to these publications, I have also 
conducted some international comparative research that is indirectly related 
to this PhD project. Together with my colleagues from the theme group ‘Hous-
ing Institutions and Governance’, I have collected a great deal of information 
on housing policies. The publications in which these studies have resulted are 
presented in Table 1.5. Below are some comments on the content of this table. 
In 2004, in a project commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Mari-
etta Haffner and I carried out an international comparison of housing alloca-
tion systems in six European countries (the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Ire-
land, Italy, and the United Kingdom). This project resulted in a Dutch report, 
an international journal article, and a Dutch professional publication. 
Some years later, I took part in an international comparative study commis-
sioned by the Flemish government. A team of Flemish and OTB researchers 
analyzed the policies towards the market rental sector in six European coun-
tries: Belgium, Germany, France, Spain, the Netherlands, and the United King-
dom. This project also resulted in a Dutch report, an international journal 
article, and a Dutch professional publication. 
Because these two projects have generated a wealth of information on 
housing policies and housing market developments in different European 
countries, a team of researchers at OTB decided to start an in-depth project 
on the differences between the social and market rental sectors in six Euro-
Table 1.5 Related international comparative research on housing policies
• Haffner, M.E.A. and J.S.C.M. Hoekstra (2004), Woonruimteverdeling in Europese context [Housing allocation in 
a European context], Delft: Onderzoeksinstituut OTB
• Haffner, M.E.A, and J. Hoekstra (2005), Nederlandse woonruimteverdeling in Europees perspectief [Dutch 
housing allocation in European perspective], Ruimte en Planning, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 74-83. 
• Haffner, M.E.A. and J.S.C.M. Hoekstra (2006), Housing allocation and freedom of movement: A European 
comparison. Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, Vol. 97, No. 4, pp. 443-451.
• Elsinga, M, M. Haffner, J. Hoekstra, P. Vandenbroucke, E. Buyst and S. Winters (2007), Beleid voor de private 
huur: een vergelijking van zes landen [Policies for the private rental sector: a comparison of six countries] 
Brussel: Ministerie van de Vlaamse Gemeenschap, Departement Ruimtelijke Ordening, Woonbeleid en 
Onroerend Erfgoed.
• Haffner, M., M. Elsinga and J. Hoekstra (2008), Rent regulation: the balance between private landlords and 
tenants in six European countries, European Journal of Housing Policy, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 217-233.
• Haffner, M., J. Hoekstra, M. Oxley and H. van der Heijden (2009), Substitutability between social and market 
renting in four European countries, European Journal of Housing Policy, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 241-258.
• Haffner, M., M. Elsinga and J. Hoekstra (2009), Huurregulering vanuit de welvaartseconomie ontleed [Rent 
regulation analyzed from the perspective of welfare economics], Tijdschrift voor de Volkshuisvesting, Vol. 15, No. 
1, pp. 43-48.
• Haffner, M., J. Hoekstra, M. Oxley and H. van der Heijden (2009), Bridging the gap between social and market 
rented housing in six European countries?, Housing and Urban Policy Studies 33, Amsterdam: IOS Press.
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pean countries (the Netherlands, Flanders, Germany, United Kingdom, Ire-
land, France). This project was funded by the Dutch government through the 
Habiforum Program for Innovative Land Use and by Delft University of Tech-
nology through the Delft Center for Sustainable Urban Areas. It resulted in an 
international edited book and an international journal article. 
The information on housing policies that was collected in these research 
projects served as a context in which to interpret the differences in housing 
outcomes that arise from the six substantive chapters comprising this thesis. 
Looking ahead, I am planning to relate the available international compara-
tive information on housing policies to the typologies of Esping-Andersen 
and Kemeny in a more extensive manner. 
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 2  Housing and the welfare 
state in the Netherlands
  An application of Esping-Ander-
sen’s typology
Joris Hoekstra, 2003, Housing, Theory and Society 20 (1): 58-71. Reprinted with per-
mission of Taylor & Francis.
Abstract
Esping-Andersen’s theory and typology of the welfare state have been wide-
ly discussed in international comparative housing research. Most of the de-
bate has been theoretical in nature; empirical applications of the theoretical 
framework are rare. We have therefore applied Esping-Andersen’s typology to 
the housing system of the Netherlands. The results of this research project 
are described in this contribution.
The paper starts with an outline of the theoretical background of the research 
project. There follows a description of Esping-Andersen’s theory of the welfare 
state, with its typology of three welfare state regimes. This typology is reinter-
preted for the field of housing. The resulting scheme of analysis shows how var-
ious welfare state regimes differ on some important housing system aspects. 
The scheme of analysis is applied to the housing system of the Netherlands. 
Several relevant aspects of this system, such as the organisation of housing 
provision, subsidisation, and rent regulation, are analysed. For each of these 
aspects, the welfare state regime with which it can be best linked is determined. 
Two epochs are analysed: the 1980s and the 1990s. Consequently, the develop-
ment in time of the housing system in the Netherlands can be described.
Some general conclusions are drawn concerning the applicability of Esping-
Andersen’s typology of welfare states to the field of housing. We propose a 
possible modification of this theoretical framework and outline some direc-
tions for future research. 
Key words: welfare state regimes, Esping-Andersen, comparative housing research, 
the Netherlands
 2.1  Introduction
Esping-Andersen’s welfare state theory and typology have attracted 
considerable attention in international comparative housing research. Various 
researchers have discussed the position of housing within the welfare state 
in general and within Esping-Andersen’s framework in particular1. Most of 
the debate, however, has been at a conceptual or theoretical level. Esping-
1 See Brandsen (2001), Doling (1999), Harloe (1995), Kemeny (1992, 1995, 2001), Kemeny and Lowe (1998), 
Kleinman (1996), and Matznetter (2002).
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Andersen’s work has rarely been tested, or directly related to housing 
practices. One exception is the study by Barlow and Duncan (1994), who 
relate the Esping-Andersen typology to housing production in the United 
Kingdom, France and Sweden. Another exception is the research of Domburg-
De Rooij and Musterd (2002), investigating the relationship between welfare 
state regimes2 and segregation. Nevertheless, these researchers all focus 
on specific elements of the housing system (the production of newly built 
dwellings, segregation), and not on the housing system as a whole3.
The lack of empirical application of Esping-Andersen’s theoretical frame-
work within housing research probably results from the nature of this frame-
work on the one hand, and the characteristics of housing on the other. Hous-
ing is not considered in the Esping-Andersen welfare state theory and typol-
ogy. As a consequence, whatever it might have to say about housing systems 
is not clear. Moreover, the position of housing within the welfare state is far 
from obvious and has provoked a good deal of discussion. Some authors (for 
example Kemeny 1992, 2001) focus on the entanglement between the housing 
system and the welfare state, while others predominantly stress the private 
market characteristics of housing (Harloe, 1995). 
In this article we concur with the vision of Kemeny and we assume that 
the housing system is an essential part of the welfare state. This point of 
departure implies that Esping-Andersen’s theoretical framework can be used 
to explain and interpret developments within this housing system. Since 
we thought that some empirical evidence of the applicability of Esping-
Andersen’s typology would contribute to the theoretical debate, we have 
applied this particular typology to the housing systems of the Netherlands 
and Belgium (Hoekstra and Reitsma, 2002). The findings of this research 
project are outlined in this paper, with the restriction that only the results for 
the Netherlands are discussed. The article consists of eight sections (besides 
this introduction):
▪ Section 2.2 gives an outline of the theoretical background of the research 
project. Esping-Andersen’s welfare state theory, with its typology of three 
welfare state regimes, is briefly discussed.
▪ In Section 2.3, the Esping-Andersen typology is reinterpreted for the field 
of housing. The resulting scheme of analysis shows how the three welfare 
state regimes differ on some important aspects of the housing system.
▪ In Sections 2.4 and 2.5, this scheme is applied to the housing system of the 
2 The typology of welfare states used by Domburg-De Rooij and Musterd differs from that of Esping-Andersen. 
3 Following Bourne (1981), we define housing system as follows: “ … an imprecise, but nevertheless convenient 
expression encompassing the full range of interrelationships between all the actors (individual and corporate), 
housing units, and institutions involved in the production, consumption, and regulation of housing. The term 
housing system is thus much broader than housing market or housing sector.”
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Netherlands. A distinction is drawn between two epochs: the 1980s (Sec-
tion 2.4), and the 1990s (Section 2.5). The development in time of the Dutch 
housing system is described.
▪ In Section 2.6, some conclusions drawn concerning the applicability of Esp-
ing-Andersen’s typology are presented.
▪ In Section 2.7, a possible modification of the theoretical framework is pro-
posed (based on the analysis of the Dutch housing system in Sections 2.4 to 
2.6).
▪ In Section 2.8, the modified theoretical framework is generalised with 
respect to the welfare state as a whole.
▪ In Section 2.9, some possible directions for further research are outlined.
 2.2  The theory and typology of Esping-Andersen
According to Esping-Andersen, one should not speak of the welfare state, 
since different welfare states have different characteristics. Esping-Andersen 
argues that welfare states can be reduced to three ideal typical welfare state 
regimes, which differ fundamentally from each other. This has resulted in his 
well-known and widely used typology of welfare state regimes.
In his theory of welfare state regimes, Esping-Andersen explains how 
the differences between the three welfare regime types came about. As far 
as this is concerned, three factors were of particular importance: the way 
in which the mobilisation of the working class took place; the coalitions 
between the political parties; popular support for the conservation and 
expansion of the welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990). In this article, the 
welfare state typology of Esping-Andersen is used as a point of departure. It 
is investigated whether this typology is also applicable to the housing system 
of the Netherlands, which we see as a crucial part of the Dutch welfare state. 
The power relations and class coalitions within the Dutch housing system 
are not profoundly analysed (although Section 2.7 briefly pays attention to 
this issue). Consequently, the welfare state theory in itself is not tested and 
thus largely remains unproblematised. For the moment, we assume that the 
processes that underlie the Dutch welfare state as a whole (these processes 
are explained in Esping-Andersen, 1990) also apply to the Dutch housing 
system (but this issue definitely merits further research).
Furthermore, it’s important to recognise that the Esping-Andersen typol-
ogy is of ideal typical nature. Most countries will only to some extent cor-
respond to the welfare regime they are classified in (see for example Kvist, 
1999). Therefore, the typology should not be seen as an exhaustive classifica-
tion system. Rather, it is an analytical device that can be used to interpret dif-
ferences in welfare systems between countries.
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Three welfare state regimes
The typology of Esping-Andersen makes a distinction between three welfare 
state regimes. Below, the most important characteristics of these three regime 
types are briefly discussed. We identify some countries belonging to each of 
the regime types. As far as this is concerned, the Netherlands is a hybrid case. 
According to Esping-Andersen, the Dutch welfare state has both social-demo-
cratic and corporatist characteristics.
In social-democratic welfare state regimes, the provision of welfare services 
is dominated by the State. There are universal welfare services of a high level, 
to which a large proportion of the population has access. As a result of the re-
distributive effects of the welfare state, income differences are relatively low. 
Sweden is the classic example of a social-democratic welfare state, although 
other Scandinavian countries also belong to this regime type.
In corporatist welfare state regimes, the State is fairly active in the provi-
sion of welfare services. However, this does not lead to income redistribution, 
since preservation of the existing hierarchy in society is the starting-point for 
welfare polices at State level. Consequently, the welfare provision is segment-
ed; different groups are entitled to different welfare services and the tradi-
tional family is often explicitly favoured. Furthermore, the State is definitely 
not the only provider of welfare services. In this respect, the family and pri-
vate non-profit organisations (churches, trade unions, and so forth) also play 
an important part. Austria, Germany, Italy and Belgium are representative 
corporatist welfare state regimes.
The liberal welfare state regime is characterised by little State interfer-
ence and a strong market orientation. Private companies are responsible for 
the majority of the welfare services. The State only provides help for a limit-
ed group of people with really low incomes (safety net). As a result, the soci-
ety is characterised by dualism. There is equality (but also poverty) under the 
recipients of state welfare, while there is differentiation in income in the rest 
of the society. The United States, Australia and, to a lesser extent, the United 
Kingdom and Ireland represent liberal welfare state regimes.
 2.3  The welfare state typology applied to 
  housing
Esping-Andersen discriminates between the three welfare state regimes on 
the basis of three (strongly interrelated) criteria: de-commodification; strat-
ification; the arrangements between State, market, and family. In this sec-
tion, these three criteria are applied to housing and translated into four spe-
cific housing aspects, which are expected to cover an important part of the 
housing system. Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between Esping-Andersen’s 
three criteria and the four aspects of the housing system to which they have 
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been converted.
It should be noted that the fiscal treatment of housing, which is particular-
ly relevant for owner-occupiers, is not included in Figure 2.1. There are three 
main reasons for this. First of all, the fiscal policies are formulated and car-
ried out by the ministry of finance. Consequently, they are not part of the 
housing policies that come under the ministry of housing and spatial plan-
ning. Second, it is very difficult to assess whether certain fiscal regulations 
are subsidies or not. This all depends on the definitions and benchmarks 
that are used (Haffner, 1999). Third, the effects of fiscal regulations can only 
be adequately interpreted within the context of the whole tax system. As a 
result of this, a sound analysis of the fiscal treatment of housing would be 
very labour-intensive.
De-commodification
When applied to housing, de-commodification can be defined as the extent 
to which households can provide their own housing, independent of the in-
come they acquire on the labour market. Thus, governmental interference4 
is involved with the price of housing and with household incomes. The wel-
fare state can decommodify housing not only via price regulation and pro-
duction subsidies (affecting the price of housing), but also via subject subsi-
disation, which influences the household income (Lundqvist, 1991). The lat-
ter can involve both general income support (pensions, unemployment ben-
4  It should be noted that the State is not the only actor responsible for de-commodification, since the family can 
also have de-commodifying effects. However, following Esping-Andersen, we focus on the de-commodification 
caused by the State.













efits) and subject subsidies that are specific to the field of housing. In the re-
search project, we have restricted ourselves to the last category. Thus, the de-
commodification is translated into the following two housing aspects: hous-
ing subsidisation (both object and subject subsidies), and price regulation.
Stratification
The welfare state is a system of stratification; the way in which the welfare 
state distributes welfare services has consequences for the hierarchy in soci-
ety. In this respect, a distinction can be drawn between economic stratifica-
tion and social stratification. Economic stratification refers to income distri-
bution within a society, whereas social stratification is related to differenc-
es in social status. Social stratification can be related to economic factors (in-
come) but also to non-economic factors such as ancestry, or occupation. In 
the field of housing, stratification is reflected in the process of housing al-
location. Without State interference, housing allocation could be expected to 
be a direct reflection of the economic stratification in a society; households 
with the most resources would obtain the best and most expensive houses. 
However, the State is able to regulate the housing allocation process. Certain 
groups can be favoured by applying allocation rules. These State interventions 
can have different objectives. They can aim at increasing choice for low-in-
come groups, but also at the preservation of status differentials. 
The State, market, and family mix 
Welfare services can be provided by the State (or public sector), but also by 
the market or the family (or household sector). The differences between State, 
market and family are connected with the so-called ‘decision units’ and the 
way the decisions are coordinated (Priemus, 1983). For the State, the deci-
sion units are public bodies, for the market suppliers and buyers and for the 
household sector small groups (households, families, friends, associations). 
Every sector is characterised by a specific kind of coordination of decisions. 
Public bodies are responsible for the decisions that are taken in the public 
sector (supported by laws or regulations), while the coordination of decisions 
in the market sector takes place on the basis of the ‘market-mechanism’ 
(with the price as an important point of orientation). In the household sector, 
the co-ordination of decisions occurs without financial transactions and pric-
es, often on the basis of reciprocity.
It has to be noted, however, that the abovementioned trichotomy between 
State, market and family refers to an ideal typical situation. In reality there 
are many graduations and mixes, both with regard to the decision units and 
the co-ordination of decisions. First of all, it is obvious that the decision units 
in the State and the household sector frequently enter the market (mostly as 
buyers but sometimes also as suppliers). On the other hand, nowhere in the 
world there is a totally free market; every market is subject to government 
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regulations and has some informal aspects. Eventually, it is important to real-
ise that there are decisions units that don’t properly fit within one of the 
three sectors. In virtually every country, there are institutions that combine 
private (household sector and market) and public (state) interests and tasks. 
The Dutch housing associations are a good example of such institutions.
The relationships between State, market and family determine which wel-
fare services are provided, how they are distributed, and for which groups 
they are destined. In other words, the mix between State, market, and fam-
ily is decisive for the de-commodification and stratification in a country. 
Although Esping-Andersen is not explicit on this matter, we assume that the 
mix between State, market and family is superior to the de-commodification 
and the stratification. The specific configuration between State, market and 
family in a certain society then represents the essence of the welfare state. 
The implication is that the criteria discussed earlier in this section are in fact 
all influenced by this configuration. The most direct influence can be seen in 
the organisation of the production of newly built dwellings and the way in 
which actors from the public, market, and household sectors participate in 
this process.
Towards a scheme of analysis
We hypothesised that the four housing aspects in Figure 2.1 differentiate be-
tween the three welfare state regimes. The hypothesis led to the scheme of 
analysis (see Table 2.1), which we applied to the housing system of the Neth-
erlands. The scheme of analysis was deductively constructed on the basis of 
the welfare state typology of Esping-Andersen5. This implies that the scheme 
is of an ideal typical nature; when constructing the scheme, developments 
that are specific for a particular country, (like for example the pillarisation 
in the Netherlands) were not taken into account. Accordingly, the scheme 
should be considered as a mere analytical device that can be used to make 
sense of empirical country data on housing. The scheme solely applies to the 
national level. It does not reckon with territorial differences within a certain 
country. 
When applying the scheme to the housing system of the Netherlands, a 
distinction between the 1980s and the 1990s is made. According to Esping-
Andersen, a country’s future development depends largely on the welfare 
state regime type to which it adheres. It is interesting to evaluate how the 
Dutch housing system has developed over a longer time period against that 
background.
5 A more detailed underpinning of this deductive process can be found in Hoekstra and Reitsma, 2002.
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 2.4  The Dutch housing system in the 1980s
Table 2.2 shows how the Dutch housing system of the 1980s scores on the 
four housing variables into which the Esping-Andersen typology has been 
Table 2.1 Differences between the housing systems of the three welfare state regimes
Social-democratic
•  Large
•  Relatively low 
•  Dominant position of 
the State
• Strong central govern-
ment influence
• Guaranteed universal 
high level of housing 
quality
• Large–scale production 
subsidies
• Subject subsidies for 
large target groups
• Strong State influence on 
price setting and price 
regulation
•  Allocation on the basis 
of need
• Strict spatial planning
• State takes initiative for 





Mix of State, market and 
family
State regulation
General housing policy 
objectives
Subsidisation






• Quite large 
• High, mainly based on 
social status
• Important position for 
the family
• Considerable influence 





• Preservation of the social 
stratification in society 
• Preferential treatment of 
the traditional family 
• Stimulation of 
households and other 
private actors to take 
initiatives on the housing 
market
• Segmented subsidies; 
specific arrangements for 
specific groups
• Moderate State influence
• State regulation of prices 
to correct negative 
effects of the market
• State intervention to 
correct the market
• Certain groups may be 
favoured in the allocation 
process 
• Moderately strict spatial 
planning 
• Private actors 
(households, small 
companies) take the 
initiative for the 




• High, mainly based on 
income
• Dominant position of 
market parties
• Relatively little State 
regulation (at both 
central and local levels)
• Dominant position for 
the market
• State only supports 
marginal groups
• Means-tested subject 
subsidies
• Few production subsidies
• Market determination of 
house prices
• Market determination of 
housing allocation in a 
large part of the housing 
stock
• Regulated allocation in a 
small part of the housing 
stock. (reserved for 
low-income groups)
• No strict spatial planning
• Private actors (mainly big 
companies) take the 
initiative for the 
production newly built 
houses
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translated. The scoring has been based on an analysis of relevant policy doc-
uments and textbooks (notably Van der Schaar, 1991). Although the infor-
mation in Table 2.2 is only indicative6, the conclusion that the Dutch hous-
ing system of the 1980s had mainly social-democratic and corporatist traits 
seems to be justified. 
Social-democratic characteristics
The social-democratic traits of the Dutch housing system in the 1980s relate 
closely to the subsidisation of the rented sector (both social and private rent-
al). To reduce the post-war housing shortages, the State was eager to promote 
the production of newly built housing. Object subsidies (DKP-subsidies) were 
therefore provided on a large scale, with the aim of accelerating the produc-
tion of rented dwellings. In addition, households with lower incomes could 
6 The table only gives indicative information, because:
▪ only a limited number of elements of the four housing aspects are considered.
▪ not all the elements of the four housing aspects are of equal importance: this is not taken into account in the 
interpretation.
▪ relating housing aspects to welfare state regimes involves subjective choices in any case.
Table 2.2 The Dutch housing system in the 1980s, linked to the typology of Esping-Andersen
Social-democratic
• Large-scale object 
subsidies for the 
production of rental 
dwellings (DKP-subsidies)
• Subject subsidies for a 
large group of tenants 
(huursubsidie) 
• State determination of 
the initial rent levels of 
subsidized newly built 
rental dwellings
• State determination of 
the development of rent 
for all rented dwellings 
(trendhuurbeleid)
• Detailed land-use plans
• Production of newly built 
subsidised rental 
dwellings initiated by the 
State 
• Allocation of rental 





Price setting and price 
regulation
Organisation production 
of newly built houses
Allocation housing stock
Corporatist




• Indirect State influence 
on price setting of newly 
built owner-occupied 
houses 
• Local anti-speculative 
policies 
• Indirect influence exerted 
by the State on the 
production of newly built 
owner-occupied houses 
• Settlement in another 
municipality only 
possible if there are 
social and/or economic 
ties (not applicable in all 
local authorities)
Liberal
• Existing owner-occupied 
houses sold at market 
prices (if this is not 
prevented by local 
anti-speculative policies)






apply for subject subsidies. Although these kinds of subsidies are usually con-
sidered characteristic of liberal welfare state regimes (Doling, 1999, p. 161), the 
target group for the Dutch huursubsidie (rent subsidy) was so large, classifying 
this instrument as social-democratic seems more appropriate.
The strong State influences in the rented sector also limited the autono-
my with respect to pricing policy of the landlords (housing associations, com-
munities, or private landlords). The State determined the initial rent levels of 
the new rented dwellings built with the help of objectsubsidies (price setting). 
Moreover, by means of the trendhuurbeleid (trend in rent policy), the State also 
dictated the development of rents in the existing rental housing stock (both 
social rented and private rented).
The spatial planning was also typical of a social democratic welfare state. 
Local land-use plans (bestemmingsplannen) used strict zoning, and residential 
development was only possible in a limited number of areas. In the rented 
sector, the passendheidscriteria7 (suitability criteria) were applied in the process 
of housing allocation. Rented dwellings were (at least partly) allocated on the 
basis of need: large dwellings for large households, ground floor dwellings for 
the elderly, and so forth. Such a method of housing allocation can be consid-
ered typical of a social-democratic welfare state.
Corporatist characteristics
In the 1980s, the influence of the Dutch government was again substantial in 
the owner-occupied sector. The premium house purchase regulations (premie-
koopregelingen) were of great importance. Within the framework of these reg-
ulations, premiums were granted to certain buyers of new owner-occupied 
houses. Households were eligible for such premiums if certain conditions re-
garding the price of the house and the income of the household were met. 
The premiekoopregelingen, which were intended to facilitate access to the own-
er-occupied sector, can be considered typical of a corporatist welfare state re-
gime. They were aimed at a specific group (new house buyers with an average 
income) and had a specific goal (making the owner-occupied sector accessi-
ble to average-income households). Because of their competitive position and 
the explicit stimulation exerted by the central government’s housing policy, 
building contractors had an interest in building houses at prices below the 
premiekoopregelingen price levels. Thus, by means of the premiekoopregelingen, 
the government actually exerted an indirect influence on the production and 
price setting of newly built owner-occupied dwellings. Such an indirect man-
ner of State control is characteristic of a corporatist welfare state regime.
Other corporatist elements are to be found in the housing allocation at the 
municipal level (which households were allowed to settle in a certain com-
7 In the private rental sector these criteria were usually less strict than in the social rented sector.
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munity?). Households wanting to settle in a certain community could be 
asked to verify their social or economic ties to the community concerned8. 
These demands were set to preserve existing local communities – a feature 
of a corporatist welfare state regime. Finally, it can be noted that some local 
authorities applied anti-speculative policies. Given their nature (formulat-
ed at a local level, problem solving, focused at correcting the negative effects 
of the market), we have linked these policies to the corporatist welfare state 
regime.
Liberal characteristics
The Dutch housing system of the 1980s contained relatively few liberal as-
pects. When no anti-speculative policies were in operation, the price develop-
ment of existing owner-occupied houses was regulated by the market, a situ-
ation that can be interpreted as liberal. Similarly, the market determined the 
housing allocation of non-subsidised newly built owner-occupied dwellings or 
existing owner-occupied dwellings (irrespective of any earlier subsidisation).
 2.5  The Dutch housing system in the 1990s
Table 2.3 links the Dutch housing system of the 1990s to the Esping-Andersen 
typology. If we compare Table 2.3 with Table 2.2, the substantial changes oc-
curring between the 1980s and the 1990s become clear. Many social-dem-
ocratic elements disappeared, while the corporatist characteristics grew 
stronger. This change is related to changes in the national housing policy. The 
introduction in 1989 of the policy document Volkshuisvesting in de jaren negen-
tig (Housing in the 1990s) marked a major policy turn. Decentralisation, in-
dependence and deregulation were central concepts in this document. Since 
1989, the direct involvement of central government with the housing system 
has declined and local government authorities and private non-profit organ-
isations such as housing associations now have more freedom and responsi-
bility, including in financial respects (decentralisation). The role of the State 
has moved from direct governance to indirect governance. The State now 
largely confines itself to creating the conditions and formulating the policy 
frameworks within which local government authorities and private actors op-
erate.
Social-democratic characteristics
In the beginning of the 1990s, the long-established large-scale object subsi-
dies for housing production in the rented sector were abolished, as were the 
8 This requirement mainly applied to local authorities in the Randstad.
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premiums for buyers of new owner-occupied houses (premiekoopregelingen). 
With the bruteringsoperatie (clearout of subsidies and loans) of 1995, the gov-
ernment bought out all the outstanding obligations concerning object subsi-
dies. Subject subsidisation continued, however, although the huursubsidie was 
changed in 1997. Since then, the subject subsidies for tenants aim more ex-
plicitly at support for lower-income groups, which can be seen as a devel-
opment in the liberal direction. Nevertheless, linking the current Dutch rent 
subsidy (huursubsidie) to a liberal welfare state regime would be a step too far. 
After all, the target group for these subsidies still amounts to 800,000 house-
holds. Given this large target group, we have continued to associate the rent 
subsidy (huursubsidie) with the social-democratic welfare state regime. Spatial 
planning is another relatively stable aspect of the Dutch housing system. In 
the 1990s this planning was still fairly strict, which can be considered a fea-
ture of a social-democratic welfare state regime.
Corporatist characteristics
The object subsidies of the 1980s (DKP-subsidies) involved a direct money 
transfer from the central government to the builders and landlords of new-
ly built rental houses. As stated above, these subsidies were abolished at the 
beginning of the 1990s. They were replaced by a new kind of subsidisation (in-
volving considerably less money), whereby the central government subsidis-
Table 2.3 The Dutch housing system in the 1990s, linked to the typology of Esping-Andersen
Social-democratic
• Subject subsidies for a 
large group of tenants 
(huursubsidie)
• Detailed land-use plans
Criterion
Subsidisation
Price setting and price 
regulation
Organisation production 
of newly built houses
Allocation housing stock
Corporatist
• Budgeted subsidies for 
local authorities or 
provinces (BWS, BLS, 
ISV)
• Indirect State influence 
on initial prices of new 
rental and owner-
occupied dwellings 
• State definition of the 
framework within which 
landlords can raise rents
• Local anti-speculative 
policies 
• Indirect State influence 
on the production of new 
owner-occupied and 
rental dwellings 
• In principle, free 
settlement in all local 
authorities, but possible 
requirement of social or 
economic ties 
(Huisvestingswet) 
• Allocation of social 
rented dwellings via the 
supply model
Liberal
• No rent regulation for 
more expensive rental 
dwellings 
• Existing owner-occupied 
dwellings sold at market 
prices
• Allocation of new and 
existing owner-occupied 
dwellings via the market
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es funds administered by provinces or local authorities (BWS, BLS and, since 
2000, ISV). In introducing these funds, the central government sought to stim-
ulate initiatives at regional or local levels. Within certain conditions defined 
by the central government, local government authorities were free to decide 
which new housing projects they would subsidise. That is not to say, however, 
that the central government lost all control. It is still the central government 
that defines the policy framework within which local authorities and private 
actors operate. Such an indirect way of exerting influence is typical of a cor-
poratist welfare-State regime.
A similar development can be seen in the price regulation of the rental sec-
tor, where the central government has also moved towards more indirect con-
trol. Nowadays, the central government only determines the maximum rent 
price increase. Under this limit, landlords are free to decide their own rent 
price increases. For the more expensive rental houses, there is no rent regula-
tion at all, which is a liberal characteristic.
With the cutback of the traditional (direct) object subsidies and the 
increased independence of the housing associations, direct central govern-
ment influence on the production of rental dwellings has come to an end. 
Thus, an important social-democratic characteristic of the organisation of the 
production of newly built rental dwellings has disappeared. The influence of 
the central government has moved from direct to indirect. It now has a more 
indirect influence on the production and price setting of both new rental and 
new owner-occupied dwellings through its general policy framework and con-
tinuous consultation with local policymakers.
In the 1990s, Dutch housing allocation retained its corporatist characteris-
tics. Nevertheless, the policy instruments have changed. In 1993, the Huisves-
tingswet was introduced. This Act defines the conditions for settling in a cer-
tain municipality. The Huisvestingswet can be considered a typical corporatist 
instrument. Although non-intervention is the starting-point, when local cir-
cumstances so demand (in the case of restrictive spatial policy), the Act pro-
vides the opportunity to correct the market by demanding social and eco-
nomic ties. Housing allocation in the social rented sector has also been mod-
ified; many local authorities have switched to supply models (the Delft mod-
el, for example)9. At first sight, these supply models seem to have liberal traits 
(households can choose for themselves from the available supply of houses). 
However, this is not a free market situation, since houses are not allocated on 
the basis of supply and demand, but on the basis of rules agreed by the local 
government and the housing associations.
9 These supply models only apply to the social-rented sector. In the private-rental sector, dwellings are still allo-
cated on the basis of the traditional system of waiting lists and income criteria.
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Liberal characteristics
It was pointed out above that landlords are free to determine rent increases 
as long as they do not exceed the maximum set by the central government. 
However, this ceiling only applies to houses with a rent below €565 10. Land-
lords may increase the rents of the more expensive houses in the rental sec-
tor as they so wish. In this respect, rent regulation (or its absence) in the ex-
pensive rental sector can best be linked to the liberal welfare state regime. 
Other liberal elements concern the allocation and (absence of) price regula-
tion for new and existing owner-occupied houses (except in local authorities 
with anti-speculative policies).
 2.6  The relevance of Esping-Andersen’s typo-
logy for Dutch housing
In Section 2.4, Esping-Andersen’s typology was shown to be applicable to the 
Dutch housing system of the 1980s. According to Esping-Andersen, in that pe-
riod the Dutch welfare state had both social-democratic and corporatist traits. 
Table 2.2 demonstrates that this hybrid nature is also visible in the housing 
system. For the 1990s, the application of Esping-Andersen’s typology seems 
more problematic. The analysis (see Section 2.5) shows that the Dutch hous-
ing system lost most of its social-democratic traits in that period and became 
more corporatist in character. If we follow Esping-Andersen’s typology, this 
implies that the Dutch housing system was more conservative in the 1990s 
than it was in the 1980s. Theoretically, this should have resulted in a seg-
mented housing policy aiming to preserve the status differentials in society 
and favouring the traditional family. In reality, however, conservative princi-
ples only play a limited part in Dutch housing policy. There used to be some 
conservative elements in the past (reservation of newly built houses for civ-
il servants, social and economic ties as a precondition for settling in a certain 
municipality, higher subject subsidies for tenants with children), but most 
have now been abolished, or become unimportant. 
Thus, the rise of corporatism in the 1990s should be related to the chang-
ing role of the central government rather than be perceived as a conservative 
phenomenon. From the 1980s to the 1990s, there was a significant reduction 
in the direct influence of the central government on the Dutch housing sys-
tem. The central government switched to a more indirect style of governance 
in which the central government defines the policy frameworks within which 
the local authorities and the private actors operate (functional decentralisa-
tion). 
10 This limit applies to the period July 1, 2002-June 30, 2003.
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Although this new style of governance can certainly be defined as corpo-
ratist (policy is developed in cooperation between central government, local 
authorities, and private actors), it has little to do with conservatism. In 
present-day Dutch society, with its strong individualisation and declining 
church influence, the view that housing policy seeks to preserve the tradi-
tional hierarchy in society cannot be sustained. In short, the corporatism that 
characterised the Dutch housing system in the 1990s does not correspond 
with corporatism as defined by Esping-Andersen. Although the Dutch hous-
ing system of the 1990s may have many corporatist traits, it does not have 
the conservative features of the corporatist welfare state regime described by 
Esping-Andersen. We have therefore distinguished a new kind of corporatism: 
modern corporatism.
 2.7  A proposed modification of the theoretical 
framework
In the previous section it was shown that certain difficulties arise when Esp-
ing-Andersen’s typology is applied to the Dutch housing system of the 1990s. 
These difficulties are mainly related to Esping-Andersen’s definition of the 
corporatist welfare state regime. In this section, we propose a solution for 
these difficulties. In this connection, some of Kemeny’s theoretical concepts 
are discussed. A possible modification of the theoretical framework is pro-
posed on the basis of these concepts.
Kemeny’s view of corporatism
According to Kemeny (1995), Esping-Andersen uses an unusual definition of 
corporatism, since he clearly relates this concept to conservative elements, 
like the preservation of status differentials in society and the preferential 
treatment of the traditional family. In the political sciences, the definition of 
corporatism is more neutral: there, corporatism is a system of co-operation 
and compromise between capital and labour, coordinated by the State. Fol-
lowing this line of thought, Kemeny comes to the following working defini-
tion of corporatism: A system of institutionalised political representation of 
different interest groups that is essentially founded on compromise and ac-
commodation between conflicting power groupings – whether these be based 
on class, religion or ethnicity (Kemeny, 1995, pp. 65-66). Kemeny asserts that, 
when so defined, corporatism applies to corporatist as well as social-demo-
cratic welfare state regimes. He argues that both the continental Europe-
an countries (corporatist welfare state regimes) and the Scandinavian coun-
tries (social-democratic welfare state regimes) are characterised by a political 
structure that is based on corporatism (in the political science definition). In 
the Anglo-Saxon countries on the other hand, there is little political corporat-
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ism and often a dual political system (two main parties). 
According to Kemeny, the Scandinavian and continental European coun-
tries differ from each other in one important aspect: the influence of the 
labour movement in a historical perspective. In Scandinavia, the strong posi-
tion of the labour movement has resulted in a welfare state in which the 
central government has a dominant position and social equality is of great 
importance. Kemeny refers to this as labour-led corporatism. In continental 
Europe, however, the labour movement was less strong. As a result, private 
non-profit organisations played an important part in the provision of wel-
fare services in continental Europe, and the ability to cope on one’s own was 
strongly stimulated. Kemeny refers to welfare states of this kind by the term 
capital-led corporatism (Kemeny, 2001, p. 62). 
A proposed modification of the theoretical framework 
In our view, Kemeny’s visualisation of corporatism can offer a solution for the 
problems mentioned in Section 2.6. If we consider social democracy as a form 
of corporatism, the changes undergone by the Dutch housing system from the 
1980s to the 1990s become less abrupt and unexpected. They were merely ide-
ological changes within a corporatist system. Moreover, Kemeny does not re-
late corporatism to conservative elements. This view supports our concept 
of modern corporatism, which we see as characteristic of the Dutch housing 
system of the 1990s.
Following Kemeny’s ideas suggests, however, that the political structure 
criterion should have an important position in the theoretical framework. 
Kemeny’s distinction drawn between liberal and corporatist (labour-led and 
capital-led corporatism) welfare states is made principally on the basis of this 
criterion. On the basis of our analysis of the Dutch housing system, we sub-
divide Kemeny’s capital-led corporatism into two types: conservative corpo-
ratism, and modern corporatism. Conservative corporatism corresponds with 
corporatism as defined by Esping-Andersen, whereas modern corporatism 
refers to the style of governance found in the Dutch housing system in the 
1990s. Thus, next to liberalism, we distinguish three different kinds of corpo-
ratism: labour-led, conservative, and modern. In short, we have arrived at a 
modified theoretical framework that differs from the original framework (see 
Section 2.3, Table 2.1) on the following three points:
▪ The political structure criterion has been added to the criteria listed in Table 
2.1.
▪ The social-democratic welfare state regime is considered to be a specific 
form of the corporatist welfare state regime: labour-led corporatism.
▪ The corporatist welfare state regime of Esping- Andersen is subdivided into 
two types: a conservative corporatist welfare state regime (coinciding with 
Esping-Andersen’s original corporatist welfare state regime) and a modern 
corporatist welfare state regime.
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The modified theoretical framework applied to the Dutch housing system
In this section, we show how the modification of the theoretical framework 
described in the preceding section enables a better interpretation to be made 
of the developments in the Dutch housing system. In the modified theoreti-
cal framework, the difference between liberal (or Anglo-Saxon) welfare state 
regimes on the one hand, and corporatist welfare state regimes on the oth-
er, is based on the presence of corporatist structures and processes. Thus, we 
first examined whether these structures and processes played a part in the 
Dutch housing system. We observe that the Dutch housing system has many 
corporatist traits. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, private non-
profit organisations such as housing associations have occupied an important 
position in the Dutch housing system. In general terms, the configuration of 
relevant actors within the Dutch housing system can be said to be remarka-
bly stable. Furthermore, the Netherlands is well known for its consensus cul-
ture, often referred to as the polder model (Boelhouwer, 2002, p. 221). This cul-
ture applies to all segments of the welfare state, including the housing sys-
tem. Policy decisions concerning housing are usually only taken after exten-
sive consultation involving all the relevant stakeholders. Consequently, we 
can conclude that corporatist structures and processes characterise the Dutch 
housing system. This conclusion applies to both the 1980s and the 1990s. 
But how should corporatism in the Dutch housing system be typified? Is it 
labour-led, conservative, or modern? Using the Esping-Andersen typology, we 
considered the Dutch housing system of the 1980s to be a mixture of a social-
democratic and a corporatist welfare state regime (see Section 2.4). Since the 
labourled welfare state regime of our modified typology largely coincides with 
Esping-Andersen’s social-democratic welfare state regime11, we can conclude 
that the Dutch housing system of the 1980s had a strong labour-led corporat-
ist component. 
The question remains, however, as to how the other part of the housing 
system – considered corporatist on the basis of the Esping-Andersen typology 
– should be interpreted. Conservative corporatism does not seem an appro-
priate term; conservative elements have never acquired a strong foothold in 
the Dutch housing system (see also Section 2.6). Closer inspection of Table 2.2 
can lead us to conclude that the corporatist elements in it refer basically to 
three aspects: a central government exerting indirect influence, stimulation 
of the initiative of private actors (premiekoopregelingen), and correction of the 
observed negative effects of the free market (local antispeculative policies). 
These aspects all concur perfectly with our concept of modern corporatism 
(specified in more detail in Section 2.8). In brief, if we apply the modified the-
oretical framework, the Dutch housing system of the 1980s can be interpreted 
11 Although Esping-Andersen does not take the social structure criterion into consideration.
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as a mixture of labour-led corporatism and modern corporatism. 
In the 1990s, the central government reduced its direct influence on the 
housing system and confined itself to defining general policy frameworks 
within which private actors take their own initiatives. However, the corpora-
tist structures within the housing system remain intact, as does the corpora-
tist character of the policy-making process. Nonetheless, the character of the 
corporatism has changed. The labour-led corporatist traits of the 1980s have 
largely disappeared, while the modern corporatist characteristics have grown 
considerably stronger.
 2.8  Towards a modification of the welfare state 
typology
The modification of the theoretical framework (Section 2.7) was constructed 
inductively. Certain adaptations to the original framework were proposed as 
a result of the problems we encountered when applying Esping-Andersen’s 
typology to the Dutch housing system. These adaptations were partly de-
rived from concepts defined by Kemeny. The modified theoretical framework 
proved to be a good basis for the interpretation of the developments within 
the Dutch housing system. But could the framework also be generalised to 
the welfare state as a whole? To answer this question, a more detailed specifi-
cation of the modified theoretical framework was needed.
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A further specification of the altered theoretical framework
The main novelty of the modified theoretical framework is the distinc-
tion drawn between conservative-corporatist and modern-corporatist wel-
fare state regimes. To clarify this distinction, there follows a discussion of 
some of the aspects generally considered to be characteristic of Esping-An-
dersen’s corporatist welfare state regime (see also Matznetter, 2002, p. 275). 
Table 2.4 shows how the various welfare state regimes of the modified theo-
retical framework differ with respect to these characteristics. Figure 2.2 shows 
the same information in the form of a diagram, based on Evers’ State-market-
family triangle (1988).
In the remainder of this section, the focus is on the modern corporatist wel-
fare state regime and the way in which this regime type differs from the oth-
er three welfare state regimes, particularly from the conservative-corporatist 
regime type. In the modified theoretical framework, the conservative-corpo-
ratist and the modern corporatist welfare state regime are expected to differ 
from each other in the following three aspects: the fragmentation in the pro-
vision of welfare services, the treatment of the traditional family in welfare 
policies, and the role of the family in the provision of welfare services.
Fragmentation in the provision of welfare services
Two kinds of fragmentation in the provision of welfare services can be dis-
tinguished. On the one hand, there is fragmentation aimed at favouring spe-
cific groups. Some continental European countries have a welfare system in 
which every occupational group has its own specific benefits. These systems 
can be seen as characteristic of a conservative-corporatist welfare state re-
gime, since they aim to maintain the social stratification in society. The level 
of welfare services to which a person is entitled depends on the person’s oc-
cupation. However, fragmentation in the provision of welfare services is not 
necessarily related to the preservation of stratification in society. Fragmen-
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tation can also be based on objective measurable criteria, such as income. If 
such objective measurable criteria are applied, social status is not taken in-
to account when the target groups for welfare services are defined. In that 
case, welfare services are distributed purely on the basis of (perceived) need. 
Fragmentation on the basis of objective measurable criteria is typical of lib-
eral, labour-led corporatist, and modern corporatist welfare state regimes (al-
though these regimes differ markedly from each other with regard to the per-
ceived need for welfare services). Nevertheless, it can also occur in conserva-
tive-corporatist welfare state regimes. The treatment of the traditional family 
in the provision of welfare services In conservative-corporatist welfare states, 
the provision of welfare services is often explicitly aimed at the traditional 
family. Regulations tend to favour the breadwinner, or provide extra benefits 
for large families. Such policies can be seen as a specific form of fragmen-
tation, supporting and maintaining the position of the traditional family in 
society. The similarity with the fragmentation based on occupation discussed 
above is strong. Both kinds of fragmentation are focused on preserving exist-
ing social structures. The conservative-corporatist regime type differs notice-
ably from the individually oriented labour-led, modern corporatist, and liberal 
welfare states regimes, where welfare services are mainly provided on the ba-
sis of individual needs and rights.
The role of the family in the provision of welfare services
In conservative-corporatist welfare state regimes, the family provides rela-
tively many welfare services. There is a culture in which a high value is at-
tached to the ability of traditional families to cope for themselves. This at-
titude is also stimulated by the welfare policies of the central government 
(see the previous paragraph). It is not promoted by modern corporatist wel-
fare state regimes, where there is invariably strong individualisation. In these, 
the role of the family is limited and the State and the market provide the ma-
jority of welfare services. The modern corporatist regime type occupies an in-
termediate position between the labour-led corporatist welfare state regime 
(State provision of welfare services) and the liberal welfare state regime (mar-
ket provision of welfare services).
 2.9  Directions for further research
To a certain extent, this modified theoretical framework is speculative and 
should certainly not be considered as the endpoint of this study. The modified 
framework should be seen as a starting-point for discussion and further re-
search. Many questions still have to be addressed before anything can be said 
about the validity of the adapted framework. Four such questions are:
1. The modified theoretical framework has been mainly based on an appli-
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cation of the typology of Esping-Andersen. The theory that underpins this 
typology has not really been put to the test (although Section 2.7 briefly 
pays attention to the power relations in the Dutch housing system). Nev-
ertheless, it would be of importance to fully test the theory as well. How 
did power relations and class coalitions shape the (Dutch) housing system? 
And to what extent does this correspond to the developments in the other 
fields of the welfare state?
2. The modified theoretical framework has only been applied to the housing 
systems of the Netherlands (and Belgium). In order to check its more gener-
al validity for housing, the application of the framework should be extend-
ed to the housing systems of other countries. Such an extension to other 
countries could also shed light on the more general trends within Europe. 
Do the housing systems of the various countries converge or diverge?
3. The modified theoretical framework is predominantly based on an analy-
sis of the Dutch housing system; the developments within this system have 
been generalised to the welfare state as a whole. Whether this generalisa-
tion is valid is not yet clear, however. The question arises; does the modified 
theoretical framework also apply to other segments of the welfare state, 
such as social insurance, pensions, health care, or education? Research on 
this issue is needed.
4. The developments in the housing system can be studied from various per-
spectives. Confronting the modified theoretical framework with theories 
from the various perspectives would be interesting. What, for example, is 
the relationship between new corporatism and new public management?
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 3  Is there a connection 
between welfare state re-
gime and dwelling type?
  An exploratory statistical analysis
Joris Hoekstra, 2005, Housing Studies 20 (3): 475-495. Printed with permission of 
Routledge.
Abstract
This exploratory paper tests whether there is a relationship between the na-
ture of a particular society (represented by its welfare state regime), and the 
characteristics and appreciation of the single-family dwellings and the apart-
ments within this society. In order to grasp differences in the nature of soci-
eties, the study uses the welfare state typology of Esping-Andersen (with the 
addition of a Mediterranean welfare state regime). In this (adapted) typolo-
gy, four different welfare state regime types are distinguished: a social-demo-
cratic welfare state regime, a corporatist welfare state regime, a liberal welfare 
state regime and a Mediterranean welfare state regime. Different statistical 
techniques are used to investigate the relationship between welfare state re-
gime type and dwelling type. First, a number of bivariate tables are presented 
that indicate how the incidence, tenure category, quality and the appreciation 
of single-family dwellings compared to apartments differ between welfare 
state regimes. Subsequently, there is an analysis of the bivariate relations be-
tween these aspects. To find out whether the typology of Esping-Andersen re-
ally is a useful classification system with regard to the characteristics and ap-
preciation of single-family dwellings as against apartments, a cluster analysis 
is conducted. The clusters that result from this analysis are interpreted and 
compared with the typology of the four welfare state regimes. Based on the 
results of these statistical analyses, some conclusions are drawn and some 
directions for further research are outlined.
Key words: Welfare state regimes, dwelling types, international comparative housing 
research
 3.1  Introduction
Recently, there has been much interest in international comparative research 
on the ‘meaning’ of various housing aspects. Different scholars have analysed 
cross-national differences in the meaning of home (Arias, 1993), the meaning 
of homeownership (Mandic & Clapham, 1996) or the meaning of housing de-
sign (Ozaki, 2002). However, little attention has been paid to the meaning of 
dwelling type. This is rather curious because at first sight there seems to be a 
clear connection between the incidence and function of the various dwelling 
types and the nature of a society. 
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In the Netherlands, for example, 3 in 10 dwellings are apartments. Seen 
from this frame of reference, Dutch people who travel to Southern Europe are 
often amazed by the large number of apartments found in the region. Where-
as most Dutch newly-built houses are single-family dwellings, new housing 
areas in Southern Europe are usually characterized by a large proportion of 
apartments, typically built in relatively small building blocks. 
A Dutch traveller to the English-speaking New World countries (USA, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand) will also observe important differences between 
his or her homeland. Outside the central parts of the larger cities, the residen-
tial areas of these countries are mainly characterized by detached dwellings 
in a spacious and green suburban setting. In the Netherlands, where terraced 
houses are the dominant dwelling type, such residential environments are rela-
tively scarce and only affordable for households with high incomes. 
The international differences in the incidence of the various dwelling 
types has also been noted by Kemeny who has compared the housing sys-
tems of social-democratic Sweden and liberal Australia (Kemeny, 1981, 1992). 
Kemeny makes a distinction between housing systems with a collectivist ide-
ology and housing systems with a privatist ideology. He associates advanced 
industrial homeownership dominated societies with an ideology of priva-
tism and a residualization of welfare, whereas advanced industrial societies 
that are dominated by rental tenure are associated with an ideology of collec-
tivism and a commitment to welfare provision. Within the housing system, 
the tendencies towards collectivism and privatism manifest in two impor-
tant respects: the social forms that emerge around the ownership of housing 
and the socio-spatial consequences of the dominance of one or more dwell-
ing types (Kemeny, 1992, p. 125). 
As far as the latter aspect is concerned, Kemeny states that the differenc-
es between the spatial organization of modern urbanized societies in terms of 
the proportion of detached houses as against apartments are quite dramatic: 
The difference this makes to the socio-spatial organization of the cities of these coun-
tries is profound, yet almost unresearched. The differences, in terms of balance between 
public and private space in urban areas (e.g. parks and gardens), dominant modes of 
transport (private car versus collective transport) and the balance between domestic 
and wage-labor female roles (with domestic roles more widespread in societies where 
detached housing is more common and where state child care is less developed) are 
far-reaching in their implications. They suggest that the single difference between socie-
ties in the predominance of one dwelling type over another is an important index of the 
organization of everyday life and perhaps the provision of welfare. This fact alone could 
possibly constitute the basis for understanding some important differences between 
industrial societies (Kemeny, 1992, p. 124). 
In connection with the above statement, the aim of this paper is to investi-
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gate whether there is a relationship between the nature of a particular soci-
ety (represented by its welfare state regime), and the characteristics and the 
appreciation of respectively the single-family dwellings and the apartments 
within this society. The paper deliberately refers to characteristics’ and ‘ap-
preciation’ and not meaning, because the concept ‘meaning’ is much more 
comprehensive than the former two concepts. Obtaining real insight into the 
meaning of the various dwelling types requires more profound research. In 
order to grasp differences in the nature of societies, the study uses the wel-
fare state typology of Esping-Andersen (with the addition of a Mediterranean 
welfare state regime). In this (adapted) typology, four different welfare state 
regime types are distinguished: a socialdemocratic welfare state, a corporatist 
welfare state, a liberal welfare state and a Mediterranean welfare state.
There are two main reasons for applying the Esping-Andersen welfare state 
typology. First, Kemeny’s theoretical work, which forms the starting point for 
this paper, does not provide a comprehensive classification of EU countries, 
thus making it less suitable for conducting EU-wide comparative research 
(which is the aim of this contribution). Therefore, it was decided to use the 
welfare state typology of Esping-Andersen as an alternative. Although they 
focus on different aspects (Esping-Andersen focuses on social services and 
labour market issues whereas Kemeny mainly pays attention to housing), 
and have a slightly different vision on some concepts, Kemeny’s and Esping-
Andersen’s work have many things in common. However, there is one impor-
tant difference. Whereas Kemeny’s work is mainly of a conceptual nature, 
Esping-Andersen has empirically underpinned his theory. On the basis of sta-
tistical analyses, he has classified a number of Western countries according 
to the characteristics of their welfare state. This classification serves as the 
basis for the analyses that are carried out in this paper. 
Furthermore, there is also a more theoretical reason for using Esping-
Andersen’s welfare state typology. In international comparative housing 
research, this typology has attracted considerable attention. Various research-
ers (Brandsen, 2001; Harloe, 1995; Matznetter, 2002) have discussed the posi-
tion of housing within the welfare state in general and within Esping-
Andersen’s framework in particular. Most of the debate, however, has been 
at a conceptual or theoretical level. Esping-Andersen’s work has rarely been 
tested or directly related to housing practices (Hoekstra, 2003, p. 58). Con-
fronting the welfare state typology with international comparative dwelling 
type related data might thus shed a new light on the applicability of Esping-
Andersen’s work to the field of housing.
The differences between the four welfare state regimes that are used in this 
paper are briefly described in the next section. The following section elabo-
rates on the data and the research methods. The empirical results of the 
analysis are then presented in three sections. The fourth section describes 
a number of tables that indicate how the characteristics and appreciation of 
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single-family dwellings compared to apartments differ between EU countries. 
This is followed by a systematic analysis of the bivariate relations between 
the variables that were used in the fourth section, and a cluster analysis is 
conducted after this. The final section contains a conclusion and outlines 
some directions for further research.
 3.2  The Welfare State Typology of Esping-Ander-
sen
According to Esping-Andersen, reference should not be made to ‘the welfare 
state’, since different welfare states have different characteristics. Esping-An-
dersen argues that welfare states can be reduced to three ideal typical welfare 
state regimes, which differ fundamentally from each other on aspects such 
as ‘degree of decommodifcation’, ‘social stratification’ and the ‘mix between 
state, market and family’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990).
The three Welfare State Regimes of Esping-Andersen
In ‘social-democratic welfare state regimes’, the provision of welfare services 
is dominated by the state. There are universal welfare services of a high level, 
to which a large proportion of the population has access. As a result of the re-
distributive effects of the welfare state, income differences are relatively low. 
Sweden is the classic example of a social-democratic welfare state, although 
the other Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands1 also belong to this re-
gime type.
In ‘corporatist welfare state regimes’, the state is fairly active in the pro-
vision of welfare services. However, this does not lead to income redistribu-
tion, since preservation of the existing hierarchy in society is the starting 
point for welfare policies at state level. Consequently, the welfare provision 
is segmented; different groups are entitled to different welfare services and 
the nuclear family is often explicitly favoured. Furthermore, the state is defi-
nitely not the only provider of welfare services. In this respect, the family and 
private non-profit organizations (churches, trade unions, etc.) also play an 
important part. Austria, Germany, France, Italy and Belgium are representa-
tive corporatist welfare state regimes.
The ‘liberal welfare state regime’ is characterized by little state interference 
and a strong market orientation. Private companies are responsible for the 
provision of the majority of the welfare services. The state only provides help 
for a limited group of people with really low incomes (safety net). As a result, 
1 The position of the Netherlands is not very clear because this country has both social-democratic and corporat-
ist characteristics.
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the society is characterized by dualism. There is equality (but also poverty) 
under the recipients of state welfare, while there is income differentiation in 
the rest of the society. The US, Australia and, to a lesser extent, the UK and 
Ireland represent liberal welfare state regimes.
The position of Southern Europe
In the original typology of Esping-Andersen, the Southern European countries 
were not considered (with the exception of Italy, which was classified as a 
corporatist welfare state regime). As a reaction to this omission, different re-
searchers (Barlow & Duncan, 1994; Leibfried, 1992) have proposed the formu-
lation of a new welfare state regime for the Southern European countries, us-
ing various names (rudimentary welfare state regime, Latin Rim regime) to in-
dicate this regime type. The study here uses the term ‘Mediterranean welfare 
state regime’ because this is how Esping-Andersen (1999, p. 139) refers to this 
welfare regime type.
The Mediterranean welfare state regime has some similarities with the lib-
eral model; the state provides few welfare services and there is no history of 
full employment policies. However, different from liberal welfare states, the 
provision of welfare services is not dominated by market parties but by the 
family. There is a strong degree of familialism, which implies that a dispro-
portionately large part of the welfare tasks are carried out within the fami-
ly, without much interference of the market or state (Barlow & Duncan, 1994, 
p. 30). Greece, Portugal and Spain are examples of countries that belong to the 
Mediterranean welfare regime type.
It can be expected that the Mediterranean welfare state regime will also 
have specific housing outcomes. For example, in his description of Spanish 
housing policy, Donner (2000, p. 221) observes that the specific features of the 
Spanish family life have a strong influence on housing markets. He concludes 
that the pervading interdependence and multifaceted help that is given and 
received within wider family structures, enables people to cope with econom-
ic crises caused by unemployment and illness and provides access to tempo-
rary or even long-term accommodation owned by other family members.
In his later work, Esping-Andersen (1999) has acknowledged the great 
importance of familialism in the Southern European countries. Nevertheless, 
since the corporatist welfare state regimes are also fairly familialistic, Esping-
Andersen prefers to consider the Mediterranean welfare state regime as some 
kind of sub-regime of the corporatist welfare state regime (Esping-Andersen, 
1999, p. 94). However, in this paper the Mediterranean welfare state regime is 
treated as a separate regime type.
Four Welfare State Regimes: An overview table
The most relevant features of the welfare state regime typology used in this 
paper are shown in Table 3.1. It is important to recognize that the typology is 
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of ideal typical nature. Most countries will only correspond to the welfare re-
gime they are classified in to some extent. Moreover, other typologies or sub-
divisions within the current typology would have been possible. Consequent-
ly, the typology should not be seen as an exhaustive classification system. It 
is merely an analytical device that can be used to make sense of differences 
between countries.
 3.3  Methods and data
Research methods
Using a particular theoretical framework usually also means formulating hy-
potheses. This implies that the typology of Esping-Andersen should be ap-
plied to the field of housing, which should result in a number of hypothe-
ses that indicate how the characteristics and the appreciation of single-fami-
ly dwellings compared to apartments differ between the various welfare state 
regimes. However, this exploratory paper refrains from this ‘classical’ deduc-
tive process, for reasons that are outlined below.
According to Rapoport (2001), it is not very worthwhile to directly con-
nect a general and abstract concept, such as welfare state regime, to some-
thing more concrete such as the characteristics and appreciation of differ-
ent dwelling types. Rapoport argues that a stepwise approach should be fol-
lowed instead. First, there should be an investigation of how the nature of a 
particular society reflects itself in both physical and non-physical concepts 
such as values, specific institutions, policies, rules, lifestyles, meanings etc. 
Subsequently, these concepts should be related to concrete aspects of the 
built environment, in the case of this paper the characteristics and appreci-
ation of single-family dwellings compared to apartments. However, such a 
stepwise approach can only be followed if the researcher has some theoret-
ical notions concerning the relevance and nature of the various steps. Which 
concepts at the intermediate level adequately reflect the differences between 
welfare state regimes? How can these concepts be linked to international dif-
ferences in the characteristics and appreciation of the various dwelling types? 
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Unfortunately, such theoretical notions are insufficiently available. As far as 
is known, there is no real theory development on the way in which the char-
acteristics of a particular welfare state regime can be linked to the character-
istics and appreciation of single-family dwellings as against apartments.
For that reason, an exploratory and inductive approach was chosen for this 
study. The paper investigates whether the characteristics and appreciation of 
single-family dwellings compared to apartments differ between the various 
welfare state regimes. Do the welfare state regime characteristics of a partic-
ular society really matter with regard to dwelling type? If the answer to this 
question is positive, the relations between welfare state regime and dwelling 
type need to be investigated in more detail, following the stepwise approach 
advocated by Rapoport.
Data
All the data used in this paper come from the European Community House-
hold Panel (ECHP). In the ECHP survey, residents from all the EU countries (15) 
are interviewed about their work, economic situation, health and housing sit-
uation. Since this is done in a uniform way (the same questions are asked in 
all EU countries), the introduction of the ECHP has opened up new possibili-
ties for international comparative housing research. The sample sizes of the 
ECHP range from 1757 households in Ireland to 5680 households in Italy. The 
ECHP data used in this paper refer to the years 2000 (some figures for Sweden 
and the UK) and 2001 (all other figures).
 3.4  Results
This section examines whether the incidence, tenure category, quality and 
the appreciation of single-family dwellings compared to apartments differ be-
tween the four welfare state regimes that were outlined earlier.
The share of single-family dwellings and apartments
Figure 3.1 shows the proportion of single-family dwellings (detached, semi-
detached or terraced dwellings) and apartments in 14 of the 15 EU countries 
(Luxembourg is not included because it has not been classified in the Esping-
Andersen typology). Figure 3.1 shows that the countries within the liberal 
welfare state regime (UK, Ireland) have a lower proportion of apartments 
than the countries that belong to one of the other three welfare state regimes. 
As far as the latter group is concerned, the variation within the various 
welfare state regimes is bigger than the variation between these regimes. 
In particular, there are considerable differences between the countries that 
belong to the corporatist and the Mediterranean welfare state regime types.
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Dwelling type and tenure
Table 3.2 gives an insight into the relationship between dwelling type and 
tenure category in the various EU countries. The table shows that in all EU 
countries, single-family dwellings are more often owner occupied than apart-
ments. A chi-square test indicated that this relationship is statistically sig-
nificant (p < 0:01) for all countries in the table, which is not surprising giv-
en the large sample sizes. However, Table 3.2 also shows that the strength of 
the relationship between dwelling type and tenure category differs between 
countries and welfare state regimes. In order to quantify this relationship, the 
study used the measure of association Kendall’s tau b. Kendall’s tau is well 
known as a measure of correlation between two sets of rankings. Nonethe-
less, it may be adapted for the general r x c contingency table having ordered 
categories by regarding the table as a way of displaying the ranking of the n 
Figure 3.1 Proportion of apartments and single-family dwellings in 14 EU 
countries in 2000 (Sweden) and 2001 (all other countries) 
Sources: European Commission, Eurostat, 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP) 2000 and 2001 (UDB)
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cases according to two variables, for one of which only r (number of rows) 
separate ranks are distinguished and for the other of which only c (number 
of columns) separate ranks are distinguished (Everitt, 1977, p. 67). Thus, while 
interpreting the Kendall’s tau parameters, the two nominal variables that play 
a role in the analysis (dwelling type and tenure category), should be seen as 
ordinal variables with two rankings. Kendall’s tau can have values between 
-1 (perfect negative correlation) and +1 (perfect positive correlation). Howev-
er, apart from the extreme values, it should be noted that Kendall’s tau does 
not have an obvious probabilistic interpretation, which means that the tau 
parameters cannot be interpreted in terms of probabilities or errors in predic-
tion (Everitt, 1977, p. 63).
An inspection of the tau parameters shows that there is a clear divide 
between Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy (tau parameters lower than 0.23) 
and the other EU countries (tau parameters-values ranging between 0.36 and 
0.62). In the four Southern European countries, with the exception of Italy all 
belonging to the Mediterranean welfare state regime, the percentages of own-
er occupied and rental dwellings do not differ very much between single-fam-
ily dwellings and apartments. In the rest of the EU, however, apartments are 
mainly rented, whereas single-family dwellings are predominantly owner 
occupied. As far as this is concerned, there do not seem to be clear differenc-
es between (countries belonging to) the social-democratic, corporatist and lib-
eral welfare state regimes.
Dwelling type and quality of the dwelling
The ECHP contains a number of variables that can be used to measure the 
quality of dwellings. With regard to this, two aspects have been examined: the 
condition of the dwelling and the size of the dwelling (number of rooms). For 
both aspects, a separate table is constructed.
Condition of the dwelling
With regard to the condition of the dwelling, the following five variables have 
been analysed:
▪ presence of light (is the accommodation too dark?);
▪ presence of heating facilities (does the accommodation have lack of ade-
quate heating facilities?);
▪ condition of the roof (does the accommodation have a leaky roof?);
▪ presence of humidity problems (does the accommodation have damp walls, 
floors, foundations etc….?);
▪ presence of putrefaction (does the accommodation have rot in window frames 
or floors?).
It is realized that the concept ‘condition of the dwelling’ is much broader than 
just these five variables. However, for the aim of this paper (comparing the 
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quality of single-family dwellings as against apartments) these variables are 
useful because they are not tied to a particular dwelling type (for example, 
variables such as ‘presence of a garden’ would be less suitable because apart-
ments almost never have a garden). The five variables have been integrated 
into one variable that shows how many of the questions mentioned above 
have been answered with ‘yes’.
Table 3.3 shows the averages and standard deviations for this new variable. 
First, it can be concluded that there are important differences between coun-
tries with regard to the condition of the dwelling. In general, Finnish dwell-
ings are in the best condition, whereas Portuguese dwellings have the highest 
average number of problems. However, the prime interest is in the quality dif-
ferences between single-family dwellings and apartments within one particu-
lar country, expressed by the ratio of the average number of problems in each 
of these two dwelling types (RANOP).
An inspection of this ratio makes clear that in most countries the general 
condition of single-family dwellings is better than that of apartments. Greece, 
Portugal, Spain and, to a lesser extent, Belgium are exceptions to this rule. In 
Table 3.2 The relationship between dwelling type and tenure category in 2000 (Sweden) and 
































































































the latter countries, apartments generally are in better condition than single-
family dwellings. Thus, also on this variable, the Mediterranean welfare state 
regime seems to distinguish itself from the other three welfare state regimes.
Size of the dwelling
The European Community Household Panel does not contain information 
on the surface area of the dwelling. However, there is an ECHP variable that 
measures the number of rooms. Table 3.4 shows the average number of rooms 
(kitchen not included, dwellings with more than six rooms are counted as 
having six rooms) in single-family dwellings and apartments in 14 EU coun-
tries. In order to gain an insight into the relative position of both these dwell-
ing types, the ratio of the average number of rooms in single-family dwellings 
and the average number of rooms in apartments (RANOR) was also calculated.
As far as this ratio is concerned, the table clearly shows a distinction 
between the Southern European countries (Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ita-































































































Note: dwelling type: 1 = single-family dwelling, 2 = apartment; tenure category: 1 = owner occupied,
2 = rental.
*Due to the small number of cases, Eurostat does not allow publication of these figures.
Source: European Commission, Eurostat, European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP) 2000 and 2001 (UDB)
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only slightly higher than one, which indicates that with regard to the average 
number of rooms, there are no big differences between single-family dwell-
ings and apartments. For the other EU countries, RANOR ranges between 1.39 
(The Netherlands) and 1.79 (Sweden), indicating that single-family dwellings 
generally have many more rooms than apartments.
Table 3.3 Average number of problems concerning the condition of single-family dwellings 
and apartments, and the ratio of these averages, in 12 EU countries
Single-family 
dwellings
 0.17 (n = 1441)
0.11 (n = 1654)
 0.25 (n = 2929)
 0.32 (n = 1837)
 0.42 (n = 3339)
 0.34 (n = 1942)
 0.20 (n = 1196)
 0.27 (n = 3621)
0.21 (n = 1638)
 0.49 (n = 1984)
 1.37 (n = 2848)



























0.25 (n = 647)
 0.11 (n = 1263)
 0.44 (n = 1177)
0.29 (n = 414)
 0.49 (n = 1815)
 0.43 (n = 3154)
 0.25 (n = 1103)
0.35 (n = 744)
(0.41) (n = 48)*
 0.35 (n = 2952)
 0.72 (n = 1504)






























*According to the regulations of Eurostat, figures that refer to 20 to 49 observations need to be shown in brackets.
Source: European Commission, Eurostat, European Community Household Panel (ECHP), 2001 (UDB)
Table 3.4 Average number of rooms in single-family dwellings and apartments, and the ratio 
between these averages, in 14 EU countries, 2000 (Sweden) and 2001 (all other countries)
Single-family 
dwellings
 4.50 (n = 1442)
 3.84 (n = 1654)
 4.50 (n = 2923)
5.11 (n = 2929)
 4.47 (n = 1836)
4.55 (n = 3175)
 3.89 (n = 1932)
4.79 (n = 1195)
4.39 (n = 2176)
4.60 (n = 3623)
4.79 (n = 1625)
4.69 (n = 1987)
 3.99 (n = 2990)































2.93 (n = 651)
  2.19 (n = 1263)
 2.51 (n = 2751)
  3.67 (n = 1178)
3.13 (n = 414)
 3.14 (n = 1714)
 3.37 (n = 3149)
 3.20 (n = 1103)
 2.76 (n = 2369)
2.79 (n = 744)
3.43 (n = 42)
4.12 (n = 2954)
 3.65 (n = 1504)


































Source: European Commission, Eurostat, European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP) 2000 and 2001 (UDB)
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Dwelling type and housing satisfaction
Whereas previous sections have dealt with the characteristics of single-fami-
ly dwellings compared to apartments, this section discusses the appreciation 
of both these dwelling types. The appreciation of the various dwelling types 
can be measured by analysing the resident’s housing preferences (which 
dwelling type is most preferred, all other things being equal?) or the housing 
satisfaction of residents who already live in a particular dwelling type. The 
ECHP only contains information on the latter aspect. In the ECHP survey, the 
housing satisfaction is measured by the variable ‘satisfaction with the hous-
ing situation’. This variable ranges from 1 (totally dissatisfied) to 6 (totally sat-
isfied). Table 3.5 shows how the average satisfaction with the housing situ-
ation differs between residents of single-family dwellings and residents of 
apartments. Unfortunately, Table 3.5 does not contain data for Sweden, Ger-
many and Luxembourg. This is a pity, because the first two countries are gen-
erally considered as archetypical representatives of the social-democratic and 
the corporatist welfare state regime, respectively. Nevertheless, the Table still 
contains enough social-democratic and corporatist countries to be able to 
draw conclusions on both these regime types.
Additionally in Table 3.5, a ratio (RASH) was calculated. At first sight, the 
international differences in this ratio do not seem to be very marked. How-
ever, on closer examination the table shows an already familiar pattern, with 
rather obvious differences between the Southern European EU countries and 
the rest of the European Union. In Southern Europe (with the exception of Ita-
ly), RASH is about 1 (Spain) or slightly lower than 1 (Portugal and Greece). This 
implies that in these countries, residents in apartments are generally some-
what more satisfied with their housing situation than residents in single-
family dwellings. In the rest of the European Union, however, it is the other 
way round.
Table 3.5 Average satisfaction with the housing situation of respondents in single-family 
dwellings and apartments and the ratio of these averages, in 12 EU countries, 2000 (UK) 
and 2001 (all other EU countries)
Single-family 
dwellings
5.26 (n = 1439)
4.96 (n = 1628)
5.12 (n = 2929)
4.98 (n = 1802)
4.85 (n = 3190)
4.43 (n = 1936)
5.33 (n = 1197)
5.22 (n = 3608)
4.99 (n = 1603)
4.52 (n = 1970)
3.96 (n = 2844)



























4.76 (n = 646)
4.65 (n =1251)
 4.62 (n = 1178)
4.48 (n = 399)
  4.46 (n = 1714)
 4.10 (n = 3133)
  5.08 (n = 1102)
4.78 (n = 761)
(4.17) (n = 48)
   4.48 (n = 2940)
  4.20 (n = 1504)






























Source: European Commission, Eurostat, European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP), 2000 and 2001 (UDB)
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 3.5  Relations between relevant variables
The previous section presented a number of tables that showed the relation-
ship between dwelling type on the one hand, and tenure category, housing 
quality, number of rooms and housing satisfaction on the other hand. Howev-
er, the interrelationships between these last four variables have not been tak-
en into account. This section deals with this issue.
Table 3.6 shows all relevant bivariate relationships between the vari-
ables that were used in the previous section. In this table the strength and 
the direction of the various bivariate relations are described by means of the 
measures of association Kendall’s tau b or Kendall’s tau c. Kendall’s tau b and 
Kendall’s tau c are very similar to each other. However, Kendall’s tau b is par-
ticularly suitable for square tables (bivariate relationship tenure category–
dwelling type), whereas Kendall’s tau c should be used in tables in which the 
number of rows is different from the number of columns (all other bivariate 
relationships).
Bivariate relationships
The first four bivariate relationships in Table 3.6 have already been described 
Table 3.6 Bivariate relationships between the relevant variables (Kendall’s tau b or c) in 12 
EU countries
Bivariate relation
Dwelling type: tenure 
category 
Dwelling type: number of 
problems
Dwelling type: number of 
rooms
Dwelling type: housing 
satisfaction
Tenure category: number 
of problems
Tenure category: number 
of rooms
Tenure category: housing 
satisfaction
Number of problems: 
number of rooms
Number of problems: 
housing satisfaction






































































































































* = statistically significant at the 95%-level.
Dwelling type: 1 = single-family dwelling, 2 = apartment. Tenure category: 1 = owner occupied, 2 = rental
Source: European Commission, Eurostat, European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP) 2000 (UK) and 2001 (UDB)
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in the Tables 3.2 to 3.5 and are therefore not discussed.2
The other six bivariate relationships are briefly described below.
▪ The tau parameters for the relationship between tenure category and the 
variable ‘number of problems with regard to the housing situation’ turned 
out to be slightly positive (and statistically significant) in almost all coun-
tries (except in Greece where there is no statistically significant correla-
tion), indicating that rental dwellings (value 2) generally have more housing 
quality problems than owner-occupied dwellings (value 1).
▪ In all 12 EU countries, owner-occupied dwellings tend to have more rooms 
than rental dwellings. However, this correlation is less strong in the South-
ern European EU countries than in the rest of the European Union.
▪ In all 12 EU countries, owner occupiers are more satisfied with their hous-
ing situation than renters.
▪ In most EU countries, there is a slightly negative correlation between the 
‘number of problems’ and the ‘number of rooms’; dwellings with relatively 
few rooms generally have relatively many problems.
▪ In all EU countries, there is a negative correlation between the ‘number of 
problems’ and the housing satisfaction. Residents in dwellings with rela-
tively many housing quality problems are generally less satisfied with their 
housing situation than residents in dwellings with relatively few housing 
quality problems. 
▪ In all EU countries, the number of rooms is positively related with the hous-
ing satisfaction.
Relations between bivariate relationships
The parameter values in Table 3.6 are all based on bivariate relationships, 
which have not been controlled for the influence of other relevant variables 
(by keeping those variables constant). This implies that the various bivariate 
relationships all influence each other. Since it is not feasible to describe and 
interpret all these interactions, the discussion here is confined to the inter-
vention of the variable tenure category, since this intervention is strong and 
very relevant for the aim of this paper.
It can be seen that there is a considerable correlation between dwelling 
type and tenure category, but that this correlation is less strong in the South-
ern European EU countries than in the rest of the European Union. This has 
some repercussions for the other bivariate relationships. Because South-
ern European apartments are relatively often owner occupied, and owner-
2 Possible small differences between the trends that were described on the basis of the Tables 3.2 to 3.5 and 
the parameters in Table 3.6 are due to the fact that the former Tables are based on the ratios of average values, 
whereas the Kendall’s tau values in Table 3.6 are calculated on the basis of the distribution in the cross table 
concerned.
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occupied dwellings generally have less housing quality problems than rent-
al dwellings, Southern European apartments can be expected to have rela-
tively few housing quality problems. In other words, the negative tau param-
eters in Southern Europe for the bivariate relationship dwelling type, number 
of problems, might be partly explained by the fact that Southern European 
apartments are relatively often owner occupied. A similar line of reasoning 
can be followed with regard to the bivariate relationships between dwelling 
type on the one hand, and number of rooms and housing satisfaction on the 
other hand. After all, the last two variables are also clearly related to tenure 
category. Thus, international differences in the relationship between dwelling 
type and tenure category (such as the described differences between South-
ern Europe and the rest of the European Union) will also reflect themselves 
in international differences in the relationships between dwelling type and 
number of rooms and dwelling type and housing satisfaction. The differences 
between Southern Europe and the rest of the European Union with respect to 
these bivariate relationships are therefore partly caused by the fact that there 
are relatively many owner-occupied apartments in Southern Europe.
It must be admitted that the above analysis has been partial and rath-
er superficial. To obtain a more comprehensive and precise insight into the 
interrelationships between the five relevant variables (including not only the 
bivariate effects but also the higher order interaction effects), there would 
have to be a more sophisticated multivariate statistical analysis, such as a log 
linear analysis (see, for example, Hagenaars, 1990). However, such an analysis 
is beyond the scope of this exploratory paper.
 3.6  Cluster analysis
Cluster analysis is a method that can be used to reduce the number of cases 
(countries in this study). It aims at grouping similar cases in order to come to 
clusters that are both internally homogeneous and different from other clus-
ters. Since the aim here was to check whether the housing aspects analysed 
in the fourth section really differentiate between countries and welfare state 
regimes, a decision was made to cluster on the following variables:
▪ percentage of single-family dwellings (Figure 3.1);
▪ percentage of owner-occupied single-family dwellings (Table 3.2);
▪ percentage of owner-occupied apartments (Table 3.2);
▪ ratio average number of problems (single-family dwellings/apartments): 
RANOP (Table 3.3);
▪ ratio average number of rooms (single-family dwellings/apartments): RAN-
OR (Table 3.4);
▪ ratio average satisfaction with the housing situation (single-family dwell-
ings/apartments): RASH (Table 3.5).
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The scores on these variables for 12 EU countries (there were no data for Swe-
den, Germany and Luxembourg on all these variables) were imported in a sep-
arate database and standardized to Z-scores. Subsequently, a cluster analy-
sis was conducted by means of a hierarchical cluster method, the method of 
Ward. This method tries to minimize the loss of information when two cas-
es are grouped together (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984, p. 43). The method of 
Ward normally results in rather compact homogeneous clusters.
Figure 3.2 shows the dendrogram (countries on the Y-axis, loss of infor-
mation on the X-axis) of the cluster analysis. From this dendrogram, it can 
be concluded that the cluster analysis should be stopped when there are 
two clusters left: one cluster with the Southern European countries (Italy, 
Greece, Spain, Portugal) and one cluster with the other EU countries. If these 
two clusters are compared with Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare state 
regimes, only the Mediterranean welfare state regime is clearly visible. Coun-
tries belonging to the other three welfare state regimes all fall within the 
same cluster, which means that the characteristics and appreciation of sin-
gle-family dwellings compared to apartments do not greatly differ between 
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these three regime types. This conclusion is in line with the results from the 
fourth section. Table 3.7 gives insight into the differences between the two 
clusters that resulted from the cluster analysis.
Although presented in a different form, Table 3.7 provides the same infor-
mation as the tables in the fourth section. The following conclusions can be drawn.
▪ The proportion of single-family dwellings is lower in the Southern European 
EU countries than in the rest of the European Union.
▪ In the Southern European EU countries, most apartments are owner occu-
pied, whereas this is the other way round in the other EU countries.
▪ In the Southern European EU countries, residents in single-family dwell-
ings have more problems concerning the general condition of their dwelling 
than residents in apartments (ratio of 1.77). In the other EU countries the 
opposite is true (ratio of 0.79).
▪ In the Southern European EU countries, single-family dwellings only have 
slightly more rooms than apartments (ratio of 1.04). In the rest of the Euro-
pean Union, however, single-family dwellings generally have considerably 
more rooms than apartments (ratio of 1.51).
▪ In the Southern European EU countries, there are no significant differences 
in housing satisfaction between residents in single-family dwellings and 
residents in apartments. In the other EU countries, residents in single-fam-
ily dwellings are generally more satisfied with their housing situation than 
residents in apartments.
 3.7  Conclusions and directions for further re-
search
 3.7.1  Conclusions
This paper has been explorative and should merely be considered as a starting 
point for discussion and further research. There was an investigation into wheth-
er there is a connection between the nature of welfare states, and the charac-
teristics and appreciation of single-family dwellings and apartments. In order to 
grasp differences in the nature of welfare states, the (extended) welfare state ty-
pology of Esping-Andersen was used, in which a social-democratic, a corporatist, 
a liberal and a Mediterranean welfare state regime were distinguished.
Based on various statistical analyses, it was concluded that the charac-
teristics and the appreciation of single-family dwellings compared to apart-
ments do not differ much between social-democratic, corporatist and liber-
al welfare state regimes. However, there is a significant difference between 
these three regime types on the one hand, and the Mediterranean welfare 
state regime on the other hand. It should be noted that Italy, which is a cor-
poratist welfare state regime according to the Esping-Andersen typology, has 
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much in common with the other Southern European EU countries, which are 
all Mediterranean welfare state regimes. Thus, with regard to the characteris-
tics and appreciation of single-family dwellings compared to apartments, Ita-
ly appears to be closer to the Mediterranean welfare state regime than to the 
corporatist welfare state regime. In this respect, it is important to realize that 
Italy is characterized by significant internal differences. The country can be 
seen as straddling the Mediterranean and corporatist regimes, both socially 
and geographically. While the north of Italy is part of the central corporatist 
core of the European Union, the south retains many features of Mediterrane-
an welfare states (Barlow & Duncan, 1994, p. 30).
The above findings raise the question of whether the welfare state regime 
typology of Esping-Andersen constitutes a valuable starting point for an 
international comparative analysis of differences in the characteristics and 
appreciation of single-family dwellings compared to apartments. It is tempt-
ing to give a negative answer to this question. After all, most of the criteria 
mentioned in Table 3.1 did not seem to have a really differentiating influence 
on the characteristics and appreciation of single-family dwellings as against 
apartments in the various welfare state regimes. In fact, the only aspect that 
seems to matter is ‘the role of the family’, since it is this aspect that causes 
the distinction between the familialistic Mediterranean welfare state regime 
and the other three (less familialistic) welfare state regimes. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that especially the differences between the 
Southern European EU countries and the rest of the European Union mer-
it more detailed research. Many questions still have to be addressed before 
more valid conclusions can be drawn about the nature of these differences. 
The remainder of this section deals with five such issues and some possible 
directions for further research on this topic are outlined. This research agen-
da lays the emphasis on explaining the peculiar situation in the Southern 
European EU countries.
 3.7.2  Directions for further research
The role of the family, homeownership and the relative preference for 
apartments
In the fifth section it was concluded that the variable ‘tenure category’ plays 
a role in the explanation of the differences between countries with regard to 
the characteristics and appreciation of single-family dwellings compared to 
apartments. The differences that were observed between the Southern Euro-
pean EU countries on the one hand, and the rest of the European Union on 
the other hand, can be partly traced back to differences in the relationship 
between dwelling type and tenure category. Southern European apartments 
are much more often owner occupied than apartments in other EU countries, 
which partly explains their relatively good quality and the relatively high 
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housing satisfaction of their residents. Therefore, it is relevant to examine the 
relationship between dwelling type and tenure category in more detail. Why 
are Southern European apartments more often owner occupied than apart-
ments in the rest of the European Union?
The answer to this question could be found in the role of the family. After 
all, as concluded, the differences between the Mediterranean welfare state 
regime and the other three welfare state regimes are mainly due to differenc-
es in the degree of familialism. Consequently, further research should focus 
on the following question: does the Southern European familialism result 
in a relative preference for owner-occupied apartments? This question con-
tains two aspects: the preference for owner occupation and the preference for 
apartments. 
With regard to the first aspect, the analysis should be connected to 
international comparative research on the role of homeownership in 
general (Doling & Ford, 2003), and the trade-off between homeownership 
and pensions in particular (Castles, 1997; Castles & Ferrera, 1996). Since the 
1950s, the rate of homeownership in the Southern European EU countries 
has risen disproportionately fast. Today, these countries have the highest 
homeownership rates of all EU countries (see also Table 3.2). There are two 
main reasons for this.
First, there seems to be a relationship with the familialistic characteristics 
of the Mediterranean welfare state regime. Given the limited extent and cov-
erage of publicly provided welfare services and benefits in Southern Europe, 
homeownership is seen as a form of family self-protection, an investment 
against social risks (Flaquer, 2000). The resources of homeownership are often 
pooled within the family. When a young married couple sets out to purchase 
a home, this is frequently an extended family operation, mobilizing the cap-
ital assets of both households of origin (Castles & Ferrera, 1996, p. 181). Sec-
ond, the housing policies adopted by Southern European governments have 
largely reinforced spontaneous popular inclinations towards homeowner-
ship. On the one hand, these governments have provided many privileges for 
homeowners (tax relief, reduced mortgage rates etc.), while on the other hand 
they have failed to promote an adequate supply of public or ‘social’ housing 
opportunities (Castles & Ferrera, 1996, p. 173).
The relative preference for apartments in the Southern European 
countries might also be related to the dominant position of the family. The 
Mediterranean welfare state regime is characterized by a large amount 
of both material and non-material intra-family transfers, in which the 
involvement of women in particular in care of the elderly and children is 
crucial (Moreno, 2001). Kin clustering is a prerequisite for such collaboration 
across genders and generations. After all, the delivery of services such as 
care of children or the elderly needs some daily interaction, which would not 
be possible if parents and children did not live close to each other (Flaquer, 
[ 75 ]
2000). But how does this affect the built environment? It might well be that 
the Southern European way of life, with its many intra-family relations, 
requires compact cities and therefore results in a relative preference for 
apartments. However, this explanation is rather speculative and definitely 
needs further testing. 
The influence of phase differences in the modernization process 
The theoretical framework that was applied in this paper belongs to the so-
called divergence approach. Theories within this perspective typically use 
typologies of housing systems derived from cultural, ideological or political 
theories as the basis for understanding differences between groups of soci-
eties (Kemeny & Lowe, 1998, p. 162). An equally important approach in inter-
national comparative housing research is the so-called convergence perspec-
tive. A basic assumption of studies within this perspective is that all modern 
societies are developing in the same direction. In the convergence approach, 
the development of housing systems is often connected to general trends. In 
this approach, differences in housing outcomes are primarily related to phase 
differences in the modernization, industrialization and/or urbanization pro-
cess. Donnison (1967) and Donnison & Ungerson (1982), for example, explain 
the distinctive housing situation in Southern European countries by referring 
to the late start of the industrialization and urbanization process in thismac-
ro-region. It would be very interesting to investigate whether the effects of 
this ‘late start’ are still visible in the current housing systems of the countries 
concerned. To what extent is there a relationship between the economic de-
velopment of a particular country and the characteristics and appreciation of 
single-family dwellings compared to apartments? What is the role of the ur-
banization process? Will the suburbanization process, which has started only 
relatively recently in the Southern European EU countries, lead to an increas-
ing popularity of single-family dwellings in this macro region? Extending the 
analysis to other countries. Extending the analysis to countries outside the 
European Union, such as the US or the countries in East Asia, is another op-
tion for further research. More than the UK and Ireland (the liberal countries 
that were included in the analysis), the US can be considered as the archetyp-
ical liberal country. Against this background, it would be very interesting to 
investigate how the American liberalism reflects itself in the characteristics 
and appreciation of single-family dwellings as against apartments. The East-
Asian countries (Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea) are another interesting 
case. These countries show some clear similarities with the Mediterranean 
welfare regime, because they are also characterized by a relatively large pro-
portion of owner-occupied apartments, a relatively ‘late’ industrialization and 
urbanization process and a strong degree of ‘familialism’. Therefore, it would 
be interesting to extend the research to this part of the world.
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The role of social rented housing
Just as with the characteristics and the appreciation of single-family dwell-
ings compared to apartments, the role of social housing clearly differs be-
tween Southern Europe and the rest of the European Union. In Spain and 
Greece, less than 1 per cent of the housing stock consists of social rented 
dwellings, while this is approximately 5 per cent in Italy and Portugal. In the 
other EU countries, the percentage of social rented dwellings is considerably 
higher, ranging from 7 per cent in Belgium to 40 per cent in the Netherlands 
(figures derived from the ECHP, 2001). Thus, there seems to be a correlation 
between the proportion of social housing and the characteristics and appre-
ciation of single-family dwellings compared to apartments. This correlation 
certainly merits further research (is it just a statistical correlation or is it a re-
flection of a causal relationship?).
Differences within dwelling type categories, age of the dwelling, and loca-
tion of the dwelling
This paper did not examine quality differences within each of the dwelling 
type categories (single-family dwellings and apartments). However, these dif-
ferences definitely play a role. Detached dwellings usually have more rooms 
than terraced houses. Luxury penthouses are in no way comparable with gal-
lery flats. Thus, the analysis can be refined by also looking at the variation 
within each of the dwelling types.
Furthermore, it should be realized that the dwelling stock of a particular 
country is the product of layer upon layer of housing construction dating back 
decades, sometimes even centuries. Since the welfare state regimes described 
in the second section basically refer to the last three to four decades, part of 
the dwelling stock had already been built before the welfare states grew to 
full stature. Consequently, the analysis that was carried out in this contribu-
tion would have been more precise if it had been able to make a distinction 
between dwellings that were built in different time periods (unfortunately, 
the ECHP does not allow such distinctions).
Finally, the location of the dwelling is also important. Households who 
want to move not only choose a particular dwelling type, but also a particular 
living environment (central, suburban, etc.). Because single-family dwellings 
and apartments are usually unevenly distributed among the various living 
environments, it might well be that the choice of a particular dwelling type is 
in fact the choice for a particular living environment. Future research should 
take these aspects into account as well.
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 4  Two types of rental sys-
tem? 
  An exploratory empirical test of 
Kemeny’s rental system typology
Joris Hoekstra, 2009, Urban Studies 46 (1): 45-62. Reprinted with permission of Sage 
Publications.
Abstract
The organisation of the rental market varies from country to country. Kemeny 
draws a distinction between societies with an integrated rental system (rel-
atively minor differences between the non-profit and the profit rental sec-
tors) and societies with a dualist rental system (relatively major differences 
between the non-profit and the profit rental sectors). In this exploratory pa-
per, Kemeny’s typology is tested against data from the European Communi-
ty Household Panel (ECHP). The tentative conclusion is that integrated rental 
systems and dualist rental systems do indeed exist, but there are signs of in-
creasing convergence between the two.
 4.1  Introduction
A great many international comparative housing studies concentrate on the 
developments in one particular tenure category and thus have a clear tenure-
oriented focus (see, for example, Boelhouwer, 2002; Van der Heijden, 2002; and 
Priemus and Maclennan, 1998). In most of these studies, the rental sector is 
divided into a social rental segment (dwellings let by landlords with a non-
profit character) and a private rental segment (dwellings let by profit-oriented 
landlords). There are few cross-national studies that analyse the rental mar-
ket as a unity. This might be due to the fact that, in some countries, especial-
ly in the English-speaking regions, the social and the private rental sectors 
are two separate worlds. Apart from having different owners, social and pri-
vate rental dwellings are often subject to different regulations and may even 
house different kinds of tenant. However, there are also countries in which 
the differences between social rental and private rental dwellings are less 
sharply defined. In Germany, for example, it is very hard to distinguish be-
tween social and private renting. Here, both profit and non-profit landlords 
can provide social housing with subsidies making up the difference between 
a ‘social’ rent and a commercial rent (Stephens et al., 2003, p. 772).
The international differences in the characteristics and the segmentation 
of rental markets formed the inspiration for the theoretical research of Jim 
Kemeny. In From Public Housing to the Social Market (1995), Kemeny devel-
ops a theoretical framework which explains the development of rental mar-
kets and which he connects to the more general characteristics of the hous-
ing system and the welfare state. This theoretical framework, which has been 
further refined in two recent articles (Kemeny et al., 2005; Kemeny, 2006), is 
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largely based on reasoned arguments and on the linking of different theoret-
ical concepts. Kemeny makes strong assumptions about housing policy, rent 
regulation and rental finance, assuming that different types of rental system 
exist at the national level. As far as this is concerned, Kemeny draws a dis-
tinction between societies with an integrated rental system (relatively minor 
differences between the social and the private rental sectors) and societies 
with a dualist rental system (relatively major differences between the social 
and the private rental sectors). The differences between these two types of 
society are reflected in the state housing policies and in the housing out-
comes (characteristics of the dwellings and their residents).
In his book, Kemeny uses case studies to provide evidence for the hous-
ing policy aspects of his theory. However, the housing outcomes are large-
ly ignored. It therefore remains unclear whether the assumed differences 
between integrated and dualist rental systems really have an empirical basis. 
In this exploratory paper, we attempt to shed more light on this issue. We 
compare the tenure distribution, the housing quality, the income character-
istics of residents and the rent levels in both the social and the private rent-
al sectors in six European Union countries on the basis of data from the Euro-
pean Community Household Panel (ECHP). We then draw some tentative con-
clusions on the validity and applicability of Kemeny’s rental system typolo-
gy. These conclusions may serve as a starting-point for further international 
comparative research on rental systems.
This paper consists of an introduction and four sections. Section 4.2 deals 
with the theoretical and conceptual issues. It defines the concepts of ‘social 
rental sector’ and ‘private rental sector’ and describes Kemeny’s theoretical 
framework in more detail. Section 4.3 ‘translates’ this framework into four 
hypotheses which are tested with the aid of data from the European Com-
munity Household Panel (ECHP). Section 4.4 describes the research results 
(hypotheses testing) and Section 4.5 sets out the conclusions.
 4.2  Theoretical and conceptual issues
 4.2.1  Defining social rental and private rental housing
Various researchers (Ruonavaara, 1993; Barlow and Duncan, 1988) have dem-
onstrated how difficult it is to come up with a Universal definition for the dif-
ferent tenure sectors. Some countries have forms of tenure that do not exist 
in other countries and ostensibly similar housing tenures may be intrinsically 
dissimilar in different types of society.
According to Ruonavaara (1993), there are only two main tenure categories: 
owning and renting. The cardinal difference between the two lies in the right 
of disposal. Homeowners always have right of disposal regardless of practi-
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cal or administrative restrictions, whereas tenants do not (Ruonavaara, 1993, 
p. 12). Given his focus on disposal rights, Ruonavaara does not make a further 
distinction between the private rental and the social rental sectors. Neverthe-
less, this distinction is very common in mainstream housing research, espe-
cially when this research is based on statistics. In most official statistics, the 
distinction between the social and the private rental sectors is drawn on the 
basis of the characteristics of the landlord. Landlords with a non-profit char-
acter, such as local authorities, voluntary agencies, co-operatives and hous-
ing associations, are identified with the social rental sector, whereas all other 
types of landlord are identified with the private rental sector.
Although some economists disagree with this assumption (as indicated in 
Elsinga et al., 2005), Kemeny expects that, in the long term, the rents of dwell-
ings that are let by social landlords (who do not have to make a profit) will be 
lower than the rents of comparable dwellings that are let by profit-oriented 
private landlords (Kemeny, 1995; Kemeny et al., 2005). However, the extent of 
these differences depends on the type of rental system that is in force in the 
country in question and the so-called level of maturation of both the social 
and the private rental sectors. Maturation can be defined as the debt-to-mar-
ket value of the housing stock (see also Section 2.5). If the level of maturation 
is similar for nonprofit and profit-oriented landlords, the non-profit landlords 
will be able to set lower rents than the profit-oriented landlords because they 
only need to cover their costs, whereas profit-oriented landlords also have to 
make a reasonable profit (Kemeny, 1995, Kemeny et al., 2005).
Kemeny (1995) prefers to speak of ‘nonprofit renting’ and ‘profit renting’ 
rather than social renting and private renting. In his definition, non-profit 
renting encompasses all rental housing, irrespective of ownership, with rents 
which are ‘profit-free’; roughly speaking, the rents cover only the costs that 
are actually incurred for a stock of dwellings. Social rental landlords are the 
main providers of non-profit rental housing although private rental landlords 
can also provide such housing – for example, in exchange for state subsidies. 
In Kenemy’s terms, profit renting refers to housing with landlords who try to 
maximise their profits. Profit rental housing tends to be provided by private 
rental landlords, although social rental landlords can also rent out part of 
their stock for profit-oriented rents.
Kenemy’s aim in using these definitions is to shift attention from the own-
er of the housing because, he argues, most housing research focuses too 
strongly on tenure. However, although Kemeny’s definitions are attractive 
from a theoretical point of view, they do not lend themselves to concrete 
international comparative housing analyses. International comparative data 
on the way in which rents are calculated are not generally available. This is 
why the more ‘traditional’ and better-known concepts of social and private 
rental housing are used throughout this paper. For the record, it should be 
stressed that there are no fundamental differences between the latter con-
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cepts and Kemeny’s definitions with respect to the countries in our analysis. 
Basically, as far as these countries are concerned, non-profit rental housing 
equals social rental housing and profit rental housing equals private rental 
housing.1.That is why this paper uses the terms social rental and non-profit 
rental and private rental and profit rental interchangeably. 
 4.2.2  Kemeny’s view on rental systems
Kemeny (1992, 1995, 2006) explains internationally divergent housing develop-
ments mainly by referring to differences in the social and political structures 
between countries. He assumes that these differences are associated with dif-
ferences in ideology and, more specifically, with the degree of privatism as 
opposed to collectivism. Tendencies towards collectivism and privatism are 
expected to manifest themselves in the housing system in two important re-
spects: the social forms which emerge around tenure and the spatial conse-
quences of the dominance of one or more dwelling types (see Hoekstra, 2005, 
for more information on the second aspect). In his 1995 book, Kemeny works 
out the first aspect: the social forms that emerge around tenure. He translates 
the collectivism-privatism continuum of the social structure into a distinction 
between integrated rental systems (collectivist ideology) and dualist rental 
systems (privatist ideology) and maintains that each of these rental systems 
is informed by a specific view on how markets operate and is the product of 
different kinds of power structure (Kemeny, 1995, p. 5; Kemeny, 2006).
 4.2.3  Dualist rental systems
Dualist rental systems are found mainly in countries with an ideology of pri-
vatism and economic liberalism and a hegemonic position for right-wing po-
litical parties. The most obvious representatives of this Group are the An-
glo-Saxon countries. In these societies, the state endeavours to steer clear 
of markets because it is generally believed that government involvement in 
markets undermines fair competition. However, there are still some popula-
tion groups who are simply unable to buy welfare services on the free market. 
For them, the government provides a public-sector safetynet. To prevent di-
rect competition with the commercial markets, this safety net is set apart and 
run as a residualised state sector. Privatist societies are therefore character-
ised by a dualism between largely unregulated profit-driven markets on the 
1 This observation refers to the social and the private rental sectors as a whole, but not necessarily to all indi-
vidual landlords in both sectors. In the Netherlands, for example, some housing associations let a limited part of 
their housing stock on a profit basis. Despite this, the Dutch social rental sector as a whole can still be described 
as non-profit. 
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one hand and a tightly controlled state sector on the other (Kemeny, 1995, p. 9).
Kemeny maintains that this dichotomy is also clearly visible in the rental 
markets of privatist societies. The government separates the social rental sec-
tor from the private rental sector and uses it as a kind of safety net. Conse-
quently, the social rental sector is reserved primarily for low-income groups 
and has regulated low rents. This gives it a residual character and a certain 
degree of stigma. This also reverberates on the other tenure sectors. As access 
to the social rental sector is, in effect, restricted to households with a low 
income and as the private rental sector usually charges high rents and offers 
limited or no tenant protection and rent regulation, one could say that dualist 
rental systems ‘push’ households into the homeownership sector (see Ronald, 
2004, for more information on push and pull explanations). Consequently, the 
homeownership rate in dualist rental systems tends to be relatively high.
 4.2.4  Integrated rental systems
Integrated rental systems, sometimes also called unitary rental systems,2 
originated in the social market model, which first appeared in Germany in 
the 1930s. This model 
attempts to construct markets in such a way as to strike a balance between economic and 
social priorities and thereby ameliorate the undesirable effects of the market from within 
(Kemeny, 1995, p. 11).
The social market model is therefore based on the principle that intervention 
in markets is both necessary and desirable, but that it must be market-com-
pliant. In other words, markets should be constructed in such a way that they 
incorporate important social goals (Barry, 1993). An important part of this 
strategy is the encouragement of competition between profit and non-profit 
forms of welfare provision. Kemeny states:
To use an analogy, non-profit organizations are not separated off from the economy in 
the way that fat is separated from meat. Rather it is ‘marbled’ into the meat. The skill of 
managing this political economy lies in achieving this ‘marbling’ to maximise the benefits 
of both competition and social security (Kemeny, 1995, p. 15).
These ideas have clearly shaped the welfare state in post-war Germany, but 
they have also had an influence in the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and 
2 The terms ‘integrated rental system’, ‘integrated rental market’, ‘unitary rental system’ and ‘unitary rental 
market’ are often used interchangeably in the literature. However, in this paper, I consistently apply the term ‘in-
tegrated rental system’.
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Austria (Kemeny, 1995, p. 15). This influence has been visible in all segments 
of the welfare system, but particularly in housing, where the social market 
policies have resulted in a so-called integrated rental system in which hous-
ing policies are geared towards direct competition between the profit and the 
non-profit rental sectors. This implies that governments are actively involved 
in the development and regulation of rental markets. 
Kemeny states that direct competition between profit and non-profit rent-
ing can benefit the rental market as a whole. As the social rental sector gener-
ally ensures a steady supply of new housing, the rental sector is less suscepti-
ble to economic cycles. Moreover, the non-profit rent levels in the social rent-
al sector may have a dampening effect on the commercial rent levels in the 
private rental sector (Kemeny, 1995, p. 18). The extent of this effect depends 
mainly on the size of the social rental sector compared with the private rent-
al sector and the conditions in the housing market. In a tight housing mar-
ket, this effect will obviously be less profound than in a more relaxed housing 
market (Kemeny et al., 2005, p. 859). Furthermore, integrated rental systems 
are often characterised by Universal rent regulation regimes that put a lim-
it on rent setting and rent increases in both the social and the private rent-
al sectors (or at least a substantial part of the latter sector). Thus, not only 
the direct competition but also the rent regulation suppress the differenc-
es in rent levels between the two rental sectors. The rather strict rent regu-
lation offers protection to the tenants but may have a negative effect on the 
yields and investments of the landlords in the private rental sector (Elsinga et 
al., 2008). This can further enhance the dominant position of the social rent-
al sector in integrated rental systems. Finally, the state may grant subsidies to 
the social rental and the private rental sectors provided that certain criteria 
are fulfilled for housing quality, security of tenure and sometimes rent lev-
els (Hulse, 2003, p. 31). All these characteristics make the rental sector of inte-
grated rental systems attractive (and accessible) to relatively large segments 
of the population.
 4.2.5  The mechanisms behind dualist and integrated ren-
tal systems
Integrated and dualist rental systems do not come into being overnight. They 
are the result of a long-term interaction between the economic development 
of rental housing stocks on the one hand and long-term strategic policy-mak-
ing designed to influence and channel that interaction on the other. The key 
question is whether or not renting is segmented into compartmentalised and 
segregated markets. In other words: to what extent do state housing policies 
differentiate between the social and the private rental sectors?
Whereas housing policies differ from country to country, the economic 
processes that shape the rental sector are essentially the same everywhere. 
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As far as this is concerned, the so-called maturation process is an important 
factor (Kemeny, 1995, p. 41). Maturation reflects the widening gap between 
the outstanding debt-per-dwelling on the existing stock and the average new 
debt-per-dwelling which is built, acquired or renovated. This gap is caused by 
inflation in the costs of construction and land acquisition. Each year that new 
dwellings are constructed, the difference between what it costs to build the 
first houses erected by the housing organisation and those currently being 
constructed increases. As debt-servicing usually accounts for a large share 
of the Total housing costs, maturation keeps the costs of providing old hous-
ing well below the costs of building new housing. The impact of maturation is 
expected to differ between social rental and private rental housing. In social 
rental housing, maturation should result in relatively low rent levels in either 
the oldest parts of the housing stock (if historical costs determine the rent 
levels) or within the housing stock as a whole (if rent pooling is in use, which 
is usually the case). In the private rental sector, the private landlords with 
older dwellings benefit from maturation because it allows them to charge 
rents that are well above the actual incurred costs, provided that the con-
ditions in the housing market allow for this. Thus, in the private rental sec-
tor, the maturation process leads to higher profits for the landlords and not 
to lower rents for the tenants. The possibilities of asking rents that are well 
above the costprice level are, however, considerably less in an integrated rent-
al system (where competition from the social rental sector and rent regula-
tion limit the scope for rent increases) than in a dualist rental system (where 
there is virtually no direct competition from the social rental sector and rent 
regulation for private landlords tends to be limited). Maturation is not solely a 
product of inflation; it also depends on other factors such as the rate at which 
new dwellings are added to the stock (degree of front-loading) and the extent 
of the investments in renovation in the older dwelling stock (Kemeny, 1995, 
p. 44). Furthermore, the maturation process may be temporarily reversed if 
older housing stock is remortgaged – for example, in the case of stock trans-
fer (housing associations buying old municipal housing stock, a phenomenon 
that is quite common in the UK). Maturation is not the only factor that can 
strengthen the financial position of the social rental sector. The sale of social 
rental dwellings, coupled with the fact that the lifespan of these dwellings is 
generally much longer than the 50 years for which they are usually registered 
in the bookkeeping, may play a role as well. Since social rental landlords do 
not have to make a profit, the yield from these processes often stays in the 
rental sector where it is reinvested in renovation or new housebuilding.
As a result of these processes, the social rental sector sooner or later reach-
es a point at which it begins to compete strongly with commercial renting 
and owner-occupation. This is reflected in falling real rents and growing wait-
ing-lists for social rental housing which, in turn, put pressure on the policy-
makers (Kemeny, 1995, p. 47). There is a clear difference between the policy 
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response for integrated and dualist rental systems. Effectively, one could say 
that they are fundamentally distinct.
In a (future) dualist rental system, the government normally tries to repress 
and counteract the maturation process in the social rental sector by, for 
example, forcing social rental landlords to sell off their dwellings with large 
discounts for the buyers. In a (future) integrated rental system, the govern-
ment would allow the social rental sector to expand so that it could continue 
to compete with the private rental sector.
 4.2.6  Tenure and welfare: the really big trade-off ?
Kemeny assumes that a close relationship exists between the tenure poli-
cies and the tenure distribution in a society and the way in which the wel-
fare state of this society is structured. As far back as the early 1980s (Kemeny, 
1981), Kemeny argued that high rates of homeownership impact on society 
via various forms of privatism, such as a lifestyle based on detached hous-
ing and a high degree of car ownership (Kemeny, 2005, p. 61). These tenden-
cies towards privatism also affect the nature of the welfare provision. If own-
ing a home and a car are top priorities for newly established (middle-class) 
households, it is more than likely that the high taxes that are necessary for 
a universal welfare state will encounter strong resistance. After all, such tax-
es might delay or hamper the acquisition of homes or cars. The other side 
of the coin is that a poorly developed welfare state will result in relatively 
low state retirement pensions and poor public welfare for the elderly. Conse-
quently, people will be forced to set aside resources from early adulthood in 
order to accumulate personal capital for a secure old age. Homeownership is 
an effective way of achieving this aim as it cuts down the housing costs in old 
age and offers possibilities of realising hard cash via trading down or remort-
gaging. Thus, Kemeny (1980, 2005) posits that a negative relationship exists 
between levels of homeownership and the development of the welfare state. 
As explained above, this relationship may work in two directions, an aspect 
which has also been confirmed in a statistical analysis by Doling and Horse-
wood (2005). 
In 1998, Kemeny’s thesis was taken up by political scientist and wel-
fare state researcher Frank Castles. Castles (1998) examined the relation-
ship between levels of homeownership and various indices of public welfare 
and found clear negative correlations, although the strength of these corre-
lations diminished somewhat between 1960 and 1990. Be that as it may, Cas-
tles’ work obviously supports Kemeny’s hypothesis. As far as the relationship 
between housing and welfare is concerned, there do indeed seem to be two 
types of society. On the one hand, there are countries in which a somewhat 
minimalist model of welfare provision goes hand-in-hand with a high rate of 
homeownership; the dualist rental systems. On the other, there are countries 
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that have a fairly well developed welfare state and a substantial rental sector 
that offers an alternative to homeownership; the integrated rental systems. 
Kemeny (2005) doubts, however, whether this divergence will continue to 
prevail in the future. He observes that most integrated rental systems have 
been retrenching their welfare states and suggests that this may ‘push’ peo-
ple into the homeownership sector, because owning a home is perceived as a 
kind of insurance against poverty and social deprivation in old age. Kemeny 
(2005) illustrates this point with the Swedish case. In the 1990s, Sweden 
downwardly reviewed its pension system and cut back on residential care and 
home-help for the elderly. Kemeny argues that this might steer the tenure 
preferences of young and newly formed households in the direction of home-
ownership. Over time, these changes in tenure preferences will become visi-
ble in the tenure patterns. In most integrated rental systems, the rental sector 
is already declining. In the Netherlands, for example, the share of the rent-
al sector declined from 55 per cent in 1990 to 45 per cent in 2003 (National 
Board of Housing, Building and Planning, Sweden/Ministry for Regional Devel-
opment of the Czech Republic, 2004). 
Nevertheless, the presumed relationship between the growth in home-
ownership and the decline of the welfare state — and, more particularly, the 
reduction in welfare services for the elderly — needs to be scrutinised more 
closely before firmer conclusions can be drawn. For instance, one should also 
look at possible alternative explanations for the growth in homeownership, 
such as changing ideologies, a decline in returns from alternative invest-
ments in, say, private pension schemes or the stock market, and the influ-
ence of housing policies that promote homeownership (Boelhouwer and Van 
der Heijden, 2005; Doling and Horsewood, 2005; Sommerville, 2005), such as 
generous tax benefits for homeowners. 
 4.2.7  Kemeny’s typology in international comparative 
housing research
Three main approaches, each associated with a different level of generalisa-
tion, can be discerned in international comparative housing studies. At the 
highest level of generalisation are studies that try to demonstrate that basi-
cally all housing systems are driven by the same underlying imperatives (Ke-
meny and Lowe, 1998). These studies, which fall under the heading of the 
‘convergence approach’, apply an overarching perspective that explains why 
all countries are – or are becoming – essentially similar (Doling, 1997). This 
perspective can relate to explicit theories (for example, Marxism), but it can 
also be more vague, relating to broader trends such as economic develop-
ment, privatisation or (sub)urbanisation (Boelhouwer and Van der Heijden, 
1992).
The convergence approach has been heavily criticised for failing to take 
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sufficient account of political, cultural and institutional differences between 
countries. Indeed, it is partly as a result of this criticism that the divergence 
approach saw the light of day. The theories that fit into this approach, also 
called middle-range theories, attempt to strike a balance between generalisa-
tion on the one hand and attention to differences on the other. They tend to 
use housing system typologies derived from cultural, ideological or political 
theories as the basis for understanding differences between groups of socie-
ties (Kemeny and Lowe, 1998). In housing research, Kemeny’s typology of rent-
al systems, the theoretical framework of this paper, is a clear example of the 
divergence approach.
However, the divergence approach also necessarily involves generalisations 
in which categories such as ‘homeownership’ and ‘renting’ are abstracted 
from their specific historical and geographical context and made the subject 
of general propositions. Some researchers (for example, Sommerville, 2005) 
find this unacceptable and argue that tenure-related concepts are irrevoca-
bly culturespecific with different meanings in different places and at differ-
ent points in history. In order to do justice to this specificity, a new strand 
of international comparative housing research has recently emerged in the 
form of micro-scale comparative studies (Matznetter, 2006). These studies (for 
example, Quilgars et al., 2008; Steinführer, 2005) share a number of character-
istics: they focus on rather small geographical entities, they are actor-orient-
ed and they often apply constructivist methodology and qualitative research 
methods, thus allowing case studies to be accepted in comparative research 
(Haworth et al., 2004; Matznetter, 2006).
 4.3  From theory to housing outcomes
Kemeny’s theoretical framework has not been fully tested against empirical 
data. In his book (1995), Kemeny presents a number of case studies in which 
the UK, Australia and New Zealand are presented as examples of dualist rental 
systems and Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland are regard-
ed as typical examples of integrated rental systems. In these case studies, Ke-
meny presents some data on the maturation process and interprets the way in 
which the different national governments deal with the social and the private 
rental sectors. However, he does not analyse any statistics on housing quality, 
resident characteristics or rent levels. Consequently, his book does not make 
clear whether the differences between dualist and integrated rental systems 
really lead to differences in empirical housing outcomes. The same goes for 
Kemeny et al. (2005), in which only integrated rental systems are analysed.
This paper attempts to fill this void by investigating the relationship 
between the type of rental system on the one hand and the housing out-
comes on the other. An empirical test of Kemeny’s rental system typology is 
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conducted on the basis of an analysis of data from the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP). For this purpose, Kemeny’s typology has been deduc-
tively translated into four hypotheses. Because of the specific epistemologi-
cal status of Kemeny’s typology, which is based on reasoning rather than on 
a positivist approach, this translation was not always straightforward. The 
reader should therefore be aware that the hypotheses formulated in this sec-
tion are based on the author’s own interpretation of Kemeny’s typology and 
do not necessarily represent Kemeny’s vision.
 4.3.1  Towards hypotheses
The main characteristics of dualist rental systems and integrated rental sys-
tems have already been described in Section 4.2. In this section, we translate 
these characteristics into measurable housing outcomes. This delivers four 
hypotheses which are summarised in Table 4.1. It should be noted that the 
four hypotheses only cover part of the housing outcomes that can be expect-
ed on the basis of Kemeny’s theoretical framework. One important aspect of 
integrated rental systems that could for example not be included in the hy-
potheses is the geographical distribution of tenure types and housing quality 
segments. According to Kemeny, true competition between the social rental 
and the private rental sectors is only possible if the social rental sector offers 
a viable alternative to private rental dwellings and vice versa. This implies 
that, in integrated rental systems, social and private rental dwellings need to 
be available in the same segments of the housing stock and in the same ge-
ographical areas. Unfortunately, this condition could not be adequately test-
ed with the ECHP, as it does not provide representative data on a narrow geo-
graphical scale. 
Hypothesis 1: Share of the owner-occupancy sector
Kemeny states that the housing policies in dualist rental systems steer resi-
dents far more in the direction of the owner-occupancy sector (see also Sec-
tion 4.3) than the housing policies in integrated rental systems. If this is true, 
one may expect dualist rental systems to have a larger owner-occupancy sec-
tor than integrated rental systems. 
Hypothesis 2: Level of housing quality
Although he does not explicitly say so, Kemeny seems to accept that, in both 
dualist and integrated rental systems, the better-off households have a pref-
erence for the owner-occupancy sector. Consequently, the quality of owner-
occupied dwellings is generally higher than the quality of rental dwellings. 
However, the extent of these differences is expected to vary between the two 
types of rental system.
Integrated rental systems are characterised by a relatively large social rent-
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al sector and housing policies that are relatively favourable for renting. Con-
sequently, the social rental sector not only offers dwellings at the lower end 
of the housing market but also caters for middle-income groups by including 
a relatively large number of dwellings of a somewhat higher quality and price. 
As a result, the differences between the housing quality in the social rent-
al sector and the owner-occupancy sector are expected to be relatively small.
In dualist rental systems, one can assume that the social rental dwellings 
are of a relatively low quality, as they serve merely as a safety-net and there-
fore only ‘need’ to meet basic standards. Accordingly, fairly large differenc-
es may be expected between the quality of housing in the social rental sector 
and the owner-occupancy sector.
Hypothesis 3: Income distribution of tenants
In dualist rental systems, access to the social rental sector is largely restrict-
ed to households with relatively low incomes. This implies that a large part of 
the social rental housing stock is occupied by households from lower-income 
groups. The concentration of low-income groups in a particular tenure sector 
is often referred to as residualisation.
In integrated rental systems the social rental sector is bigger than in dualist 
rental systems, the means-testing is less severe and social renting is not stig-
matised. Consequently, the social rental sector is attractive for both low- and 
middle-income households and is therefore less residualised than in dualist 
rental systems.
Hypothesis 4: Rent levels
In dualist rental systems, one can expect rather large differences between the 
rents in the social and the private rental sectors. After all, these systems are 
characterised by a limited and tightly regulated social rental sector in which 
the rents are relatively low and a private rental sector where rent regulation 
is either nonexistent or limited, thereby implying that the rents are relatively 
high.
In integrated rental systems on the other hand, one might expect the differ-
ences between rents in the social and the private rental sectors to be small. 
This is due to the fact that the two sectors are in direct competition and are 
often subject to the same kind of rent regulation.
 
Table 4.1 Differences between integrated and dualist rental systems: four hypotheses
1.  Share of owner-occupancy  
     sector
2.  Level of housing quality
3.  Income distribution of  
     tenants
4.  Rent levels, corrected for 




relatively large differences in housing 
quality between the owner-occupancy 
sector and the social rental sector 
relatively strong residualisation in the 
social rental sector
large differences between social 




relatively small differences in housing 
quality between the owner-occupancy 
sector and the social rental sector 
relatively limited residualisation in the 
social rental sector
small differences between social rental 
and private rental dwellings 
the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria
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 4.3.2  Selection of countries
Six countries were selected for the analysis presented in this paper: the UK, 
Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Austria. Kemeny considers 
the first three as representative of dualist rental systems and the latter three 
as representative of integrated rental systems (Kemeny, 2006, p. 10). If Ke-
meny’s typology is correct, the housing outcomes are expected to differ clear-
ly between these two groups of countries.
Sweden and Germany, two typical integrated rental systems according to 
Kemeny, do not feature in the analysis. Sweden has been excluded purely for 
pragmatic reasons: some of the housing questions were not answered in the 
Swedish version of the ECHP. In Germany, the distinction between social and 
private rental landlords is very indistinct as both can let rental dwellings with 
a non-profit rent (due to a specific subsidy system, see for example, Stephens et 
al., 2003, p. 771). Although, in principle, this can be regarded as a logical charac-
teristic of an integrated rental system, it could seriously complicate the interpre-
tation of the research results. This is why Germany is omitted from the analysis.
Obviously, there is a limit to which one can generalise about such a small 
number of countries. After all, individual countries also follow their own spe-
cific path and pursue their own approach within each of the two rental sys-
tems (see Kemeny et al., 2005). Nevertheless, if Kemeny’s typology is valid, the 
differences between the two types of rental system should be greater than 
the differences within them.
 4.3.3  Data
Most of the data used in this paper come from the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP). In the ECHP survey, residents from all the ‘old’ EU 
countries (EU 15) are interviewed about their work, their economic situation, 
their health and their housing. Since this is conducted in a uniform manner 
(the same questions are asked in each country), the ECHP is a useful source of 
data for international comparative research. The sample sizes range between 
2000 and 6000 households per country.
It should be noted, however, that the ECHP is not an optimal data source 
for housing research. In certain cases, housing figures produced on the basis 
of the ECHP have turned out to be a bit dubious. For example, for some coun-
tries, the tenure distribution derived from the ECHP is slightly different from 
the tenure distribution in the ‘official’ statistics. We have corrected this with 
a reweighing procedure.3 The data limitations were not considered an insur-
3 In this reweighing procedure, we used data on the tenure distribution from Scanlon and Whitehead, 2004 (Aus-
tria) and Norris and Shiels, 2004 (all other countries). 
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mountable problem for the exploratory analyses conducted in this particular 
paper. However, better data would be needed for more detailed and more con-
textualised international comparative research on rental markets.
 4.3.4  Testing the hypotheses
All the hypotheses explicitly refer to a comparison between integrated rent-
al systems and dualist rental systems. The hypotheses are tested on the basis 
of some basic descriptive statistics. Statements relating to acceptance are not 
based on formal statistical testing but on the author’s interpretation. This fits 
in well with the character of the paper, which aims to explore broad differenc-
es between integrated and dualist rental systems and is not a formal statisti-
cal testing of Kemeny’s typology.
 4.4  Results
In this section, the four hypotheses (Table 4.1) are explored on the basis of the 
ECHP data. A separate section is dedicated to each hypothesis.
 4.4.1  Hypothesis 1: Share of owner-occupancy sector
Figure 4.1 provides insight into the share of the owner-occupancy sector in 
the six EU countries. The figure shows that the presumed integrated rental 
systems do indeed have a slightly lower share of owner-occupancy dwellings 
than the presumed dualist rental systems. This supports the first hypothesis 
in Table 4.1.
 4.4.2  Hypothesis 2: Level of housing quality
Quality of housing is a broad multidimensional concept. The ECHP contains a 
number of questions with regard to the condition of the dwelling and the live-
ability in the neighbourhood. Although these questions may not cover all rel-
evant housing quality aspects, they are expected to give a reasonable indica-
tion of the housing quality in the various countries.
The housing quality dimensions that are measured by the ECHP ques-
tions have been integrated into a housing quality index. Table 4.2 shows how 
this index has been constructed. The maximum score on the housing qual-
ity index is 10. It should be noted that the variables in the index are based 
on selfreported data (respondents’ answers). Cultural differences arising from 
differing interpretations of the same question-and-answer categories (Healy, 
2003, p. 414) may therefore affect the reliability of the index. This is, however, 
inevitable in any kind of survey – based international comparative research. 
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Table 4.3 shows the mean score on the housing quality index for the three 
different tenure sectors. A ratio was worked out to quantify the differences 
in housing quality between the owner-occupancy sector and the social rent-
al sector (average housing quality owner-occupancy sector: average housing 
quality social rental sector). On the basis of this ratio, one can conclude that 
the housing quality differences between the two tenure sectors tend to be 
slightly greater in presumed dualist rental systems than in presumed unitary 
rental systems. This observation is in line with the second hypothesis that 
was formulated in Table 4.1.
 4.4.3  Hypothesis 3: Income distribution of households
To measure the degree of residualisation, the income distribution of the 
households was divided into three groups of 33.3 per cent. Figure 4.2 shows 
which percentage of the social rental sector in the six countries is occupied 
Figure 4.1 Tenure distribution in the six selected EU countries (as a percentage of the total 
housing stock)
Sources: for Austria, Scanlon and Whitehead (2004); 
for all other countries, Norris and Shiels (2004)
Owner-occupancy Private rental Social rental







Table 4.2 The construction of a housing quality index
Variable
Presence of a separate kitchen?
Presence of a place to sit outside?
Noise pollution from neighbours or outside?
Lack of light?




Pollution in the neighbourhood?
Crime in the neighbourhood?
Points
1 point if present
1 point if present 
1 point if no noise pollution
1 point if no lack of light 
1 point if no lack of adequate heating
1 point if no leaky roof
1 point if no humidity problems 
1 point if no rot
1 point if no pollution in the neighbourhood
1 point if no crime in the neighbourhood 
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by households that belong to the first 33.3 per cent (lowest income group). 
The figure shows that the social rental sectors in Belgium and the UK, both 
presumed dualist rental systems, have the highest degree of residualisation. 
Austria has the lowest. Residualisation in the relatively large social rental sec-
tors of the Netherlands and Denmark is also lower than in the UK and Bel-
gium. Ireland is an exception, where the residualisation is less pronounced 
than one would expect on the basis of Kenemy’s typology. All in all, there 
seems to be reasonable support for Hypothesis 3.
 4.4.4  Hypothesis 4: Rent levels
Figure 4.3 shows the gross monthly rent in the social and the private rent-
al sectors of the six EU countries.4 Given the data limitations of the ECHP (see 
Section 4.3), this figure should be considered as indicative. Nevertheless, a 
clear pattern emerges. In all the countries except Denmark, the rents in the 
private rental sector are higher than the rents in the social rental sector5.
However, the differences in rent levels between social rental dwellings and 
private dwellings are considerably greater in the presumed dualist rental sys-
tems than in the presumed integrated rental systems.6 This supports Hypoth-
esis 4.
 4.5  Summary and conclusions
Kemeny assumes that a close relationship exists between the social structure 
and the ideology of a given society and the way in which the rental market 
4  It should be noted that the rent levels in the Belgian and Irish social rental sectors are dependent on the in-
come of the tenants.
5 The rent levels for the private rental sector in the Netherlands have been reweighed according to the Dutch na-
tional housing demand survey 2002. 
6 It should be noted that differences in housing quality might contribute to this as well. Table 4.3 shows that, in 
presumed integrated rental systems, the social rental sector has a higher housing quality than the private rental 
sector, whereas it is the other way around in presumed dualist rental systems (with the exception of the UK).
Table 4.3 Mean score on the housing quality index for owner-occupied, social rental and 
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in this society is organised. He draws a distinction between societies with an 
integrated rental system (the social rental sector and the private rental sec-
tor compete with each other in one and the same market and are largely sub-
ject to the same kind of rent regulation) and societies with a dualist rental 
system (compartmentalisation of the rental market, no direct competition be-
tween the social rental sector and the private rental sector, strong regulation 
of rents in the social rental sector, limited or no rent regulation in the pri-
vate rental sector). The differences between these two types of rental system 
are reflected in the government’s housing policies on the one hand and in the 
characteristics of the dwellings and their residents on the other. Kemeny fo-
cuses on the former aspect (housing policies) and provides only circumstan-
tial evidence for the latter (housing outcomes). Thus, one could say that Ke-
meny only offers a partial underpinning for his typology.
In an attempt to fill this void, this paper has examined whether Kemeny’s 
typology of rental systems is supported by empirical data on housing out-
comes. For this purpose, the typology was translated into four hypotheses on 
how integrated rental systems and dualist rental systems should differ from 
each other. The hypotheses were explored with the aid of data from the Euro-
pean Community Household Panel (ECHP). Six EU countries were included 
in this deductive exploratory analysis: three were presumed integrated rent-
al systems (the Netherlands, Denmark and Austria) and three were presumed 
dualist rental systems (UK, Ireland and Belgium).
It emerged that
1.Dualist rental systems have a larger owner-occupancy sector than integrat-
ed rental systems.
2.The housing quality differences between the owner-occupancy sector and 
the social rental sector are slightly greater in dualist rental systems than in 
unitary rental systems.
3.Residualisation of the social rental sector is greater in dualist rental sys-
tems than in integrated rental systems (although the data for Ireland devi-
Figure 4.2 Percentage of households from the lowest 33.3 per cent income 
group in the social rental sector of the six EU countries, 2001
Source: European Commission, Eurostat,
European Community Household Panel, 2001 (UDB)








ate from the anticipated pattern).
4.In dualist rental systems, private rental dwellings have a higher rent than 
social rental dwellings. In integrated rental systems, only limited differenc-
es exist between rent levels for private rental dwellings and social rental 
dwellings. All in all, one can conclude that the results reported in this paper 
provide reasonable empirical support for Kemeny’s rental system typology. 
The housing outcomes in the presumed dualist rental systems are indeed 
different from the housing outcomes in the presumed integrated rental sys-
tems. This shows that divergence theories, such as the rental system typol-
ogy that was tested in this paper, are applicable and relevant.
At the same time, some important questions remain unanswered. Why is the 
residualisation in Ireland lower than one would expect on the basis of Ke-
meny’s typology? Do these research findings indicate a potential flaw in Ke-
meny’s typology or are they due to the data limitations of the ECHP? In order 
to answer the latter question, more detailed research in the countries con-
cerned is needed.
Furthermore, the results of this analysis do not necessarily mean that the 
Figure 4.3 Gross monthly rent in the social rental and the private rental 
sector in the six EU countries in 2001 (in euros)
Source: European Commission, Eurostat, 
European Community Household Panel, 2001 (UDB)
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theory that underlies the rental system typology is completely valid. To test 
this theory thoroughly, one should not only analyse the housing outcomes, 
but also the housing policies, economic processes and institutional strategies 
that underlie these housing outcomes. Do these correspond with the mecha-
nisms predicted in Kemeny’s theory or are there different processes at work? 
Some research has already been carried out in this domain by Hoekstra (2003) 
and Elsinga et al. (2005 and 2008) but only in relation to the Netherlands. 
Broadening this research to other countries is therefore desirable.
Last but not least, the question remains as to whether the observed differ-
ences are structural or temporal. Are the differences between dualist rental 
systems and integrated rental systems widening (divergence) or narrowing 
(convergence)? As Section 4.6 shows, there are some clear signs that the inte-
grated rental systems in particular are being ‘threatened’ by the reorganisa-
tion of the welfare state and by specific housing policies that prevent them 
from developing further. Another perhaps equally important threat lurks in 
the rules of the European Union. Integrated rental systems appear to be at 
odds with the ‘free market’ envisaged by the European Union. After all, the 
basis of an integrated rental system is full competition between the non-prof-
it social rental landlords (which often still enjoy some form of state support) 
on the one hand, and the profit-oriented private rental landlords on the other. 
There are indications that this competition is unequal, as the conditions are 
often not the same for both types of landlord. In economic terms: there is no 
level playingfield. In the summer of 2005, the European Commission wrote to 
the Dutch government, indicating that the Dutch social rental sector should 
limit its size by focusing more on the lowest-income groups. Even though it 
is far from clear whether the European Union is really empowered to demand 
a reorganisation of the Dutch social rental sector, this letter indicates beyond 
doubt that integrated rental systems in Europe are under mounting pressure. 
Only time will tell whether they will be able to maintain their special position, 
or whether they will be ‘forced’ to develop in the direction of a dualist rental 
system.
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 5  Homeownership and 
housing satisfaction
Marja Elsinga and Joris Hoekstra, 2005,  Journal of Housing and the Built Environ-
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Abstract
Homeownership is encouraged by many governments because it is supposed 
to have a positive effect on both the individual and society as a whole. Home-
ownership is assumed to be preferred over renting, because it provides great-
er security, more freedom, financial advantage and therefore higher housing 
satisfaction. This theory has been developed and mainly tested in English-
speaking countries. A number of researchers, most notably from continen-
tal Europe, have criticized the perceived superiority of homeownership and 
the effects that are ascribed to it by these theories. They state that, wherev-
er there is a well-developed rental sector, renting represents an adequate and 
acceptable alternative to homeownership. It can also be questioned wheth-
er the theory can be confirmed for Southern Europe, where homeownership 
seems to be part of a family tradition and not a choice.
This paper uses the European Community Household Panel to test if home-
owners are more satisfied with their housing situation than tenants. The 
results indicate that homeowners in seven out of eight countries are more 
satisfied with their housing situation than tenants. Only in Austria do home-
owners and tenants display a similar level of housing satisfaction.
Key words: homeownership, European Community Household Panel, housing satisfaction
 5.1  Introduction
In many countries, one of the objectives of housing policy is to encourage pri-
vate homeownership. This policy objective is based on the assumption that 
owning one’s own house has a positive effect on the individual and on so-
ciety as a whole. Homeownership, it is thought, will lead to greater hous-
ing satisfaction and greater self-esteem. This paper focuses on the appreci-
ation of homeownership by individual homeowners and elaborates on theo-
ries explaining and proving that homeownership is beneficial for individual 
households. Most of these theories have been developed in English-speaking 
countries. Critics of the theory emphasize that the perception and meaning 
of homeownership depend on the national institutional context. In countries 
with a well-developed rental sector and security of tenure, a rental dwelling is 
probably a very acceptable alternative to homeownership.
Empirical evidence for the theories presented is mostly drawn from sur-
veys conducted in several cities in a single country and mainly tested in Eng-
lish-speaking countries. This paper attempts to extend this discussion to oth-
er countries by making an international comparison. For this purpose, it uses 
the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), a database with compa-
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rable data from a range of countries. This database is very suitable for inter-
national comparisons and enables us to control for variables such as hous-
ing quality and social-economic status of the household. We focus on the 
relationship between housing tenure and housing satisfaction and test for 
a number of countries whether homeowners are more satisfied with their 
housing situation than tenants.
The paper starts with an overview of the literature on this topic in Section 
5.2 and then presents the results of the analysis of the ECHP in Section 5.3. 
Finally, the paper draws some conclusions and discusses the possible impli-
cations for further research and for housing policy in Section 5.4.
 5.2  Theories on the meaning and effects of 
  homeownership
 5.2.1  Homeownership as an ideal
Homeownership as natural desire and source of housing satisfaction 
Saunders (1990) offers a full account of his theories in the book A Nation of 
Homeowners. Central to this work is the assumption that people have a nat-
ural preference for homeownership rather than renting accommodation as 
tenants. Saunders believes that this preference should be a leading factor in 
housing policy. In other words, the government should encourage and facil-
itate homeownership. Saunders seeks to explain this natural preference in 
terms of people’s ‘possessive instinct’ and the desire to mark out their own 
territory (p. 70). Alongside such innate traits, there are many other reasons 
for preferring homeownership above renting. First, there is the argument that 
homeownership will, in the long term, be more financially attractive than 
renting. It also provides a feeling of autonomy, security and personal iden-
tity. Saunders points out that the preference for homeownership is particu-
larly marked in the English-speaking countries. To explain this phenomenon, 
he looks back in time and concludes that individualism was a national char-
acteristic of the English long before the eighteenth-century ‘Age of Enlighten-
ment’. Indeed, individualism and a concern for private property have been an 
essential part of the English culture for more than seven hundred years.
A number of studies have examined whether there really is a ‘natural pref-
erence’ for homeownership. Gurney (1999a, b) adopts a social-constructive 
approach in examining the significance attached to homeownership, reflect-
ing on the metaphors that are generally attached to purchase and renting 
respectively. His conclusion is that homeownership is now increasingly seen 
as ‘the norm’ in Great Britain, whereupon tenants are viewed as an ‘outsider 
group’. As a result, homeownership is perhaps mistakenly seen as an innate 
‘natural’ preference.
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The American Dream: homeownership is beneficial to the individual and 
society
Rohe et al. (2001) have collated studies into the benefits of homeowner-
ship based chiefly on the American and Australian literature. They not only 
present a general overview but also offer a theoretical foundation for the al-
leged benefits of homeownership. The studies revolve around the proposition 
that homeownership is beneficial to both the individual and the wider com-
munity. It serves to promote health, happiness and social involvement. Self-
esteem is an important factor in individual wellbeing and is largely deter-
mined by how a person believes others see him (Rohe et al., 2001). Given that 
homeowners are usually accorded a higher social status, homeownership can 
promote self-esteem because the homeowner assumes that others will grant 
him a certain status based on this factor alone. Self-esteem is influenced by 
the individual’s impression of how others perceive him. Homeownership may 
then give a feeling of ‘achievement’. Finally, self-esteem can be influenced by 
actual achievements: the purchase of property can be regarded as a signifi-
cant achievement. Perceived self-esteem is an important factor in the hous-
ing satisfaction and the general wellbeing of the individual. The relatively 
high housing satisfaction of owner-occupiers is due to the fact that they have 
attained ‘the American Dream’. The ability to maintain, decorate and modi-
fy the home to one’s own taste is also an important factor. Last but not least, 
homeownership serves to create wealth through appreciation and decreasing 
mortgage liabilities.
Empirical research conducted in surveys in the United States (Rohe and 
Stegman, 1994; Rossi and Weber, 1996) and also in the Netherlands (Elsinga, 
1995) demonstrates for a number of cities/neighbourhoods conclusively that 
homeowners display a higher degree of housing satisfaction than tenants. 
A study conducted in the United Kingdom provides some evidence in sup-
port of the hypothesis that self-esteem is greater among homeowners than 
among tenants (Saunders, 1990). However, an assessment of the differenc-
es in self-esteem between the two groups in the United States indicates that 
the main determinant is not ownership itself but the quality of the home. 
Nevertheless, owner-occupiers do believe that the purchase of a home has 
improved their quality of life (Rohe and Stegman, 1994).
A fragmented and differentiated owner-occupied sector
Besides the support for these theories voiced in the UK and the USA, they 
have also been criticized. A number of British researchers (Karn et al., 1985; 
Murie, 1986; Forrest et al., 1990) have examined the rapid growth of home-
ownership in the United Kingdom following the introduction of the ‘Right-to-
Buy’ legislation. They conclude that the growth of the owner-occupied sector, 
and in particular the increase in the number of low-income homeowners and 
properties in the less desirable areas, has led to a significant differentiation 
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within the sector. The crux of their analysis and hypotheses is that the ad-
vantages generally ascribed to homeownership do not apply to all owner-oc-
cupiers. ‘‘Homeownership may be a game that all can play, but the chances of 
winning are skewed heavily in certain directions’’. People with lower incomes 
will frequently buy property in the less desirable neighbourhoods, whereby 
the benefits are fewer and less marked. Moreover, they are frequently unable 
to undertake proper maintenance and are unable to move elsewhere. There is 
a risk that these homeowners will be ‘trapped’ in a poorly maintained house 
in a run-down neighbourhood. In that case, there are therefore no individual 
or social advantages, but rather individual and social disadvantages.
 5.2.2  The meaning and effects of homeownership depend 
on the context
It is interesting to note that the theories relating to the benefits of homeown-
ership are usually formulated by observers in the English-speaking countries. 
A number of authors question the validity of these theories when consider-
ing other countries. They suggest that in the English-speaking countries, the 
importance of homeownership has been over-emphasized and raised to the 
status of ‘ideal’ purely because no satisfactory alternative exists. In English-
speaking countries, owning a home therefore represents basic security and 
social success.
The unitary rental market as alternative
Kemeny’s interest in ownership forms was awakened in 1972 when he, an 
Englishman, arrived in Sweden. He was surprised to note that so few Swedes 
seemed to be interested in homeownership, regarding rented accommoda-
tion as a viable long-term prospect. In the years which followed, Kemeny de-
veloped a theory which seeks to explain why homeownership is regarded as 
the norm for the British middle class, while rented accommodation forms a 
perfectly acceptable alternative for most Swedes (Kemeny, 1981). He draws 
a distinction between ‘homeowning societies’ and ‘cost-rental societies’. In 
the former (the United Kingdom, United States, Australia and New Zealand) 
there is an extensive private housing market and the government promotes 
homeownership. The rental market has a dualistic character: social housing 
is in limited supply, strictly regulated, subsidized and reserved for the most 
vulnerable social groups whereby a degree of stigma attaches to it. This so-
cial housing sector is strictly separated from the commercial rental sector in 
which market prices apply.
The ‘cost-rental societies’, common in continental Europe, represent a ‘uni-
tary market’. According to Kemeny, this type of rental market is characterized 
by well-developed supply of rental dwellings and rents that are established 
on the basis of the actual cost price. Kemeny suggests that rental dwellings in 
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these cost-rental societies could be considered as a satisfying alternative to 
an owner-occupied dwelling.
Basic security in a well-developed rental sector
Like Kemeny, Behring and Helbrecht (2002) have sought an explanation for 
the low penetration of homeownership in relatively prosperous countries in 
continental Europe. Their study is particularly interesting in that it focuses 
on Germany, Austria and Sweden while also drawing comparisons with the 
Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. It presents the history, underly-
ing mentality and form of the housing market for each country. The authors 
arrive at the conclusion that, in the English-speaking countries and the coun-
tries of Southern Europe, homeownership is actually essential to acquire a 
degree of personal security and to offset individual risk. In the Southern Euro-
pean countries, the security of the extended family is a prime concern, while 
in the English-speaking countries the focus is on the financial independence 
of individual households. In the latter countries homeownership stands for 
security and success, as described by Saunders.
In prosperous countries, which have an effective social security system, this 
basic security will also extend to the rental sector in the form of tenancy pro-
tection. This in turn will render the rents so high that some subsidies will be 
required to maintain affordability. The rental sector allows people some free-
dom in that they are not obliged to enter into homeownership at an early age, 
whereupon they will be obliged to moderate their spending in other areas for 
some time to come. The authors conclude that in Germany, Austria and Swit-
zerland there is really no necessity to enter into homeownership for the pur-
poses of acquiring basic security and social acceptance. The decision to do so 
is entirely a matter of personal choice and can be made purely in the inter-
ests of satisfying individual housing preferences.
Through a study of historical development, mentality and government pol-
icy (as an expression of that mentality), Behring and Helbrecht (2002) draw 
conclusions regarding the significance of homeownership. In the English-
speaking countries, homeownership is a precondition of a feeling of securi-
ty and an indicator of success. This is reflected by housing and fiscal policies, 
which actively encourage homeownership and which accord the social rental 
sector the status of a ‘safety net’. The low proportion of owner-occupied prop-
erties in Switzerland, Austria and Germany is attributed to the effectiveness 
of the welfare state, which renders it unnecessary to own a property in order 
to experience a sense of security. Tenancy protection laws play a significant 
part here, besides the fiscal support for landlords and the size, quality and 
status of the rental sector. In these countries, people may prefer homeowner-
ship as a means of personal expression but there is no necessity to own. This 
offers people greater freedom than their counterparts in the English-speaking 
countries, the latter feeling obliged to buy, whereupon their purchasing power 
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in other areas is restricted during their early adult years.
Empirical research conducted in some cities in the Netherlands reveals that 
security and freedom, subjective factors which Saunders states are inextrica-
bly linked to homeownership, are also determining factors in the choice of 
rented accommodation. In the Netherlands the security factor is represent-
ed by the lack of any long-term capital risk and by the tenancy protection and 
price capping which are established features of the Dutch system. Freedom is 
represented by the individual’s mobility: the tenant is able to move elsewhere 
at short notice. For many of those who have opted for rented accommodation, 
these advantages formed the decisive factors in that decision (Elsinga, 1995).
Homeownership in Southern Europe
The Southern European EU countries (Spain, Italy and Greece) are character-
ized by relatively high rates of homeownership (see also Figure 5.1) and a lim-
ited social rental sector. There are different explanations for this phenome-
non. Some authors, for example Castles and Ferrera (1996), state that the 
preference for homeownership is part of the cultural heritage, whereas others 
point to the specific nature of the Southern European housing policies and 
housing provision systems. As far as the latter aspect is concerned, it is gen-
erally accepted that the Southern European distribution of tenures reflects 
policies which have strongly supported the growth of homeownership while 
discouraging rented housing through legislation strongly favouring tenants 
at the expense of landlords. Contrary to for example Germany, where tenant 
protection goes hand in hand with fiscal support for landlords, such policies 
discourage investment in rental dwellings in Southern Europe. We think that 
the cultural and the policy explanation are complementary to each other. The 
Southern European culture of homeownership is probably the result of a gen-
eralized response by households in the context of housing policies and mar-
kets, which offered no alternatives (Allen et al., 2004, p. 20).
Behring and Helbrecht (2002) reach the conclusion that most people in 
Spain own a property. In this relatively poor country, the family network is 
regarded as a form of social security and is often called up as a source of 
financing for the home. It seems that in Southern European countries home-
ownership is part of a family tradition rather than a choice. The question is 
whether the advantages of homeownership are perceived in a similar way as 
described by Saunders.
 5.2.3  Towards hypotheses
An owner-occupier of a property has the right to determine how that prop-
erty is used, maintained, fitted out, decorated and, eventually, disposed of. 
Based on these rights, homeownership is generally associated with security, 
freedom, independence, responsibility and involvement. Furthermore, the ap-
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preciation of the property and the development of personal equity through 
the gradual repayment of the mortgage loan are regarded as a financial ben-
efit. The whole package of rights, duties and investment results in a natural 
preference for homeownership in English-speaking countries, according to 
the theory described by Saunders. Therefore housing policy should encourage 
people to become homeowners.
Housing policy, however, not only influences the development of housing 
tenures but also contributes considerably to the status and the attractiveness 
of both tenures. Kemeny (1995) and Behring and Helbrecht (2002) point out 
that people in countries with a well-developed rental sector do not rely on the 
owner-occupied sector for their basic security. Government policy serves to 
ensure that the rental sector remains a reasonable alternative to homeown-
ership. Such policy has a major influence on the attractiveness of homeown-
ership as opposed to renting. On the one hand, this concerns policy towards 
the rental sector including tenure protection, subsidies and rent regulation. 
On the other hand, the policy towards the owner-occupied sector is relevant; 
to what extent do fiscal policies stimulate homeownership? In countries with 
a well-developed rental sector and a tenure-neutral policy, a rental dwelling is 
a satisfying alternative to homeownership.
Just as in the English-speaking countries, homeownership seems to be the 
norm in Southern Europe. However, in these countries homeownership may 
be more a matter of family tradition and a lack of rental dwellings than an 
innate preference. The question is whether homeownership is appreciated to 
a similar extent as in English-speaking countries.
Table 5.1 summarizes the above description of three groups of countries and 
presents hypotheses that can be tested with the help of the ECHP. The table 
also provides an overview of the countries that are included in our analysis.
When testing the relation between tenure and housing satisfaction, not 
only the rights and duties but the whole packages, including the effects of 
housing policy and culture, are the object of analysis (see Table 5.1). The ECHP 
enables us to test whether the housing satisfaction of homeowners compared 
to tenants varies from country to country. Such an analysis, however, cannot 
clarify the causality of the statistical relations that are found. If homeown-
ers appear to be more satisfied than tenants, one can only guess if this is due 
to the characteristics of the tenure, the effects of policy, cultural influences or 
some other factor.
Moreover, when comparing housing satisfaction between tenure catego-
ries, the quality of the dwelling and the social-economic status of the house-
hold will have an impact. Compared to the rental sector, the quality of owner-
occupied dwellings and the social-economic status of the homeowners are in 
general higher. A higher housing satisfaction of homeowners might therefore 
be caused by higher housing quality and higher status. Fortunately, the ECHP 
makes it possible to control for such variables.
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 5.3  Homeownership and housing satisfaction: a 
comparative statistical analysis 
As we saw in Section 5.2, various studies have established empirical evidence 
supporting the idea that homeownership is more advantageous to the indi-
vidual than renting a property. However, these studies considered the situa-
tion in one or more cities in a single country. A complete overview of the ap-
preciation of homeownership in the various countries of the European Union 
has not yet been provided. The analysis that is carried out below attempts to 
fill this void.
First of all, Section 5.3.1 describes the data and the selection of countries. 
Subsequently, Section 5.3.2 gives insight into the share of the different tenure 
categories in the various selected EU countries. This provides the context for 
the analyses that are carried out in sections 5.3.3-5.3.6. In these sections, the 
relationship between tenure category, on the one hand, and housing satisfac-
tion on the other is statistically analysed using cross tabulation and multiple 
regression analysis. These statistical analyses allow us to draw conclusions 
with regard to the validity of the hypotheses that were formulated in Section 
5.2 (Table 5.1).
 
 5.3.1  Data and selection of countries
Data
The ECHP is the data source on which the analyses that are carried out in this 
section are based. The ECHP survey asks households in all EU countries (EU15) 
questions about their employment status, financial situation, state of health 
and housing situation. Because the ECHP survey is conducted in a standard-
ized manner throughout the European Union (the same questions are asked 
in each country), the resulting ECHP database is very suitable for use in in-
ternational comparative housing studies. On the level of countries, the sur-
vey involves a sample group of between 1,760 households (Ireland) and 5,570 
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households (Italy). The ECHP data used in this paper is that for the year 2000 
(United Kingdom) and 2001 (all other selected EU countries).
When interpreting the results of this paper it should be kept in mind that 
the analyses that we carry out are not without shortcomings. First of all, it 
should be realized that the ECHP is a sample and that it is not specifically 
constructed for conducting international comparative housing research. Con-
sequently, the figures that are produced on the basis of the ECHP may not 
always be perfectly reliable and accurate. In some cases, there may even be 
significant differences between the ECHP figures and the ‘official’ housing 
statistics. However, for the kind of analyses that are carried out in this paper, 
this should not be too much of a problem. After all, the paper is not about 
detailed housing developments in one particular country but about broad and 
structural differences between the housing systems of a number of selected 
countries.
Selection of countries
Table 5.1 distinguishes three different groups of countries for each of which a 
separate hypothesis has been formulated. Obviously, this implies that the hy-
potheses can only be adequately tested if countries from each of these three 
groups are included in the analysis. For this purpose, we selected the two 
English-speaking EU countries (Ireland and the United Kingdom), three coun-
tries with a well-developed rental sector (Austria, the Netherlands and Den-
mark) and three Southern European countries (Spain, Italy and Greece).
Unfortunately, the ECHP data did not allow us to include Germany and 
Switzerland, two countries which feature prominently alongside Austria 
in Behring and Helbrecht’s research. Nor was it possible to include Sweden, 
the ‘classical’ example of a unitary rental market. This is due to the fact that 
for Germany and Sweden, some of the housing data is missing in the ECHP, 
whereas Switzerland, not being member of the European Union, is not cov-
ered by the ECHP survey.
 5.3.2  Tenure sectors in the selected EU countries
Figure 5.1 shows the share of the homeowning sector, the social rental sector 
and the private rental sector in the eight selected EU countries. Based on the 
figure, we can conclude that the highest degree of home ownership can be 
found in the English-speaking and the Southern European EU countries. How-
ever, there is one important difference between these two groups of coun-
tries. Whereas social rental dwellings dominate the rental sector in the Eng-
lish-speaking EU countries, the Southern European EU countries are charac-
terized by a very limited social rental sector and a comparatively large private 
rental sector. In the Netherlands, Austria and Denmark there is a substantial 
rental sector. In the Netherlands, this sector mainly consists of social rental 
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dwellings, but in Austria and Denmark the social rental and the private rental 
sector are of comparable size.
 5.3.3  Homeownership and housing satisfaction
The ECHP information has been analysed to gain an insight into the relation-
ship between homeownership and housing satisfaction. More specifically, we 
have sought to answer the following two questions: 
1. To what extent are there differences in housing satisfaction between home 
owners and tenants, controlling for relevant intervening variables such as 
housing quality, household characteristics and housing costs?
2. To what extent does the relationship between tenure category and housing 
satisfaction vary between the three groups of countries that were distin-
guished in Table 5.1?
The ECHP measures the housing satisfaction of households using the ques-
tion: How satisfied are you with your housing situation? Respondents can an-
swer by means of a six-point scale, where 1 indicates not satisfied at all and 
6 fully satisfied. Table 5.2 shows the scores on this housing satisfaction com-
ponent for homeowners and tenants, as both serial percentages and averages.
As can be seen from the table, homeowners in all countries are generally 
very satisfied with their current housing situation. The vast majority provide 
a rating of 4, 5 or even 6. The most satisfied of all are the Austrian, British and 
Danish homeowners, with averages of 5.36, 5.29, and 5.27, respectively, while 
those in the Southern European countries are least satisfied. Among the ten-
Figure 5.1 Share of the homeowning and rental sectors in eight EU coun-
tries, 2001
Source: European Commission, Eurostat, 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP), 2001 (UDB)
homeowning sector social rental sector private rental sector










ants, those in Austria, the United Kingdom and Denmark are most satisfied, 
while the Southern European countries once again show the lowest relative 
scores.
However, this paper is not so much concerned with the absolute satis-
faction level of tenants and homeowners, but rather with the differences 
between these two groups of households. Accordingly, the right-hand col-
umn of Table 5.2 shows the ratio of homeowner satisfaction to tenant satis-
faction. The ratio reveals that tenant satisfaction is markedly lower in all the 
selected EU countries. As far as this is concerned, there are no clear differenc-
es between the three groups of countries that we have distinguished in our 
analysis. 
Based on Table 5.2, it is tempting to conclude that, in all selected EU coun-
tries, homeowners are more satisfied with their housing situation than ten-
ants. However, this conclusion would be premature because the observed dif-
ferences may also be due to differences in housing quality, household char-
acteristics and/or housing costs. In order to correct for these factors, a multi-
ple regression analysis has been carried out. The next three sections deal with 
the variables, the method and the results of this regression analysis.
 5.3.4  Multiple regression: variables
In this section we try to find out whether the differences in housing satisfac-
tion between homeowners and tenants remain valid when we adjust for pos-
sible tenure-related differences in housing quality, household characteristics 
and housing costs. In order to make such adjustments, we carry out a mul-
tiple regression analysis in which the tenure category, the housing quality, 
the household characteristics and the housing costs are included as predic-
tor variables, whereas the housing satisfaction serves as the dependent varia-
ble. In the rest of this section, the three ‘groups’ of predictor variables, besides 
tenure category, are briefly discussed.
Housing quality
Housing quality is an important determinant of housing satisfaction. The bet-
ter the quality of the dwelling, the more satisfied the occupant of this dwell-
ing is expected to be. Since housing quality in the owner-occupied sector is in 
general higher than in the rental sector, it is important to separate the effect 
of housing quality from the effect of housing tenure. Housing quality, howev-
er, cannot be represented by one single variable. It is a broad concept that en-
compasses many housing aspects and has both an objective and a subjective 
dimension. As far as this objective dimension is concerned, four aspects are 
of particular importance: the dwelling type, the number of rooms, the pres-
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ence of facilities and the condition of the dwelling1. The first two aspects are 
included in the analysis as separate variables, whereas the latter two have 
been integrated in a so-called housing quality index, the structure of which 
is presented in Table 5.3. The subjective dimension of housing quality is rep-
resented by the variable ‘shortage of space’ (Does the accommodation have 
shortage of space?).
Household characteristics
Tenants tend to have other household characteristics than homeowners, 
which might have had an effect on the observed differences in housing satis-
faction (Table 5.2). In order to correct for this possible influence, the following 
three household characteristics are included in the multiple regression mod-
1  It should be noted that the variables that refer to this issue may have a subjective dimension as well because 
they are based on judgements of the respondents (Does the accommodation have rot in window frames or 
floors?).
Table 5.2 The relationship between tenure and housing satisfaction in the selected EU
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Source: European Commission, Eurostat, European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP), 2000 and 2001 (UDB)
Country       Type of tenure                 Housing satisfaction                    Average    Ratio owner/tenant
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el: age, household size and net household income.
Housing costs
The housing costs are expected to have a significant influence on the hous-
ing satisfaction. High housing costs are expected to result in a relatively low 
housing satisfaction, especially if the relationship between housing costs and 
housing quality is not optimal. The ECHP contains information on the hous-
ing costs for both homeowners (monthly mortgage repayments) and tenants 
(monthly rent). However, since owning and renting are two fundamentally 
different tenure sectors, it would not be correct to integrate these two vari-
ables into one single variable. After all, homeowners accumulate capital re-
turns but also bear maintenance costs, whereas tenants ‘just’ pay a month-
ly rent. This incomparability of ‘objective’ housing costs between homeown-
ers and tenants is the reason why we have decided to use a subjective indica-
tor instead, namely the opinion of the household with regard to the housing 
expenditure.
One dependent variable and nine predictor variables
Table 5.4 offers a complete overview of all the variables that are used in the 
regression analysis. The housing satisfaction serves as the dependent vari-
able. As far as this is concerned, it should be noted that the formal condi-
tions for a linear multiple regression analysis are not completely met. Strict-
ly speaking, such an analysis requires the dependent variable to be of an in-
terval or ratio scale, while in this instance the housing satisfaction has been 
measured on a six-point ordinal scale. However, for the purposes of an indic-
ative analysis, as offered by this paper, this problem is of minor importance. 
The predictor variables comprise both nominal variables and ratio variables. 
The five nominal variables have been encoded as ‘dummy’ variables, where-
as the four ratio variables are included in the analysis without further modi-
fications.
 5.3.5  Multiple regression: a stepwise methodology 
A separate multiple regression analysis was conducted for each selected EU 
country. In this analysis, a stepwise (phased) methodology was followed. In 
the first phase, only the ‘type of tenure’ (owner or tenant) variable is taken in-
to account. The housing quality variables are then introduced in phase 2, with 
the household variables in phase 3 and the households’ perception of housing 
Table 5.3 Housing quality index: structure
Aspect









1 point if present
1 point if present
1 point if present
1 point if present
1 point if no lack of light
1 point if in good condition 
1 point if no damp problems 
1 point if no dry/wet rot 
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costs added in phase 4. Table 5.5 shows the standardized regression coeffi-
cients (beta coefficients) and the explained variance (R square) for each coun-
try and for each of the four phases.
 5.3.6  Multiple regression: interpretation of the results
In the first step of the analysis, only the ‘type of tenure’ variable is introduced 
into the regression analysis. The beta coefficient for this variable is statistical-
ly significant and positive for all countries. This indicates that, without con-
trolling for other relevant variables, there is a positive relationship between 
the dummy variable ‘type of tenure’ (0=rented, 1=owner-occupied) and the 
variable ‘housing satisfaction’: homeowners show a higher level of housing 
satisfaction than tenants.
In phase 2, the four housing quality variables are introduced into the mod-
el. This results in a reduction in the values of the beta coefficients for the var-
iable type of tenure. This reduction is rather substantial in all countries, with 
the exception of Greece and Spain. Thus, one can conclude that in general, 
tenure category, housing quality and housing satisfaction are strongly relat-
ed to each other. Owner-occupied dwellings tend to have a higher housing 
quality than rental dwellings, which partly explains the higher housing sat-
isfaction of homeowners compared to tenants (see Hoekstra, 2005a for more 
information on this issue). Nevertheless, also after controlling for the tenure-
related housing quality differences, the beta coefficients for the variable ‘type 
of tenure’ remain positive and statistically significant in all countries except 
Austria.
Of the four housing quality variables that are introduced in step 2 of the 
analysis, the housing quality index and the subjective perception of the 
dwelling size (is there or is there not a shortage of space?) have the largest 
Table 5.4 Variables in the regression analysis
Variable 
Housing satisfaction (dependent 
variable)
Type of tenure (owner/tenant)
Housing quality index 
Dwelling type
Number of rooms
Space shortage in dwelling?
Age of the respondent
Income
Size of household













1 = not satisfied at all, 6 = very satisfied
0 = rented accommodation 
1 = owner-occupied accommodation
Value 0 to 8 (see Table 5.3)
0 = apartment
1 = single-family dwelling 
1 to 6 rooms 
(values in excess of 6 are counted as 6)
0 = space shortage
1 = no space shortage
Years
Net household income 
(in local currency)
0 = single-person household
1 = two or more persons
0 = housing costs are problematic
1 = housing costs are not problematic 
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influence on the housing satisfaction. By contrast, the influence of the objec-
tive size of the dwelling (number of rooms) is negligible in most countries. 
Only in Austria and the Southern European EU countries is this variable of 
Table 5.5 Beta parameters and explained variance (R square) in the regres-















































































































































































































































































Parameters which are not statistically significant (P < 0.05) are shown in italics.
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some importance. In all countries, the introduction of the housing quality 
variables within the regression model leads to a substantial improvement of 
the explained variance (R square) of the dependent variable ‘housing satisfac-
tion’.
Phase 3 involves introducing the variables ‘age’, ‘income’ and ‘size of house-
hold’. The influence of the variable ‘age’ largely differs between countries. 
In some countries, the age of a household has a clear positive autonomous 
influence on its housing satisfaction, while in other countries, such as the 
Southern European EU countries, this influence is statistically insignificant. 
In four of the eight selected EU countries, the income level does not have an 
autonomous influence on housing satisfaction. Only in the English-speaking 
EU countries and the Southern European countries Italy and Greece does this 
variable have a statistically significant positive coefficient. The variable ‘size 
of the household’ is either statistically insignificant or of limited importance 
in all eight selected EU countries. The introduction of the three household 
variables into the regression model does not bring about big changes in the 
coefficients for the variable ‘tenure type’. Nor does it result in a significant 
increase in the amount of variance that is explained by the different multiple 
regression models.
In the fourth phase, the variable ‘opinion regarding housing expenditure’ is 
added to the regression model. When controlled for the other variables in the 
model (as happens when all these variables are included in the same mul-
tiple regression model), this variable turns out to have a statistically signifi-
cant positive coefficient in five of the eight included EU countries (only in the 
Netherlands, Greece and Italy is the coefficient not statistically significant). 
This implies that in these five countries, households for whom the housing 
costs are not problematic generally have a higher housing satisfaction than 
households for whom the housing costs are problematic. Finally, we can 
observe that the addition of the housing cost variable to the multiple regres-
sion models barely affects the coefficients for the variable ‘type of tenure’ or 
the amount of variance that is explained by the different models.
Once all nine variables have been introduced into the regression model, the 
model serves to explain between 14% (United Kingdom) and 29% (Austria) 
of the variance of the dependent variable ‘housing satisfaction’. This is not 
a particularly high figure. It would therefore seem that housing satisfaction 
is not only dependent on the variables included in the regression model, but 
that other aspects (psychological factors, personal circumstances) also play a 
part.
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 5.4  Conclusions and discussion
According to Saunders (1990), people have a natural, innate desire to own 
their own home. Homeownership ensures basic security, freedom, self-es-
teem and financial advantage and therefore higher housing satisfaction. One 
group of critics point out that the benefits of homeownership are largely re-
stricted to the relatively well off in the better neighbourhoods. Other critics of 
this theory assert that the alleged advantages of homeownership are largely 
confined to the English-speaking countries. In particular, the ontological se-
curity to which Saunders refers is inextricably linked to homeownership in 
English-speaking countries, while in countries with a well-developed rent-
al sector (Kemeny, 1995; Behring and Helbrecht, 2002), it can also be found 
in the rental sector. In the latter countries rental dwellings might be consid-
ered as a satisfying alternative to homeownership. Besides English-speaking 
countries and countries with a well-developed rental sector, the Southern Eu-
ropean countries can be distinguished as a separate group. In these countries 
homeownership seems to be rather a family tradition than a housing choice. 
This paper has investigated the relationship between housing satisfaction 
and tenure in each of these three groups of countries.
The European Community Household Panel enabled us to compare the 
housing satisfaction of homeowners and tenants over the three groups of 
countries when controlling for housing quality, household characteristics and 
housing costs.
In all the selected English-speaking and Southern European EU coun-
tries, the type of tenure has an autonomous influence on housing satisfac-
tion, homeowners being more satisfied than tenants (see Table 5.5, model 4). 
This means the hypotheses that we have formulated with regard to these two 
groups of countries are supported by the empirical data. For the third group 
of countries, the societies with a well-developed rental sector, the picture is 
diverse. In Austria, the type of tenure does not have an autonomous influence 
on the housing satisfaction, which is in line with our hypothesis. However, in 
the Netherlands and Denmark, homeowners are significantly more satisfied 
with their housing situation than tenants, also if one corrects for differenc-
es in housing quality, household characteristics and housing costs. Thus, the 
hypothesis that was formulated with regard to this third group of countries 
needs to be rejected. 
 5.4.1  Directions for further research
It should be noted that the exact causes of the statistical relationships that 
we have found in our analysis remain largely unknown. We have concluded 
that in seven of the eight selected EU countries, homeowners are more satis-
fied with their housing situation than tenants. However, we still don’t know 
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whether this is the result of an innate preference for homeownership (as 
Saunders asserts) or whether it is due to housing policies that push house-
holds into the direction of homeownership. Therefore, additional research is 
needed to get a better insight into the processes that underlie the statistical 
relationships that we observed.
Do the results presented in this article imply that homeownership is the 
most satisfying tenure, no matter how well developed the rental sector is? 
Or is it possible that the countries with a well-developed rental sector once 
provided a satisfying alternative to homeownership in the past but are now 
shifting towards the homeowning model as a result of deregulation of the 
housing market? In many of these countries, the size of the social rental sec-
tor is decreasing, whereas the concentration of low-income households with-
in this sector is increasing, as shown for example by Hoekstra (2005b). Moreo-
ver, in Denmark and the Netherlands fiscal policy seems to contribute to the 
attractiveness of homeownership. For proper conclusions on this issue, fur-
ther research is necessary.
It is remarkable that Austria is the only country where tenants are as sat-
isfied as homeowners. In this country the private rental sector dominates in 
the rental market and there is no policy supporting the increase of homeown-
ership. This could be an indication that the situation is different for countries 
with a rental sector that mainly consists of private rental dwellings. Unfor-
tunately ECHP does not cover Germany and Switzerland, countries that are 
rather similar to Austria, so we cannot fully test this hypothesis.
Another question is whether the results support a housing policy encour-
aging homeownership. The relevant question here is if the increase in home 
ownership and housing satisfaction outweighs the risk of stigmatizing the 
rental sector and its tenants. Finally, the analysis shows that when improving 
housing satisfaction is the aim of housing policy, housing quality appears to 
be more important that housing tenure.
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Abstract
The conventional model of social housing in Spain is a peculiarity within Eu-
ropean housing policy, in that it is almost entirely owner-occupied. Subsi-
dized owner-occupancy housing maintains the status of social housing for a 
set number of years, during which time it cannot be sold against market pric-
es. After that period, its status changes, and the housing concerned becomes 
part of the free housing market. However, recent developments in Spanish 
housing policy suggest that this model might change in the future. In some 
Spanish regions, subsidized owner-occupancy housing is now considered as 
a separate and permanent tenure category and not as a temporal subsidy ar-
rangement. This paper discusses the background and the possible implica-
tions of this new policy perspective.
 6.1  Introduction
Spain is a country of homeowners. Of all Spanish dwellings, 81% is owner-oc-
cupied, 11% belongs to the rental sector and 8% belongs to the category ‘oth-
er’ (for example, dwellings that are provided rent free). The large majority of 
the Spanish rental dwellings is owned by individual private landlords. The 
share of the social or subsidized rental sector is very limited. Nevertheless, 
this does not mean that there is no social housing in Spain. In contrast with 
most other European countries, social housing in Spain is mainly delivered 
through the owner-occupancy sector.
From 1998 till 2007, the Spanish housing market has been characterized by 
a housing construction boom and by substantial house price increases. These 
developments were positive for housing developers and existing homeowners 
(insiders), but they have caused serious accessibility and affordability prob-
lems for first-time buyers (outsiders). Since 2008, the Spanish housing mar-
ket has entered a period of crisis; the housing production rate, the number of 
transactions and the house prices have seriously decreased. However, at the 
moment of writing, it is still too early to assess the long-term impacts of this 
housing crisis.
Traditionally, social housing in Spain is mainly provided through subsidized 
owner-occupied dwellings that are sold at below-market prices to households 
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with low and middle incomes. For a limited number of years, during the so-
called qualification period, these dwellings keep a protected status, which 
means that they may not be sold against market prices. Only when the qual-
ification period has expired does the housing concerned become part of the 
‘normal’ housing stock. Recently, there have been policy changes in some 
Spanish autonomous regions that make the qualification period much long-
er than it was before. Consequently, it seems as if the subsidized owner-occu-
pancy sector is developing into a new permanent tenure sector. This paper 
analyzes the background and the possible implications of this new develop-
ment. It is structured as follows.
Section 6.2 analyzes the house price increases and the housing construc-
tion boom on the Spanish housing market and the accessibility and afford-
ability problems in which these processes have resulted. This section also 
briefly touches upon the recent housing market crisis. As such, this sec-
tion sets the stage for the Sections 6.3 and 6.4 in which the Spanish system 
of subsidized owner-occupancy dwellings, and the recent changes that took 
place in this system, are described. Finally, Section 6.5 contains the conclu-
sions and proposes some points for discussion.
 6.2  The Spanish housing market
In the last decades, but especially in recent years, the Spanish home-owning 
sector has been characterized by large house price increases. Especially after 
the year 2000, the rise was spectacular, with average prices increasing by more 
than 10% each year (see Figure 6.1). In 2008, however, the growth came to an 
end; at the moment, the house prices are actually decreasing. According to 
the Spanish housing market index of Tinsa (2009), house prices dropped by 
8.8% between December 2008 and December 2007. Many analysts (for example 
BBVA, 2009) think this is only the start of a much larger house price reduction.
Spain is not the only European country that has known a large increase in 
house prices. A similar trend can be observed in countries such as the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands. However, in these countries the price increas-
es were mainly caused by limited supply responsiveness. Due to institution-
al factors, such as strict spatial planning and a complicated regulatory frame-
work, the production of new dwellings could keep pace with the increasing 
demand for dwellings (see Boelhouwer, 2005).
In Spain, the situation has been different. Since 1950, the Spanish hous-
ing stock has tripled while the number of households has only doubled. 
Since 2001, more than 500,000 dwellings were built each year (see Figure 6.2), 
whereas the average number of households increased by about 300,000 per 
year (Rodriguez et al., 2008).
The discrepancy between the growth in the number of households and the 
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growth in the number of the dwellings can be explained by the fact that a 
significant share of the newly built dwellings is used as a second residence, 
either by Spanish households or by households from abroad. Furthermore, 
thousands of properties have been built as personal investments. Once they 
are completed, these properties often remain uninhabited because – for a 
variety of reasons, among which speculation is an important factor – they are 
not sold or placed on the rental market (see Hoekstra and Vakili-Zad, 2006). 
Paniagua (2003) has shown that between 1991 and 2001, of every 100 dwellings 
built, 60 were intended as a main residence and 40 as other types of residen-
tial structures. The latter are not related to meeting the need for permanent 
housing and include, for example, tourist accommodation, investment prop-
erties and second homes (see Barke, 2008, for a detailed description of second 
homes in the Spanish housing market). This clearly demonstrates the impor-
tance of the investment component in the current Spanish housing market.
In 2008, the Spanish housing construction boom came to an abrupt end. 
Although the number of completions remained relatively high (about 450,000 
new dwellings were finished in the first 9 months of 2008), the number of 
housing starts dropped rather dramatically. In 2007, there were 616,000 new 
housing starts, whereas in the first 9 months of 2008 construction was started 
on only 246,000 dwellings.
Other housing-related indicators are showing a substantial decrease as 
well. Between 2007 and 2008, the number of building permits dropped from 
651,000 to 215,000 whereas the number of transactions on the housing mar-
ket decreased from 789,000 to 448,000 (BBVA, 2009). Of these 448,000 trans-
Figure 6.1 Average house prices of unsubsidized dwellings (in euros per square metre), 
2000-2009 (prices for the second quarter of each year)
Source: Spanish Statistical Institute (www.ine.es)



















actions, 216,000 concerned existing dwellings whereas 232,000 transactions 
referred to new homes. Since the sale of new dwellings (232,000) is much less 
than the number of completed new dwellings (still more than a half million 
in 2008), there is substantial oversupply of newly built dwellings. In March 
2008, the excess supply in the Spanish residential sector was estimated at 1.1 
million dwellings, and this figure is still rising (BBVA, 2009). This development 
has resulted in a high vacancy rate in the new stock. Many newly built hous-
ing complexes are standing almost or sometimes even completely empty.
Obviously, the above figures have had negative effects on the employment sit-
uation. In 2008, unemployment in the Spanish construction sector doubled. At 
the end of 2008, about 600,000 people in this sector were out of work (data on 
unemployment per sector from the Spanish statistical institute: www.ine.es).
 6.2.1  Increasing affordability and accessibility problems
As a result of the strong increase in house prices, the affordability and acces-
sibility of the home-owning sector has been significantly reduced. Figure 6.3 
shows the ‘theoretical effort’, an index that has been developed by the Span-
ish central bank (Banco de Espanã). It shows the percentage of net household 
income that the median household pays to the mortgage provider in the first 
Figure 6.2 Number of finished subsidized and unsubsidized dwellings in 
Spain, 1991-2007 
Source: Spanish Ministry of Housing (www.mviv.es)















year after the acquisition of an unsubsidized dwelling financed with a stand-
ard mortgage that covers 80% of the value of the dwelling, taking into account 
fiscal deductions. Factors such as the development of house prices and in-
comes, the interest rate and the conditions of credit providers are (implicitly) 
taken into account in this index. 
The index shows a peculiar development. It was high in 1995 and then 
dropped in the second half of the 1990s as result of a declining interest rate, 
better and easier access to mortgages, longer mortgage terms and an increasing 
share of households with two wage earners. However, due to the house price 
boom that characterized Spain in the first years of the twenty-first century, the 
index started to rise again after 2002, until it reached almost 38% in 2007.
Based on Figure 6.3, we can conclude that the affordability and accessibil-
ity of the Spanish unsubsidized owner-occupancy sector has significantly 
decreased in the last 5 years. As far as this is concerned, it should be noted 
that the already worrisome indicators in Figure 6.3 refer to Spain as a whole. 
In the regions with the highest house prices (Madrid, Catalonia and Basque 
country), the accessibility and affordability problem is actually much bigger 
than the data in the figure suggest.
 6.2.2  Tensions between stakeholders in the housing 
  market
Just like the other Mediterranean countries, Spain is a typical example of a 
home-owning society (Allen et al., 2004; Hoekstra, 2005). The Spanish focus 
on owner-occupation has created a complex system of stakeholders, all with 
their own interests: market insiders and outsiders; the construction industry; 
and the financial services. The rapid rise in house prices over the last 10 years 
Figure 6.3 The ‘theoretical effort’ indicator for the Spanish owner-
occupancy sector, 1995-2008 
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has heightened tensions between the insiders, for whom the house price in-
creases are favorable, and the outsiders. For a large part of the latter group, 
the unsubsidized owner-occupancy sector is simply not accessible anymore. 
The subsidized home-ownership sector provides a flexible means to balance 
the conflicting stakeholder interests (insiders versus outsiders) and can be 
adapted to localized market conditions. More details about the Spanish subsi-
dized home-owning dwellings are provided in Section 6.3.
 6.3  Spanish subsidized owner-occupancy dwel-
lings
In Spain the right to housing is enshrined in the Constitution (Leal, 2004). Ar-
ticle 47 of the Spanish Constitution establishes that ‘‘All Spaniards have the 
right to enjoy decent and adequate housing. The public authorities shall pro-
mote the necessary conditions and establish appropriate rules to uphold this 
right, regulating the use of land in accordance with the general interest to 
prevent speculation.’’ However, Spanish housing policy has yet been unable to 
fulfill the provisions of this constitutional mandate, witness the speculative 
tendencies and the large accessibility and affordability problems described in 
Section 6.2.
The basic characteristics of Spanish housing policy have their roots in the 
Francoist period and have remained relatively stable since that time. In fact, 
one could say that Spain has never had a genuine social housing policy. As 
highlighted by Trilla (2001), Spanish policies for the provision of housing – 
both private market housing and social or subsidized housing – have been 
shaped more by a desire to stimulate economic activity than by social policy 
per se.
It should be noted that the responsibility for housing policy is shared 
among the different tiers of government. The national government is in 
charge of coordinating housing as an economic sector. The Autonomous Com-
munities, depending on the powers granted to them in their respective stat-
utes of autonomy, are authorized to modify and complement the central 
state’s housing policies with the help of their own resources. They are respon-
sible for establishing regional housing and land-use regulations, developing 
and managing their subsidized owner-occupied and rental housing stock, and 
granting and controlling subsidization of housing investments.
An important characteristic of Spanish housing policy is the complete lack 
of tenure neutrality in the housing policy instruments. Through both direct 
(providing subsidized owner-occupancy dwellings) and indirect housing pol-
icy interventions (tax policy), the owner-occupancy sector is clearly favored 
above the rental sector. Moreover, there have been some serious policy dis-
incentives, such as the privatization of the public rental housing stock and 
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a rather strict rent regulation (especially so in the past), to both public and 
private investment in the rental sector (Leal, 2003, 2004). Consequently, the 
share of the rental sector has been reduced from more than 50% in 1950 to 
about 10% in 2001.
 6.3.1  Subsidized home-owning housing
Spain has a long-standing tradition of providing social or subsidized owner-
occupancy housing, generally referred to in Spain by the acronym VPO (Vivi-
enda de Protección Oficia – Officially Protected Housing). As pointed out by 
Sánchez García and Plandiura (2003), the very concept of subsidized housing, 
the characteristics – and even the name – have undergone constant changes 
over time, through a complex series of laws. 
After the Civil War, a policy of construction of low-quality public rental 
housing was adopted in order to meet the growing housing demand in the 
cities. This demand was caused by large-scale rural-to-urban migration asso-
ciated with the industrialization process. Nevertheless, this policy did not 
last long and had a relatively limited impact. This is related to the fact that 
the Spanish government quickly adopted the policy of selling off the stock of 
public rental housing.
Since the 1960s, the Spanish government almost uniquely focused its atten-
tion on the production of new housing intended for owner-occupancy (Leal, 
2003; Tatjer, 2005; Jurado, 2006). As the management of public rental housing 
generated considerable losses, it was argued that the promotion of owner-
occupied housing could result in the construction of more units for the same 
cost.
The policy of promoting subsidized owner-occupancy housing has since the 
onset been based on providing assistance to private developers and home-
buyers as a form of subsidization specifically designed to boost the construc-
tion sector. Within this system, the social circumstances of the recipients 
were barely taken into consideration and cronyism and fraud prevailed. The 
new home-ownership society that began to emerge required stable employ-
ment in order to assure mortgage repayments; consequently, social and polit-
ical confrontation eased off.
Still today, direct public intervention in the area of social housing is mark-
edly different in Spain than in most other EU countries, where the majority of 
social housing tends to be rented. In Spain public housing provision prima-
rily focuses on owner-occupied housing, geared towards medium- and low-
income households (households with an income below 5.5 times the mini-
mum wage). It is characterized by a strong involvement of private developers. 
The production of subsidized owner-occupancy dwellings is coordinat-
ed through a rather complex financing system in which both developers and 
homebuyers can receive financial support from the government. A part of the 
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subsidized owner-occupancy dwellings is provided by public developers that 
work on a non-profit basis (usually these are public companies that are tied 
to the municipal, provincial or regional governments) and that are financed 
with public money. Another part is provided through profit-oriented private 
developers. Private developers that build subsidized owner-occupancy dwell-
ings can apply for loans (stemming from public finance) with interest rates 
below the market rate. As a compensation for this, they have to sell the dwell-
ings at regulated prices that are well below the market prices. In other words, 
the demand for the dwellings that they build is guaranteed, but they have to 
limit their profits (Ararteko, 2007).
There have been considerable fluctuations in the number of subsidized 
owner-occupancy dwellings built each year (see also Figure 6.2). In gener-
al, one could say that the production of subsidized owner-occupancy dwell-
ings drops when the housing market is doing well (see also Figure 6.2). This is 
due to the fact that, in such circumstances, it is much more profitable for pri-
vate developers to invest in non-subsidized owner-occupancy dwellings than 
to invest in subsidized owner-occupancy dwellings (Sánchez García and Plan-
diura, 2003).
In the past, the construction of subsidized owner-occupancy dwellings 
always increased in times of crisis (Sánchez Martínez, 2002). First of all, this 
was caused by anti-cyclical investments of the government. Secondly, invest-
ing in subsidized owner-occupancy dwellings becomes more attractive for pri-
vate developers when the economy is performing badly. Although the profit 
margins in this sector are relatively small, demand is more or less guaranteed 
and financial support from the government is available. This makes the subsi-
dized owner-occupancy sector a good outlet for risk-averse investments.
 6.3.2  A temporary social housing model
An important characteristic of Spanish subsidized owner-occupancy housing 
is the temporary nature of the subsidization arrangement. Housing developed 
with the help of public money (called VPO housing) is only considered as sub-
sidized housing for a given period of time: the so-called qualification period. 
During that period, subsidized owner-occupancy dwellings can only be sold 
against prices that are determined by the government (generally the price 
of new subsidized owner-occupancy dwellings). The aim of this is to prevent 
speculation. When the qualification period expires, the housing concerned 
loses its status as subsidized housing and is incorporated into the ‘normal’ 
housing stock, which implies that it can be sold at market prices. This sys-
tem dates back to the 1950s and 1960s, when social housing had a qualifica-
tion period of between 20 and 50 years (Sánchez García and Plandiura, 2003). 
In 1978, a standard qualification period of 30 years was established. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, a new form of subsidized owner-occupan-
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cy housing with no qualification period was created: Vivienda a Precio Tasa-
do (VPT). The price of this medium-cost housing was lower than the market 
price but much higher than the price of VPO housing. As mentioned above, 
the VPT housing was not subject to the 30-year qualification period that 
applied to VPO housing. However, recipients of VPT housing who sold the 
dwelling within 5 years were required to pay any personal subsidies they had 
received back to the government. Since VPT dwellings could be sold against 
market prices immediately after purchase, they soon became a profitable 
object for speculation (Sánchez García and Plandiura, 2003).
In 1993, all subsidized owner-occupancy housing provided prior to 1978 
was liberalized. In other words, a large part of the stock of VPO housing was 
retroactively deregulated, being released from the 20- or 50-year protection 
arrangements and the maximum sales prices applicable during those peri-
ods. In 1998, the maximum duration of the qualification period for VPO hous-
ing was reduced from 30 to 20 years. During this 20-year qualification period, 
the sales price of the dwelling was not allowed to exceed the maximum price 
decided by the government. This maximum price was based on the selling 
prices of new subsidized owner-occupancy dwellings. Furthermore, if a sub-
sidized dwelling is sold in the first 10 years after purchase, all the personal 
subsidies that were tied to the VPO regime plus the legal interests have to be 
repaid to the government.
 6.3.3  Regional differences
The share of subsidized owner-occupancy housing differs between the Span-
ish regions (see Table 6.1). The lowest percentage of subsidized homeowner-
ship can be found in the island regions (Baleares 5%, Canarias 6%), the high-
est in the northern regions of Navarra (19%) and the Basque country (16%). 
Each year almost 1% of the subsidized dwelling stock is declassified as the 
qualification period elapses. As far as this is concerned, there are no clear dif-
ferences between the various Spanish regions.
 6.4  Towards a permanent subsidized owner-
occupancy sector?
Because the qualification period for subsidized owner-occupancy housing 
(VPO housing) is limited in time, the owners of such dwellings have good pos-
sibilities to make profits in the longer term. After all, the house prices on the 
free housing market are much higher than the house prices of subsidized 
owner-occupancy dwellings. Especially in regions with very high house prices in 
the non-subsidized owner-occupancy sector, such as Madrid, Catalonia and the 
Basque country, the potential for profit-making is substantial (see Figure 6.4).
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Recently, some steps have been taken towards limiting the temporary 
aspect of subsidized owner-occupancy housing in Spain. These changes have 
come about in a social context that is characterized by keen awareness of 
Spanish public opinion in relation to the issue commonly referred to as ‘the 
housing problem’. Various young people’s associations have begun to mobi-
lize, claiming the right of the young to a decent home without being burdened 
by a high mortgage for the rest of their lives. Furthermore, many consider it 
unfair that the young (outsiders) have such difficulty finding an affordable 
dwelling, whereas people who bought a subsidized dwelling 20 or 30 years ago 
(insiders) can now make large profits.
In our opinion, all these factors have considerably influenced the policy-
makers in their decision to begin taking steps towards limiting the temporary 
nature of subsidized owner-occupancy housing. Indeed, the 2005-2008 Hous-
ing and Land Plan established a minimum qualification period of 30 years for 
traditional social housing (VPOs), which can be changed at the discretion of 
the Autonomous Communities. The Plan also established that the Autono-
mous Communities are free to determine the qualification period for medi-
um-cost VPT housing.
If an owner of a subsidized owner-occupancy dwelling wants to sell that 
dwelling (second-time or subsequent sale), it should be sold to potential 
buyers who are listed in a register that has been set up by the Autonomous 
Communities so that fraud can be prevented.1 According to the 2005-2008 
state plan, second-time and subsequent sales of subsidized owner-occupan-
cy dwellings are bound to a maximum sales price that is determined by each 
autonomous region and that is capped by the central government at twice the 
initial sales price (adjusted in line with the Consumer Price Index). This cap 
has been criticized, as it still leaves considerable room for profit-making.
 6.4.1  Regional differences
Within the regulatory framework described above, the autonomous regions 
have the freedom to implement their own regulations with regard to the 
qualification period of subsidized owner-occupancy dwellings (Burón, 2006). 
As far as this is concerned, three types of Autonomous Communities can be 
distinguished.
1. Autonomous Communities that have opted for permanent or nearly perma-
nent qualification.
1 However, due to the opposition of some of the Autonomous Communities, which claimed they would have dif-
ficulty implementing those registers immediately, this measure was not made compulsory in a transitional period, 
with the Communities being left to establish their own control measures to avoid fraud in the sale of subsidized 
housing.
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2. Autonomous Communities that apply a qualification period of 30 years, in 
line with the timescale set by the 2005-2008 State Plan.
3. Autonomous Communities that, through different regional varieties of sub-
sidized housing, have reduced the qualification period to below the 30-year 
benchmark period. This last case includes, for instance, Viviendas de Pro-
tección Pública, a form of subsidized rental housing with an option to buy, 
introduced by the Autonomous Community of Madrid, which can be declas-
sified after 7 years, and the Vivienda Protegida Autonómica, also in the 
Madrid region, which can be declassified after 15 years.
The first option is chosen in the Autonomous Communities of Catalonia, As-
turias, Extremadura and the Basque Country. In 2004, the Autonomous Com-
munity of Catalonia established a 90-year qualification period for VPO hous-
ing, whereas the Autonomous Community of Extremadura gave all the VPO 
housing a permanent character. Similarly, the Autonomous Community of 
Asturias established the qualification of social housing until such time as the 
property is declared unfit.
The Autonomous Community of the Basque Country deserves separate 
mention. This region made a pioneering move when it established a perma-
nent qualification of all subsidized owner-occupancy housing in 2002. The 
background of this is discussed in more detail below.
 6.4.2  The case of the Basque Country
The Basque Country (Comunidad Autonoma del País Vasco: CAPV) is the au-
tonomous region with the highest house prices in Spain (see Figure 6.4). With 
a share of 16% of the total stock of owner-occupancy dwellings, the subsi-
dized home-owning sector is relatively important in this region (see also Ta-
ble 6.1). In recent years, the Basque government (as well as the provinces and 
municipalities in the region) invested rather heavily in the subsidized sec-
tor. Between 2001 and 2004, no less than 44% of all the housing starts in the 
Basque Country concerned subsidized homeownership dwellings (Ararteko, 
2007).
Since 2002, subsidized owner-occupancy housing has a permanent status in 
this autonomous region. Moreover, the Basque government has a first right to 
buy for all VPO sales on the free market so that they can subsequently real-
locate the housing (see Ararteko, 2007) for an extensive and detailed descrip-
tion of the Basque policies towards subsidized homeowner housing).
The above policy measures are widely accepted by Basque society. Accord-
ing to the Survey of Housing Needs and Demand conducted by the CAPV in 
2005 (Department of Housing and Social Affairs, 2006), the vast majority of 
the Basque population was in favor of the permanent qualification of social 
housing. More specifically, 89.7% of young people seeking their first home 
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and 90.4% of the households that want to move to another dwelling approved 
of this initiative.
The sale of subsidized owner-occupancy social housing with limited lease-
hold is another recent feature of housing policy in the Basque region. For 
some years now, the bulk of subsidized owner-occupancy housing in the 
CAPV has been provided under a 75-year leasehold arrangement. This means 
that the government retains the ownership of the land on which housing is 
built. After 75 years, the units themselves also become the property of the 
government. This period remains fixed, regardless of any changes of owner. 
In reality, however, there are few owners of subsidized dwellings who wor-
ry about these conditions. Most of these people consider themselves as ‘full 
homeowners’ and expect that the strict conditions will be relaxed in the 
course of time.
Further limitations on the ownership of subsidized owner-occupancy hous-
Figure 6.4 Prices of unsubsidized and subsidized owner-occupancy dwellings in Spanish 
autonomous regions, in euros per square metre, fourth trimester of 2008
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ing are currently under discussion. For example, it has been suggested to 
review the circumstances of the occupants of subsidized owner-occupancy 
dwellings at given intervals, in order to ascertain whether there has been any 
change in their financial and economic situation. If occupants are found to no 
longer be entitled to continue living in subsidized housing, they will have to 
give it up (possibly against a compensatory sum of money).2
However, until now, this discussion has not resulted in concrete policy 
measures at the regional level.
Recent housing policy developments in the Basque Country are very much 
influenced by the current economic and housing crisis, as well as by the fact 
that there are regional elections in 2009. Given the rising unemployment and 
the increasing number of people who have problems paying their mortgage, 
the Basque government has proposed to buy the dwellings, either subsidized 
or unsubsidized, from people who are in financial problems. The former own-
er of the dwelling can then keep on living there as a tenant, paying a month-
ly rent to the Basque government. Moreover, a right to buy applies so that 
the former owner can repurchase the dwelling when his financial situation 
improves (information from www.etxebide.net, 2009).
2 Actually, there is a community in the Basque Country, Getxo, where such a system is already in force. 
Table 6.1 Number of subsidized, formerly subsidized (declassified) and unsubsidized 










































































































































































Source: Spanish Ministry of Housing (Estimación del parque de viviendas)
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 6.5  Conclusions and discussion
This paper has shown that there are some serious problems on the Spanish 
housing market. Despite the impressive housing production rate, the house 
prices are very high and there are affordability and accessibility problems for 
first-time buyers, especially in the more urbanized regions such as Madrid, 
Catalonia and the Basque Country. For many young households that want to 
buy a dwelling, the subsidized owner-occupancy sector is the only alternative.
Traditionally, the Spanish subsidized owner-occupancy sector was a tem-
porary sector. As a result of the big price differences with the unsubsidized 
sector, this offered good possibilities for profit-making once the qualification 
period had ended. In order to prevent this, various Autonomous Communi-
ties have recently developed policies that give the subsidized owner-occupan-
cy sector a more permanent character. Some Autonomous Communities have 
now chosen for a permanent or nearly permanent qualification period. This 
implies that a ‘new’ permanent or semi-permanent tenure category is being 
created.
Spain is not the only country with a permanent or semi-permanent sub-
sidized owner-occupancy sector. More or less comparable sectors exist in 
countries such as the United Kingdom (shared ownership, home buy), Ireland 
(affordable housing scheme), the United States (Low Equity Housing Coopera-
tives), and the Netherlands (see Elsinga, 2005, for more information on these 
schemes). Also in some Asian countries, notably in Singapore and Hong Kong, 
subsidized owner-occupancy dwellings are a common phenomenon (Ronald, 
2008). All the countries mentioned above have seen large increases in house 
prices, which have made the homeownership sector less accessible and 
affordable for starters on the housing ladder. Moreover, most of the countries 
concerned (with the exception of the Netherlands and to a lesser extent Hong 
Kong) can be characterized as home-owning societies. Therefore, we tenta-
tively conclude that the emergence of a more or less permanent subsidized 
homeownership sector is a phenomenon that can primarily be seen in coun-
tries that have known a large increase in house price and in which there is a 
general preference for home-owning. This certainly applies to Spain and even 
more so to the Basque Country.
 6.5.1  Discussion
In our opinion, the more permanent nature of the Spanish subsidized own-
er-occupancy sector in at least some regions is a positive development. It al-
lows for a fairer and more efficient allocation of government resources. After 
all, the government subsidies stay in the subsidized sector and are not trans-
ferred to a ‘random’ homeowner.
At the same time, the creation of a permanent subsidized owner-occupan-
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cy sector may have consequences for the further development of the hous-
ing market in the regions concerned. It can, for example, result in a further 
reduction of the already relatively low mobility rate. If occupants of subsi-
dized owner-occupied dwellings are not able to accumulate significant assets 
in their dwelling by taking profit from house prices increases, it will be dif-
ficult, as well as financially unattractive, for them to move to an unsubsi-
dized dwelling in a later stage of their life. At the moment, the price differ-
ence between subsidized and unsubsidized owner-occupancy dwellings is so 
large that it is difficult to bridge this gap on the basis of income increases and 
personal savings alone. Thus, the creation of a permanent subsidized owner-
occupancy sector might lead to a compartmentalization of the housing mar-
ket. It can result in a subsidized owner-occupancy sector on the one hand, an 
unsubsidized owner-occupancy sector on the other hand, and little interac-
tion between these two segments. In the long run, intergenerational transfers 
might even pass on the above difference from one generation to another.
This can possibly be prevented by the creation of an intermediary sec-
tor. Such a sector already exists in the form of VPT housing, which is more 
expensive and offers more quality than ordinary subsidized owner-occupan-
cy housing but is still less expensive than the unsubsidized owner-occupancy 
sector. This VPT housing can possibly function as a bridge between the subsi-
dized owner-occupancy sector (VPO) and the unsubsidized owner-occupancy 
sector. Nevertheless, we doubt whether this is a real solution since the price 
differences between VPT housing and unsubsidized housing are still consid-
erable. Thus, the stimulation of VPT housing might as well result in the crea-
tion of yet another segment within the Spanish owner-occupancy sector (next 
to the VPO dwellings and the unsubsidized dwellings).
Finally, one may wonder how the VPO sector will develop in the current 
housing market crisis. In the past, the production of subsidized owner-occu-
pancy dwellings increased in times of limited production of unsubsidized 
owner-occupancy dwellings (see Figure 6.2). An increased production of sub-
sidized owner-occupancy dwellings also entails more expenditure by the 
national or regional governments. In the last decade, the subsidized owner-
occupancy dwellings were built with no or few government production subsi-
dies. To a large extent their construction was paid by the proceeds (for either 
the government or the developers) that resulted from the construction of 
unsubsidized homeowning dwellings. But in the current context of decreas-
ing house prices and decreasing housing production, such cross-subsidization 
is not possible anymore. The government will have to step in with extra mon-
ey if it wants to maintain a steady production of subsidized homeownership 
dwellings. Also, with the current decrease in house prices, it is difficult to 
assess at which price the government should buy subsidized homeownership 
dwellings in the case of a sale of the dwelling during the qualification period.
In connection with this, one could ask whether it is really desirable to strive 
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for a high production of subsidized owner-occupancy dwellings in the future. 
In Section 6.2 we have shown that the Spanish housing market crisis has 
partly been caused by an oversupply of dwellings. More than one million new-
ly built dwellings are currently empty. Both the Spanish government and vari-
ous regional governments have taken initiatives that aim to add vacant dwell-
ings to the rental sector. We think that it might be a good idea to extend this 
strategy to the home-owning sector. The government could buy empty unsub-
sidized houses from developers or households and transform them into VPO 
housing. This is not a solution that can be applied anywhere and anytime, 
but in some cases it should definitely be considered. In our opinion, a sensi-
ble VPO strategy not only focuses on new housing construction but also takes 
into account the developments in the existing housing stock.
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Abstract
In a ‘normal’ housing market, one would expect that rising house prices go 
together with low vacancy rates and vice versa. However, in Spain, this has 
not been the case. Until very recently, Spain was characterised by strongly 
rising house prices as well as by a high rate of vacant dwellings. This is the 
Spanish paradox. This exploratory paper attempts to explain this paradox 
from a welfare regime perspective. The Spanish welfare and housing system 
has a number of specific characteristics, such as a political ideology and cul-
ture of homeownership, a history of strong rural to urban migration, a large 
role for the family, and a relatively strict rent regulation and tenant protec-
tion. The paper will show that all these characteristics contribute to the Span-
ish paradox.
The paper will also indicate how the Spanish paradox relates to the specu-
lative bubble in the Spanish property sector that has recently burst.
Key words: Vacant dwellings, Spain, housing market analysis, welfare state, housing 
bubble, homeownership
 7.1  Introduction
According to basic economics, the relationship between vacancy rates and 
house prices should be rather straightforward. In a housing market with per-
fect competition, the house price is a function of supply and demand. If the 
demand for dwellings is higher than the supply of dwellings, there will be a 
shortage of dwellings and the house prices will rise (Thalmann, 2008). In that 
case the vacancy rate will be low, because house seekers will quickly occupy 
vacant dwellings. Thus, we can expect a negative association between the va-
cancy rate on the one hand, and the development of house prices on the oth-
er. A low vacancy rate means a shortage of dwellings and therefore an upward 
pressure on house prices. On the contrary, a high vacancy rate indicates an 
oversupply of dwellings and therefore a downward pressure on house prices. 
Only when the housing market is in balance, does the vacancy rate not influ-
ence house prices.
The vacancy rate necessary for the market to be in equilibrium is not zero, 
because every housing market needs a certain ‘friction vacancy rate’ in order 
to be able to function smoothly. In this sense, the housing market is com-
parable to the labour market. The labour market cannot function efficiently 
with zero unemployment. There always need to be some people between two 
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jobs (Thalmann, 2008). The friction vacancy rate depends on the local hous-
ing market situation. In the United States, an often cited rule of thumb states 
that the vacancy rate that is needed to maintain stable prices in a well func-
tioning market is about 5 per cent (Kingsley & Turner, 1993, p. 10).
This paper will show that the reality can be quite different than the basic 
economic theory above suggests. This point is illustrated by focusing on the 
Spanish housing market. In Spain, high vacancy rates have gone hand in 
hand with rising house prices for a considerable period of time. Apparently, 
the Spanish housing market functioned according to a particular rationale 
that contradicts basic economic theory. We call this the Spanish paradox. This 
paper explores this paradox from a welfare regime perspective. We look at the 
specific traits of the Spanish welfare and housing system, and we use these 
characteristics to explain the peculiar relationship between vacancy rate and 
house price development. In the next section, we touch upon the definition-
al and measurement problems that are associated with the concept ‘vacan-
cy rate’ and we illustrate the Spanish paradox with the help of some interna-
tional comparative figures. Subsequently, we provide some basic information 
on vacant Spanish dwellings and examine at which spatial scale the Spanish 
paradox is visible. After that, we take a more theoretical and explanatory per-
spective and we link the Spanish paradox to a number of specific character-
istics of the Spanish welfare and housing system. The final section explores 
the relationship between the Spanish paradox and the current financial and 
housing market crisis.
 7.2  The Spanish paradox
A vacant dwelling is generally defined as a dwelling that is empty at a par-
ticular point in time. The term ‘vacant dwelling’ may refer to a wide range of 
situations: dwellings that are on offer on the housing market (for sale or to 
let); dwellings that are empty between change of occupants; dwellings that 
are undergoing modernisation, repair or conversion; dwellings that are await-
ing demolition; newly completed but yet not occupied dwellings; and dwell-
ings that are kept away from the housing market for some reason or another 
(for example, because of speculation).
The vacancy rate is generally measured with the help of censuses or hous-
ing need surveys. Unfortunately these censuses and surveys often tend to 
overestimate the number of vacant dwellings as a result of methodological 
problems. In Spain for example, the census takers visit a dwelling only a lim-
ited number of times. When there are no people at home during these vis-
its, the dwelling concerned is classified as vacant. In reality, however, some of 
the dwellings that are registered as vacant may actually be inhabited by peo-
ple who are often away from home. Others may in fact be second residences; 
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they are temporarily vacant instead of being permanently vacant (Leal, 2004).
Research in the autonomous region Basque country has shown that 37 per 
cent of the dwellings that are registered as vacant in the census are in real-
ity in use as second homes (Ararteko, 2007). Similar results were found in 
research on empty dwellings in Scotland (Wallace et al., 2005). Thus, in prac-
tice, it is often difficult if not impossible to assess whether a dwelling is tem-
porarily or permanently vacant. Consequently, statistics with regard to vacan-
cy rates should be interpreted with caution. 
International comparative statistics on vacancy rates are scarce. The only 
data source that we have found is the publication Housing Statistics in the 
European Union (National Board of Housing, Building and Planning Swe-
den/Ministry for Regional Development of the Czech Republic 2004; Minis-
try of Infrastructure of the Italian Republic/Federcasa Italian Housing Fed-
eration, 2006). Based on this data source, Figure 7.1 shows the vacancy rates 
in 11 Western and Southern European Union countries. From Figure 7.1, it is 
clear that the Mediterranean EU-countries have a higher rate of vacant dwell-
ings than the other countries in the European Union. With 22 per cent vacant 
dwellings, Malta has by far the highest vacancy rate of the countries in the 
figure. However, the Spanish vacancy rate is also relatively high, even if one 
takes into account that it may be somewhat overestimated (however, such an 
overestimation may as well apply to the other EU-countries in Figure 7.1). 
Based on economic theory, one would expect that high vacancy rates are 
accompanied by decreasing house prices and vice versa. Figure 7.2 shows the 
relationship between vacancy rates on the one hand and the development of 
real house prices on the other hand in eight of the 11 countries from Figure 
Figure 7.1 Share of vacant dwellings (as percentage of the total dwelling stock) in 11 selected 
EU countries, different years
Sources : National Board of Housing, Building and Planning Sweden;Ministry for 
Regional Development of the Czech Republic (2004); 
Italian Ministry for Infrastructure/Federcasa (2006); National Statistics Office Malta (2007)













7.1 (comparable data on house price development for Portugal, Greece and 
Malta were unfortunately not available).
For the house price development, we looked at the period 1996–2006. For 
the vacancy rates, we did not look at the most recent figures but at the situ-
ation in the 1990s (1990 for the Netherlands, 1991 for Spain, 1996 for France, 
1998 for Germany and 1995 for the other countries in Figure 7.2). In this way, 
the vacancy rate acts as a predictor for future house price developments. If 
the vacancy rate was high in the mid-1990s, a relatively low or possibly even 
negative real house price growth can be expected in the decade that fol-
lows. The opposite is expected for countries that had a low vacancy rate in 
the mid-1990s. For these countries, a relatively high increase in house price 
seems plausible. Figure 7.2 shows that this hypothesis is only partly support-
ed by the empirical data. In statistical terms, there is only a slightly nega-











Figure 7.2 The relationship between vacancy rate (mid-1990s) and the 
development of the real house prices (1996–2006) in 8 EU-countries
Sources: International Centre for Research and Information on the Public and Co-operative 
Economy (2002); National Board of Housing, Building and Planning, Sweden/Ministry for 
Regional Development of the Czech Republic (2004); Italian Ministry for Infrastructure/ 






























development of the house prices on the other hand.
For Germany, Figure 7.2 shows a ‘logical’ picture. In this country, a rath-
er high vacancy rate is accompanied by decreasing real house prices. For the 
Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, Denmark 
the picture also makes sense in terms of the theoretical explanation. These 
countries have had relatively low vacancy rates as well as relatively large 
increases in real house prices. For France and Finland the vacancy rates seem 
to be rather high compared to the price increases that they have experienced. 
However, as far as this is concerned, it is Spain that stands out particularly. In 
Spain with a very high vacancy rate (15 per cent) has gone hand in hand with 
a large increase in real house prices. It is the aim of this paper to explore this 
‘Spanish paradox’.
 7.3  Vacant dwellings in Spain 
In Spain, data on vacant dwellings are only collected through the Spanish 
census, which generally takes place once every ten years. The last Spanish 
census was carried out in 2001. According to this census, Spain had 20.95 mil-
lion dwellings. Of this dwelling stock, only 68 per cent is a primary residence. 
The rest of the stock consists of second homes (16 per cent), vacant dwell-
ings (15 per cent) and the category ‘other’ (1 per cent). As far as this is con-
cerned, second homes are defined as ‘dwellings that are only used part of the 
year and that do not constitute the primary residence of one or more persons’ 
(for more detailed information about second homes in Spain, see Módenes & 
López-Colás 2007; Barke 2008). Vacant dwellings are defined as ‘dwellings that 
are not occupied by a household and that do not serve as a second home’. 
The category ‘other’ consists of housing such as mobile homes and student 
accommodation.
Figure 7.3 shows how the share of vacant dwellings in Spain has developed 
between 1950 and 2001. The figure makes clear that the high share of vacant 
dwellings in Spain is not a recent phenomenon. Especially between 1960 
and 1970 the vacancy rate increased rapidly, mainly as a result of an exten-
sive rural to urban migration. Already in 1970, almost 13 per cent of the Span-
ish dwelling stock consisted of vacant dwellings. The vacancy rate reached a 
peak in 1980 (16.3 per cent vacant dwellings) and has remained relatively sta-
ble since then. Based on this, we can conclude that having a high vacancy rate 
has developed into a structural characteristic of the Spanish housing system.
Characteristics of vacant dwellings
The question is whether the vacant dwellings constitute a distinct sec-
tor of the Spanish housing market in terms of geographical location, age of 
the dwelling and type of building. Table 7.1 shows the distribution of vacant 
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dwellings by size of municipality. The table makes clear that the vacant dwell-
ings are spread rather evenly over the different sizes of municipalities. They 
are not only found in small municipalities; also in the larger cities there is a 
vacancy rate of about 15 per cent. This implies that nowadays, the phenom-
enon of high vacancy rates cannot solely be linked to the process of rural to 
urban migration, which results in empty dwellings in smaller rural villages. 
Rather, it is a much broader phenomenon that applies to both rural and urban 
municipalities.
Table 7.2 shows the building period of the dwellings that are empty accord-
ing to the census of 2001, split up between urban and rural areas. When inter-
preting this table, it should be kept in mind that, according to the Spanish 
census, residential buildings that have been substantially modified are con-
sidered to be built on the date of modification. The table shows that older 
dwellings are more often vacant than newer dwellings. Of the dwellings built 
before 1900, one in every five is vacant, whereas this is ‘only’ one in every 
ten for the dwellings that were built between 1981 and 1990. As far as these 
figures are concerned, there are hardly any differences between urban and 
rural regions. However, it is striking that for the urban dwellings that were 
built after 1991 the vacancy rate is 19 per cent. It is probable that a significant 
share of these dwellings has never been occupied since the dwelling was con-























structed or modified, which may be an indication of speculation.
It is often thought that a substantial share of the vacant dwelling stock is 
empty because the dwelling concerned is not suitable for habitation. Howev-
er, Table 7.2 shows that this assumption needs to be nuanced somewhat. Of 
all the vacant Spanish dwellings, no less than 81 per cent is in good state of 
repair, whereas this is 90 per cent for the total Spanish dwelling stock. Never-
theless, there is a clear relationship between the age of the vacant dwelling 
and the condition of the dwelling; older vacant dwellings are more often in a 
Table 7.1 Vacant dwellings by size of municipalities, Spain, 2001






















































Source: Spanish census 2001 (www.ine.es)
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* Urban regions are municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants, whereas rural areas are municipalities with 
less than 10,000 inhabitants.
** Defined as dwellings in a ruinous, bad or deficient condition.
Source : Spanish census 2001 (www.ine.es)
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worse condition than newer vacant dwellings.
The Spanish paradox at a provincial and municipal level
Housing markets do not function at a national level but at a regional level. 
Bourne (1981, p. 73) defines a functional housing market area as a contigu-
ous geographical area, more or less bounded, within which it is possible for 
a household to trade or substitute one dwelling unit for another without also 
altering its place of work or its pattern of social contacts. Functional housing 
market areas tend to be organised around one or more main cities. In Spain, 
such functional housing market regions are likely to have a spatial scale that 
is somewhere between the level of the provinces and the level of the mu-
nicipalities. A positive correlation between vacancy rate and house price in-
crease at the national level is not necessarily repeated at the level of func-
tional housing market areas (provincial or municipal level). As far as this is 
concerned, there are basically three options: 
1. The relatively high vacancy rate is a structural characteristic of the Span-
ish housing system as a whole, but on a regional level the housing mar-
kets function according to the ‘normal’ economic logic. In that case, hous-
ing market regions with a relatively high vacancy rate would be character-
ised by a relatively low house price increase (or maybe even a house price 
decrease) and vice versa.
2. There is no clear correlation between vacancy rates and house price devel-
opment at the regional level. This suggests that there is no direct causal 
relationship between the two factors.
3. The ‘Spanish paradox’ also applies to the regional level; provinces and 
Figure 7.4 Vacancy rate (2001) and nominal house price development (2002-2005) in 50 
Spanish provinces





















municipalities with a high vacancy rate are also characterised by a relative-
ly large increase in house price.
In order to get insight into the relationship between vacancy rates and house 
price developments at a provincial level, we used vacancy rate data for No-
vember 2001 (the reference date of the last Spanish census) and we matched 
these data with data on nominal house price developments for the four year 
period thereafter (from the first quarter of 2002 until the last quarter of 2005). 
We included 50 Spanish provinces in this analysis (all Spanish provinces with 
the exception of Ceuta and Melilla).
Figure 7.4 shows the relationship between the two variables. The figure 
makes clear that at a provincial level, there is no clear relationship between 
vacancy rate and house price development (r = 0.07). Thus, option 2 seems 
to apply here. Furthermore, it is clear that the spread in vacancy rate is con-
siderably smaller than the spread in house price development. The vacancy 
rate ranges between 8 per cent and 19 per cent (coefficient of variation = 0.17), 
whereas the house price increase ranges between 21 per cent and 99 per cent 
(coefficient of variation = 0.32).
Because the provincial scale may still be higher than the spatial scale on 
which the housing market functions, we repeated the above analysis at the 
level of the municipalities. For reasons of data availability, we could only 
include municipalities that have more than 25,000 inhabitants and for which 
Figure 7.5 Vacancy rate (2001) and nominal house price development (2002-2005) in 194 
Spanish municipalities with more than 25,000 inhabitants
























data on house price developments are available through the website of the 
Spanish taxation institution (Sociedad de Tasación S.A., www.st-tasacion.es). 
In total, data from 194 municipalities were included in the analysis (see Fig-
ure 7.5). The picture of Figure 7.5 is largely comparable to the picture of Fig-
ure 4. Here, there is also no clear relationship between the vacancy rate and 
the development of house prices (r = -0.04). On the municipal level, the spread 
in vacancy rates (ranging from 4.3 per cent to 26.6 per cent, coefficient of var-
iation = 0.30) is bigger than at the provincial level. It is comparable to the 
spread in house price development  (ranging from 32 per cent to 153 per cent, 
coefficient of variation = 0.28).
In sum, we can conclude that Spain is characterised by a high vacancy rate 
and a high increase in house price but that on the provincial and municipal 
level, there is no clear relationship between these two factors. In our opin-
ion, this observation can be explained by referring to some specific character-
istics of the Spanish welfare and housing system. In the next section we fur-
ther elaborate on this.
 7.4  Explanations from a welfare regime perspec-
tive
Figure 7.1 has shown that high vacancy rates are mainly a Southern European 
phenomenon. Based on this, we hypothesised that there might be a relation-
ship between the characteristics of the Southern European welfare and hous-
ing systems and the vacancy rate. In the remainder of this paper, we further 
explore these ideas. First, we briefly describe the main features of the South-
ern European welfare and housing system. After that, we will illustrate how 
these characteristics contribute to a high vacancy rate. Finally, we explain 
why the relationship between vacancy rate and house price development is 
less straightforward than one would expect on the basis of economic theory 
and we try to provide an explanation for the Spanish paradox. Although the 
theoretical framework that we apply refers to all Southern European coun-
tries, the examples that we use and the data that we interpret only refer to 
Spain. Further research will have to show whether the tentative conclusions 
that we draw also apply to the other Southern European countries.
Mediterranean welfare and housing systems
Theories and typologies of welfare states and systems are widely used in inter-
national comparative housing research, with Esping-Andersen’s framework be-
ing the most used one. According to Esping-Andersen (1990), one should not 
speak of ‘the’ welfare state, since different welfare states have different charac-
teristics. He argues that there are three ideal typical welfare state regimes (lib-
eral, corporatist and social-democratic), which fundamentally differ from each 
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other on aspects like the degree of decommodification (decommodification re-
fers to government interventions that reduce a citizen’s reliance on the market), 
the relationship between welfare state policies and forms of social stratification 
and the ‘mix between State, market and family’ in the design and delivery of 
welfare services (Esping-Andersen 1990, Allen et al. 2004). 
In the original typology of Esping-Andersen, the Mediterranean countries 
(with the exception of Italy which was classified as a corporatist welfare state 
regime) were left out of consideration. As a reaction to this omission, differ-
ent researchers (for example Leibfried, 1992; Barlow & Duncan, 1994; Ferrera 
,1996; Moreno, 2000) have proposed formulating a ‘new’ welfare state regime 
for the Southern European countries, using various names (for example, rudi-
mentary welfare state regime, Latin Rim regime, Mediterranean welfare state 
regime) to indicate this regime type. In the rest of this paper, we will use the 
term ‘Mediterranean welfare state regime’ to describe the Southern European 
welfare states because this is the way in which Esping-Andersen (1999, p. 139) 
refers to this welfare regime type in his later work.1
The Mediterranean welfare state regime, represented by Portugal, Spain, 
Italy, Greece and Malta (see also Vakili-Zad, 2007), is characterised by a low 
degree of decommodification (the welfare state is not very extensive) and a 
strong degree of familialism. The latter implies that a disproportionately large 
part of the welfare tasks is carried out within the family, without much inter-
ference of market or state (Barlow & Duncan, 1994, p. 30). As far as this is 
concerned, the family in Southern Europe should not be seen as a self-con-
tained unit. It is first and foremost a nexus in a network extending through 
a wider kinship circle and into the neighbourhood and locality. This network 
is an indispensable resource because it is a way of accessing other resourc-
es such as child-care, care for the elderly, support in kind or financial support 
(Allen et al., 2004, p. 112). In addition to this, the labour markets of the South-
ern European countries are characterised by a strong segmentation (great dif-
ferences between well-protected insiders and outsiders with little protection) 
and a relatively large informal sector. The southern family holds this system 
together by acting as a clearinghouse between the labour market and the wel-
fare system (Allen et al,. 2004, p. 96). 
Although housing has been largely left out of consideration in Esping-
Andersen’s work, his welfare state regime theory and typology has been wide-
ly discussed and used in international comparative housing research, also 
in a Southern European context. Most authors (for example Allen et al., 2004; 
Hoekstra, 2005; Arbaci, 2007) agree that there is a strong relationship between 
the characteristics of the Mediterranean welfare systems and the characteris-
1 Esping-Andersen actually prefers to consider the Mediterranean welfare state regime as a sub regime of the 
corporatist welfare state regime and not as a separate regime type.
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tics of the Mediterranean housing systems. The Mediterranean housing sys-
tems and housing markets tend to be characterised by a number of distinct 
features: a home owning culture, a strong rural to urban migration, an impor-
tant role for the family in supporting access to housing (see also Módenes 
2009) and a history of strict rent regulation and tenant protection (see also 
Allen et al., 2004). In our opinion, all these characteristics contribute to the 
high vacancy rate and the ambiguous relationship between vacancy rate and 
house price development in Spain. We further develop this hypothesis in the 
remainder of this paper.
 7.5  Explaining the high vacancy rate
In our opinion, there are four main factors that contribute to the high vacan-
cy rate in Spain.
Investment in property in a home owning culture
As in many other Southern European countries, homeownership is the dom-
inant tenure form in Spain. According to the Spanish census of 2001, 81 per 
cent of all Spanish dwellings are owner-occupied, 11 per cent belongs to the 
rental sector and 8 per cent belongs to the category ‘other’ (for example, 
dwellings that are provided rent free). About 60 per cent of the Spanish hous-
ing stock consists of apartments, which is a high percentage in a European 
context (Hoekstra, 2005, p. 481).
It is often claimed that the characteristics of the Southern European wel-
fare states contribute to this peculiar tenure distribution. The Mediterranean 
welfare states are not very extensive (low decommodification), which means 
that families are primarily responsible for their own financial future (see 
Moreno, 2000; Allen, et al., 2004; and Hoekstra, 2005 for more information on 
the familialism in the Mediterranean welfare states). They cannot, or at least 
not completely, rely on the welfare services that are provided by the State.
In such a context, family assets have traditionally filled the gaps of the wel-
fare system. In this respect, housing wealth plays a crucial role. Also for his-
torical reasons – ownership of land has always been very important in the 
Spanish culture – investments in immoveable property are typically seen as 
a safe way of saving and investing money. After all, such investments tend 
to be inflation-proof (before joining the European Union, many Mediterrane-
an countries were characterised by high rates of inflation) and generally yield 
high returns (at least this was the case in the last few decades). Until recent-
ly many people believed that house prices would more or less appreciate for-
ever, whereas most other consumption goods (caravans, boats, recreation-
al vehicles) tend to diminish in value over time (Paris, 2009, p. 5). According 
to Trifiletti (1999), homeownership may be considered as a primitive form of 
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insurance against social risks. In a similar vein, Kemeny (2005) sees owning 
a home as some kind of compensation for the often relatively limited pen-
sion facilities in countries with a poorly developed welfare state. Owneroccu-
pation, as well as owning other property, can provide financial security and 
resources in old age, when children want to get married, and in situations of 
sudden unemployment.
It should be noted that these ideas are not confined to the Mediterranean 
welfare systems only. Although in a different form, they also play a role in 
the liberal welfare states, where the welfare levels are rather low as well and 
often decreasing. In the United Kingdom for example, homeownership has 
become increasingly important as a financial asset that can be used for wel-
fare needs, especially in old age. This development, which is usually termed 
‘housing asset-based welfare’, has recently generated a large debate in the lit-
erature (see for example, Elsinga et al., 2007; Groves et al., 2007; De Wilde & 
Raeymaeckers, 2008). It tends to manifest itself in a preference for owneroc-
cupation, as well as for investment in other property such as buy-to-let pri-
vate rental housing and second homes (Paris, 2009, p. 5).
In Spain, the property sector has also been the preferred investment outlet 
for large segments of the population in the past 10 years. Given the relative-
ly low interest rates and the volatility on the stock market (especially after 
the Internet crisis in the beginning of the twenty-first century), investment 
in ‘bricks and mortar’ was seen as most secure and profitable. The relatively 
large informal and illegal economy in Spain also plays a role here. A substan-
Figure 7.6 Average house prices of unsubsidised dwellings (in euros per square metre), 
1998-2008 (prices for the third quarter of each year)




















tial amount of the black money that has been earned in this hidden econo-
my has been invested in the residential property sector (Allen et al., 2004, p. 
98). The profitability of investments in the residential property sector largely 
depends on the development of house prices. In the last decades, but partic-
ularly, so in recent years, the Spanish home owning sector has been charac-
terised by large house price increases. Especially after 2000, the rise in Span-
ish house prices was spectacular, with average house price increases of more 
than 10 per cent each year (see Figure 7.6). In 2008, however, the house price 
growth came to an end.
Spain is not the only European country that has known a large increase in 
house prices. A similar trend can be observed in countries such as the Unit-
ed Kingdom and the Netherlands. However, in these countries the price 
increases were mainly caused by limited supply responsiveness; Due to insti-
tutional factors, such as a strict spatial planning and a complicated regula-
tory framework, the production of new dwellings could not keep pace with 
the increasing demand for dwellings (see for example, Barker, 2004; Boelhou-
wer, 2005). In Spain, the situation has been different. Since 1950, the Span-
ish housing stock has tripled while the number of households has only dou-
bled. Since 2001, more than 500,000 dwellings were built each year (see Fig-
ure 7.7), whereas the average number of households ‘only’ increased by about 
300,000 per year (Rodriguez et al., 2008). The discrepancy between the growth 
Figure 7.7 Number of finished dwellings in Spain and yearly growth of the number of 
households (estimations for the years after 2001), 1991-2007 (in 1,000s)
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in the number of households and the growth in the number of the dwellings 
can partly be explained by the fact that a significant share of the newly-built 
dwellings is used as a second residence, either by Spanish households or by 
households from abroad. Another important reason is speculation. More and 
more, it has become clear that the Spanish housing market has been part-
ly built on a speculative bubble. A substantial part of the newly-constructed 
houses has been built for investment reasons and not for meeting the hous-
ing needs of the population. Many of these dwellings have remained empty 
since the moment they were constructed.
Strong rural to urban migration
For the last few decades, the Southern European countries have been (and 
still are) characterised by a strong rural to urban migration. Due to econom-
ic processes (less employment in agriculture, more employment in services), 
many people have left rural villages in search for work in the cities, thus, va-
cating their village dwellings. Some of these dwellings are used by their orig-
inal owners as second homes, whereas others are sold to foreign emigrants 
or city people. However, for some dwellings, especially those in bad condition 
or in remote areas, there is little interest. These dwellings can remain emp-
ty for a very long time. Most of these dwellings were built before 1941 and 
their condition often deteriorates quickly (see Table 7.2). In some cases, ru-
ral to urban migration can lead to a collapse of village life and the local econ-
omy, and it may result in completely deserted villages. According to informa-
tion of the Spanish Statistical Institute (INE), there are currently about 2,600 
such deserted villages in Spain (only deserted villages with at least 10 build-
ings count in the INE definition). The strong rural to urban migration is some-
times also seen as one of the factors behind the strong homeownership cul-
ture in Spain. Many rural to urban migrants bring with them a cultural predis-
position to homeownership that is rooted in the significance of land as a pro-
ductive factor in rural areas (Allen et al., 2004, p. 23).
An important role for the family in supporting access to housing
Although they are getting more individualistic, the Mediterranean welfare 
states are still characterised by a relatively large degree of familialism. This 
familialism expresses itself in three ways: a largely domestic female role (es-
pecially among the older generations), much intergenerational help and a 
high degree of family solidarity (Esping-Andersen, 1999). The familialism al-
so exerts a strong influence on how people access housing. In Mediterranean 
welfare systems, families often provide financial support to firsttime home-
buyers. The purchase of a house by a young couple typically involves the mo-
bilisation of assets by the two families and a significant proportion of house-
holds have acquired their house as a (partial) family gift or through inherit-
ance (Allen et al., 2004; Mulder & Billari, 2006; Módenes, 2009). In addition to 
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this, family relations can also have a strong effect on residential location and 
residential mobility patterns. In Southern Europe, residential propinquity to 
relatives is often the prime factor in households’ residential location prefer-
ences (see also Hoekstra, 2005).
The familialism of the Mediterranean welfare and housing systems may 
contribute to the high vacancy rate because dwellings often stay in the 
same family for a long time. Through inheritance, they are passed from 
grandparents to parents, from parents to children and sometimes also between 
other family members. Even if there are no family members interested in 
occupying a dwelling that is in possession of the family, these dwellings 
are often kept vacant instead of being sold or let, because family members 
may need them at a later stage. Furthermore, some Spanish households buy 
a house for their children or grand children with a view to their future as an 
independent household. Often, such family-bought properties remain vacant 
until the children or grandchildren are ready to occupy them. 
A history of strict rent regulation and tenant protection
Contrary to what is sometimes thought, the Southern European countries 
have not always been countries of homeowners. Still in 1950, more than 50 
per cent of the Spanish dwelling stock consisted of private rental dwellings. 
Most of these dwellings were owned by individual households who tradition-
ally saw the private rental sector as a safe target for investments. However, 
the dominance of the private rental sector disappeared as a result of the gov-
ernment policies that were formulated after the end of the Spanish Civil War 
(Leal, 2003). Due to the destruction of housing that had taken place during the 
conflict, there was a serious housing shortage and the rental prices rose con-
siderably. The government was afraid that the increasing housing costs would 
harm the middle classes, which had largely supported the victors of the war, 
the Franco regime. Therefore, in order to support these middle classes, a strict 
rent regulation was enforced in the end of the 1950s. These so-called Urban 
Rental Laws established a freeze on rents and provided for indefinite con-
tracts (Cotorruelo, 1960). Subsequently (after 1964), the updating of rents was 
made somewhat easier, but there continued to be many restrictions and the 
indefinite nature of rental contracts was maintained (Leal, 2003, p. 162).
The strict rent regulation and tenant protection had a negative effect on the 
profits of the private rental landlords and stimulated them to sell their dwell-
ings. This was not always easy because the tenant protection was strong as 
well. In case of non-payment of the tenant, eviction procedures were compli-
cated and generally took many years. As a result of the rent regulation and 
tenant security, homeowners became more and more reluctant to let their 
vacant dwellings, whereas existing private rental landlords cut back on their 
investments in maintenance and renovation (Leal, 2003, p. 163).
Even though the Spanish rent regulation was considerably liberalised after 
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1985 (Ley Boyer)2, investments in the private rental sector have remained 
unpopular. This is probably due to the fact that the protection of tenants is 
still rather strong; also today the eviction of non-paying tenants requires rel-
atively long judicial procedures. And since non-paying tenants seem to be 
more frequent in Spain than in many other countries (possibly because of 
the strong tenant protection), there has emerged a culture in which letting 
a dwelling is equated to asking for problems. Consequently, many Spanish 
homeowners are very reluctant to let their vacant dwellings. They often prefer 
a vacant dwelling over a dwelling that is let. This may entail fewer or no prof-
its but it also entails less risks.
 7.6  Conclusion: explaining the Spanish paradox
We have shown that there are four main factors that push up the vacancy 
rate in Spain. Due to lack of specific data, we have unfortunately not been 
able to quantify the importance of each of these factors. Nevertheless, we 
have the impression that they are all relevant, although their weight might 
vary according to the regional and local housing market context. But explain-
ing the high vacancy rate in Spain is only part of the story. Another important 
question remains. How does the vacancy rate relate to the house price de-
velopment? Why did the high vacancy rate in Spain not lead to a levelling or 
even a decrease in house prices? In answering these questions one element is 
of crucial importance; to what extent are the vacant dwellings actually avail-
able on the housing market? After all, only dwellings which are actually for 
sale or to let exert an influence on price setting.
Vacant dwellings that are bought for investment reasons are usually not on 
offer on the housing market. As long as the house prices keep on rising con-
siderably there is no need for the owners of these dwellings to offer them for 
sale. After all, in such a housing market, only possessing a dwelling is enough 
to yield an attractive (although fictitious as long as the dwelling is not sold) 
return. Moreover, many owners of a vacant dwelling see this dwelling as long 
term investment (for example, for their old age) and do not feel the need to 
cash in their investment.
Of course, letting the dwelling instead of keeping it vacant would lead to 
higher profits but doing so is generally perceived as a risky business. Because 
of the strong tenant protection and the rather bad image that Spanish ten-
2 Under the Ley Boyer, the rent regulation was completely liberalised. For new rental contracts, landlords were 
completely free to determine the level of the rent and the term of the rental contract. However, rent regulation 
was reintroduced again in 1995. Since then, rental contracts have a term of five years and the annual rent in-
crease is tied to inflation. The rent setting for new contracts is still free, however. 
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ants have, many owners of vacant dwellings are reluctant to act as landlords. 
As such, a situation may develop in which rising house prices lead to more 
sales of dwellings for investment reasons that are subsequently kept vacant. 
In our opinion, this is the core of what we call the Spanish paradox; rising 
house prices go handin hand with a high or even rising vacancy rate.3
However, investment motives are not the only reasons why vacant dwell-
ings in Spain are often not on offer on the housing market. Dwellings that 
are empty as a result of one of the other reasons for the high vacancy rate in 
Spain are often kept away from the housing market as well. First of all, the 
extensive rural to urban migration in Spain has caused a substantial share 
of vacant dwellings in small villages. Many of the dwellings are not on offer-
on the housing market because the owners do not want to sell them for sen-
timental and nostalgic reasons. Moreover, some of these empty village dwell-
ings are in bad state of repair which means that there will probably  be lim-
ited interest in them anyway, especially if the village has a remote location.
Second, some vacant homes are family possessions that are supposed to 
remain vacant (but not for sale or to let) until one of the family members is 
ready to occupy them.
In short, we can conclude that the specific features of the Spanish welfare 
and housing system result in a relatively high share of vacant dwellings, but 
that these very factors also prevent vacant Spanish dwellings to actually be 
on offer on the housing market. Thus, a high vacancy rate is not synonymous 
to a large supply of dwellings. In our opinion, this explains why there is no 
clear relationship between vacancy rate and house price development in the 
Figures 7.3 and 7.4.
Suggestions for further research
This paper has been rather exploratory and at points even a bit speculative. 
This is mainly due to limitations in the availability of data. For example, in-
formation on the motives that Spanish homeowners have for keeping their 
dwelling vacant is not available. Moreover, data on vacancy rates is collect-
ed only once every ten years and may not be completely reliable. Given the 
fact that vacancy rates can exert a strong influence on the functioning of the 
housing market as a whole, as has been shown in this paper, we think that 
further research on the relationship between vacancy rate and house price 
developments is desirable. In our opinion such research should focus on the 
following issues: 
▪ To what extent is the Spanish paradox also visible in other countries? Given 
the fact that the phenomenon is related to the characteristics of the Medi-
3 Unfortunately, reliable figures on the development of the Spanish vacancy rate after 2001 are not available. 
However, we think that it is very probable that the vacancy rate has increased in recent years.
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terranean welfare and housing systems, it seems plausible to expect similar 
trends in other Mediterranean countries. Indeed, Hoekstra and Vakili-Zad 
(2006) have shown that Malta is also characterised by high vacancy rates 
and rising house prices with a strong speculative component. However, it 
is possible that similar processes also appear in other countries in which 
there is preference for home owning and a strong demand for investment 
in property, such as the liberal welfare systems of the United Kingdom and 
Ireland.
▪ What is the relationship between the number of vacant dwellings and the 
actual supply in the housing market in a particular housing market region? 
Based on the results of this paper, we hypothesised that this relationship is 
in fact very weak. However, further research is needed to test and explore 
this hypothesis in more detail. Such research should also shed more light 
on possible geographical differences in the relationship between vacancy 
rate, actual supply on the market and house price development. Does this 
relationship differ between different geographical regions, for example 
between cities and countryside or between coastal areas and inland areas? 
The regional and local implications of the findings of this paper need to be 
studied in more detail. 
▪ What is the quantitative importance of each of the four different arguments 
for keeping dwellings vacant? For example, how many dwellings are kept 
vacant for speculative reasons? The Spanish census gives a reasonable 
account of the characteristics of the vacant dwellings, but does not provide 
any information on the motives of the owners of these dwellings. More, 
preferably qualitative, research into this matter is needed.
▪ What is the exact relationship between vacant dwellings and second 
homes? How big is the overlap between the two categories? In order to 
answer these questions, a more precise way of census and survey-taking is 
needed.
 7.7  What next?
In 2008, the Spanish housing bubble finally burst. At the moment Spanish 
house prices are decreasing. According to the Spanish housing market in-
dex of Tinsa (2009), Spanish house prices have dropped 8.8 per cent between 
December 2007 and December 2008. Many analysts (for example, BBVA 2008) 
think that this is only the start of a much larger house price reduction. Part-
ly as a result of the negative house price development, the number of hous-
ing starts has dropped dramatically. In 2007, there were 616,000 new hous-
ing starts, whereas in the first nine months of 2008 the new construction of 
only 246,000 dwellings was started. Other property market related indicators 
are showing a strong decrease as well. Although the number of finished new 
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dwellings remained at a relatively high level (about 450,000 new dwellings 
were finished in the first nine months of 2008), the number of building per-
mits issued for new dwellings dropped from 651,000 (2007) to 215,000 (2008).
The global financial and economic crisis is an important reason for the 
problems in the Spanish housing market. However, more specific Spanish fac-
tors play a role as well. It has become apparent that the housing construc-
tion boom in Spain has resulted in a large oversupply of dwellings. For many 
years, the housing construction rate in Spain was much higher than the 
growth in the number of households (see also, Figure 7.7). For a long time, the 
market was able to absorb a substantial part of this excess supply because 
many new dwellings were bought for investment reasons and not for reasons 
of housing need. These dwellings were often kept empty without being on 
offer on the housing market. Furthermore, the number of new dwellings that 
were available in the housing market and that were empty without being sold 
also increased steadily.
The above system, which is based on a complex interplay between hous-
ing construction, housing investments, vacancy rates and house prices start-
ed to collapse in 2008. Between 2007 and 2008, the number of transactions 
on the housing market decreased from 789,000 to 448,000 (BBVA, 2008). Of 
these 448,000 transactions, 216,000 concerned existing dwellings whereas 
232,000 transactions referred to new dwellings. Since the sale of new dwell-
ings (232,000) is much less than the number of completed new dwellings (still 
more than a half million in 2008), the oversupply on the Spanish housing 
market increased rather spectacularly. As a result of the decrease in house 
prices, very few Spanish households nowadays buy housing for investment 
reasons. In March 2008, the total excess supply in the Spanish residential sec-
tor was estimated to affect 1.1 million dwellings and this figure is still ris-
ing (BBVA, 2009). In March 2009, the excess supply was even estimated at 1.5 
million dwellings (According to an article in the Dutch newspaper NRC Han-
delsblad, 6 March, 2009). The result of this development is a high vacancy rate 
in the newly-built dwelling stock. Especially in the more urban regions there 
are many newlybuilt dwellings that are vacant. Some new housing complex-
es are almost or sometimes even completely empty. Most of the new empty 
houses are for sale on the housing market and the oversupply of them thus 
exerts a negative influence on house price development.
We think that the oversupply of dwellings on the Spanish housing mar-
ket will further increase in the future. After all, some owners of vacant dwell-
ings who have kept their dwellings away from the housing market until now 
might start to sell their dwellings in the future in order to limit their losses. In 
that case decreasing house prices are accompanied by an increasing housing 
supply. Such a situation could lead to a sharp fall in house prices and a seri-
ous housing market crisis. It seems as if the current problems in the Spanish 
housing market have ended the Spanish paradox. We are now facing a situa-
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tion in which high vacancy rates indeed contribute to an oversupply of dwell-
ings and a decrease in house price, just as one would expect on the basis of 
economic theory.4
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 8  Conclusions
 8.1  Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to test to what extent the divergence theories and ty-
pologies of Esping-Andersen and Kemeny offer a valuable framework for ex-
plaining international differences in housing policies, housing outcomes, and 
housing market developments. The book consists of six published papers. All 
use the divergence theories and typologies of Esping-Andersen and Kemeny, 
or at least some aspects of these, as a tentative explanatory framework. Fur-
thermore, two articles focus on Southern Europe, in particular on Spain. With 
this thesis, I hope to contribute to the filling of two gaps in the literature:
1. The lack of empirical testing of the theories and typologies of both Esping-
Andersen and Kemeny with regard to the field of housing;
2. The neglect of Southern European EU countries in international compara-
tive housing research in general and in the theoretical work of Esping-
Andersen and Kemeny in particular. 
Research questions
The thesis is structured around the following three research questions:
1. To what extent does the divergence theory and typology of Esping-Andersen 
offer a good framework for analyzing the characteristics and the develop-
ment in time of housing policies?
2. To what extent do the divergence theories and typologies of Esping-
Andersen and Kemeny offer a good explanation for the differences between 
countries with regard to measurable housing outcomes (tenure, dwelling 
type, housing quality, characteristics of tenants, rent levels, housing satis-
faction)?
3. How do the specific characteristics of the Mediterranean welfare and hous-
ing systems express themselves in the housing policies, the housing out-
comes, and the functioning of the housing market?
Structure of the chapter
In this concluding chapter, I try to provide answers to the three research 
questions formulated above. The chapter is structured as follows. Section 8.2 
deals with the first research question and assesses to what extent Esping-An-
dersen’s welfare state regime typology is useful as a framework for analyzing 
national housing policies. The answer to this question will largely be based on 
Chapter 2 of the thesis. There, the Esping-Andersen welfare state regime ty-
pology has been translated into a housing regime typology that was subse-
quently applied to the Dutch housing system (Subsection 8.2.1). Furthermore, 
I also look at evidence from Belgium and Norway, two countries to which my 
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housing regime typology has been applied as well (Subsection 8.2.2)1  
My overall findings with regard to research question 1 are summarized in 
Subsection 8.2.3. 
Section 8.3 attempts to provide an answer to research question 2. It sum-
marizes the three articles in this thesis that relate the divergence theories 
and typologies of Esping-Andersen and/or Kemeny to measurable housing 
outcomes (Subsections 8.3.1 to 8.3.3)2 . 
Based on findings from these articles, a more general conclusion is then 
drawn (Subsection 8.3.4). 
Section 8.4 focuses on the third research question. It summarizes the chap-
ters on Spanish housing policies (Chapter 6, summarized in Subsection 8.4.1) 
and Spanish housing market developments (Chapter 7, summarized in Sub-
section 8.4.2). Here, I speculate on whether the findings from these chapters 
are representative of the other Mediterranean EU countries (Subsection 8.4.3). 
It should be noted that Chapters 6 and 7 concentrate on particular aspects 
of Spanish housing policies and housing market developments. Chapter 6 deals 
with policies on subsidized homeownership, whereas Chapter 7 investigates the 
relationship between the development of house prices and the vacancy rate.
Like many other research projects, this thesis does not provide definite and 
complete answers to the research questions. That is why, for each of these 
questions, a rather extensive agenda for further research is formulated in 
Section 8.5.
Finally, the chapter ends with a short epilogue in which I draw some overall 
conclusions (Section 8.6). 
 8.2  Esping-Andersen’s typology as a framework 
for analyzing housing policies (research 
question 1)
 8.2.1  Relevance of the framework for the Netherlands 
(Chapter 2)
The starting point for this thesis is the assumption that the housing system 
is an important element of the welfare system (see also Subsection 1.3.1). If 
1 This concerns new evidence that has not been included in chapter 2 of this book. The evidence on Belgium 
stems from work of mine that is not included in this thesis (see also Subsection 1.5.3). The evidence on Norway 
comes from a recent article by Stamsø (2009).
2 Here too, a finding that is not presented in Chapters 2 to 7 but stems from other work of mine (see Subsection 
1.5.3) is used in the discussion: the relationship between welfare state regime and tenure (discussed in Subsec-
tion 8.3.1). 
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this assumption is correct, one might expect the differences between welfare 
systems to be reflected in housing policies. This assumed relationship be-
tween the welfare system and housing policies is the subject of Chapter 2. 
Specifically, this article translates Esping-Andersen’s (1990) welfare state re-
gime typology (see Subsection 1.3.2 and Chapter 2 for more information about 
this typology) into a housing policy regime typology. The latter distinguishes 
three ideal typical housing policy regimes: social-democratic, (conservative) 
corporatist, and liberal (see Table 2.1 in Chapter 2). 
Dutch housing policies of the 1980s and 1990s were compared with this 
housing policy regime typology in order to determine in which type they 
would fit best. It turned out that in the 1980s, Dutch housing policy had both 
social-democratic and corporatist traits, whereas in the 1990s the corporat-
ist traits were dominant. These research findings are largely in line with the 
position of the Netherlands within the welfare state regime typology of Esp-
ing-Andersen. In this typology, the Dutch welfare state is a hybrid case, since 
it has both social-democratic and corporatist characteristics. However, there 
is one aspect to which the Esping-Andersen framework seems less applicable. 
Although the Dutch housing policies in the 1990s had many corporatist traits, 
they were not conservative. 
In my opinion, the increasing importance of corporatist characteristics in 
Dutch housing policies in the 1990s is related to the changing role of the gov-
ernment. From the 1980s to the 1990s, there was a significant reduction in 
the direct influence of the central government on the Dutch housing system. 
The central government switched to a more indirect style of governance. In 
the policy frameworks subsequently formulated, local authorities and private 
actors such as housing associations could operate with a certain degree of 
freedom. This new style of governance can certainly be considered corporatist 
(whereby policy is developed jointly by central government, local authorities, 
and private actors). Yet it has little to do with conservatism, whereby housing 
policies would seek to preserve the status differentials in society and favor 
the traditional family. I have used the term ‘modern corporatism’ to indi-
cate this new style of policy. In practice, modern corporatism resembles con-
cepts such as ‘third way politics’ (Giddens, 1998) and ‘competitive corporat-
ism’ (Rhodes, 2001). 
Ultimately, I combined the observation of modern corporatist housing pol-
icies with Kemeny’s view on corporatist welfare regimes (see also Subsection 
1.3.4). On that basis I developed a new conceptual model for analyzing the 
welfare state in which, besides non-corporatist liberalism, three types of cor-
poratism are distinguished: conservative corporatism; labor-led corporatism 
(which is similar to what Esping-Andersen calls social-democracy); and mod-
ern corporatism (see Figure 8.1).
The main innovation in Figure 8.1 is the distinction drawn between con-
servative corporatism and modern corporatism. There are three key aspects 
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in which modern corporatism differs from conservative corporatism: the 
nature of the fragmentation in the provision of welfare services; the treat-
ment of the traditional family; and the role of this family within the broader 
welfare state. These differences are further elaborated below.   
The allocation of welfare services can take place in two ways. On the one 
hand, it can be based on social status and/or occupation. This traditional-
ly happens in conservative-corporatist welfare state regimes, where the lev-
el of welfare services to which a person is entitled largely depends on the per-
son’s occupation. On the other hand, the allocation of welfare services can 
also be based on measurable criteria such as income. In that approach, occu-
pation and social status are not taken into account when the target groups 
for welfare services are defined. This implies that welfare services are distrib-
uted purely on the basis of (perceived) need. Such a distribution mechanism 
is characteristic for modern corporatist, labor-led corporatist, and liberal wel-
fare states. 
In conservative-corporatist welfare states, the traditional nuclear family is 
often explicitly privileged in the provision of welfare services. For example, 
regulations tend to favor the breadwinner or provide extra benefits for large 
families. Just like the fragmentation based on occupation described above, 
such policies aim to preserve the existing social structures. In modern cor-
poratist, labor-led corporatist, and social-democratic welfare states, the ten-
dency to favor the nuclear family is less strong and might even be complete-
ly absent. Here, welfare state services are essentially provided on the basis of 
Figure 8.1 A proposed new conceptual model for the welfare state
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individual needs and rights. 
Finally, in conservative-corporatist welfare state regimes, relatively many 
welfare tasks (childcare, care for the elderly) are carried out by the family3 . 
This is less so in modern corporatist welfare states, where the role of the 
family is relatively limited and the state and the market provide the majority 
of welfare services. In this regard, the modern corporatist regime type occu-
pies an intermediate position between the labor-led corporatist welfare state 
regime (mainly state provision of welfare services) and the liberal welfare 
state regime (mainly market provision of welfare services). 
 8.2.2  Relevance of the framework for Belgium and Nor-
way
In Subsection 8.2.1, it was shown that the Esping-Andersen framework could 
be used reasonably well to explain developments in the Dutch housing poli-
cy system, although an adaptation of the definition of corporatism was pro-
posed. The question is to what extent the housing policy regime framework 
also applies to other countries. Below, I attempt to answer this question for 
both Belgium (Flanders) and Norway (see also footnote 1 of this chapter). So 
far, these are the only other countries to which my framework has been ac-
tively applied in research projects. 
Belgium
In the larger research project, embracing Chapter 2 of the thesis (see also Sub-
section 1.5.3 and footnote 1), my housing policy regime typology is applied 
to the conservative-corporatist welfare state regime of Belgium4 (see Hoek-
stra and Reitsma, 2002 and Hoekstra, 2002 for more information on this). Also 
here, a distinction was made between the 1980s and the 1990s. 
Belgium has a small social rental sector (7% of the total housing stock at 
the end of the 1980s) that is rather heavily regulated. At the same time, the 
market rental sector is substantial in size (25% of the total housing stock at 
the end of the 1980s) and subject to relatively little regulation. Such dispari-
ty between the two rental tenures is characteristic of a dualist rental system 
(see also Subsection 1.3.3 and Chapter 4 of this thesis). Dualist rental systems 
are expected to be found in liberal welfare state regimes. 
Nevertheless, Belgian housing policy of the 1980s and 1990s was certain-
3 This applies even more so to the Mediterranean welfare state regime, which is not included in Figure 8.1. In 
order to position this welfare state regime in the figure, one would have to stretch the top of the triangle.
4 Although I speak of Belgium throughout the text of this section, and the figures that are presented refer to Bel-
gium as a whole, the housing policy analysis actually focused on Flanders. This reflects the fact that in Belgium 
most housing policies, except fiscal policies, are formulated at the level of the regions.
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ly not completely liberal. Many corporatist elements could in fact be distin-
guished in the owner-occupancy sector. First of all, there was a segment-
ed system of premiums and social loans for owner-occupiers that aimed to 
promote households’ ability to cope for themselves. Second, self-provid-
ed housing was an important element of the housing production, which may 
also be seen as a feature of corporatism (Barlow and Duncan, 1994, p. 32 and 
onwards). In Belgium, unlike the Netherlands, corporatist elements in hous-
ing policy also had a clearly conservative dimension. Owner-occupiers with 
children were entitled to specific (more favorable) loans and premiums. And 
there were special regulations for specific occupational groups, such as mine 
workers. 
In short, Belgian housing policy can be interpreted as a mix of liberalism 
and conservative-corporatism. The policies for the rental sector had a strong 
liberal dimension, whereas the policies for the owner-occupancy sector were 
largely conservative-corporatist. In this respect, little had changed between 
the 1980s and the 1990s. This might be related to the fact that housing poli-
cies in Belgium tend to have an incremental and problem-solving character, 
which makes it difficult to carry through fundamental policy changes. Such 
policy-making is characteristic of a conservative-corporatist welfare state 
regime.
Norway
In the typology of Esping-Andersen, Norway is regarded as a prototype of the 
social-democratic welfare regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990, pp. 73-76); the pub-
lic sector is large, with universal welfare services financed by taxes. Conse-
quently, Norwegian society is characterized by relatively small income ine-
qualities. The Norwegian welfare state is known for combining high levels of 
public expenditure, which creates generous welfare state entitlements, with 
rapid economic growth, low unemployment, and high levels of labor force 
participation, particularly for women (Stamsø, 2008, p. 6). Despite some re-
structuring and retrenchment measures, most of these characteristics still 
persist (Stamsø, 2008, p. 9). The question is to what extent these social-demo-
cratic characteristics are also visible in the housing system. 
In order to find an answer to this question, Stamsø (2008) has analyzed the 
Norwegian housing policies for both 1980 and 2005, using my housing poli-
cy regime framework as a theoretical basis. She concludes that in 1980, Nor-
wegian housing policy was largely social-democratic in character. Universal 
housing policy goals were implemented by regulating house prices, interest 
rates, and rents; moreover, subsidies were available for the large owner-occu-
pied sector (Stamsø, 2008, p. 11). In Norway, social-democratic objectives were 
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pursued in the homeowning sector and the cooperative sector5 rather than in 
the social rental sector (as is the case in most social-democratic countries). One 
of the key goals of Norwegian housing policy was that the distribution of hous-
ing should be more equal than the distribution of income. In order to achieve 
this goal, Norwegian homeowners and would-be homeowners could get sub-
sidies and cheap loans through the Norwegian State Housing Bank. These sub-
sidies were provided in such a way that they had a redistributive effect. The 
residents in the cooperative sector (19% of the total housing stock in 1981) 
could also apply for cheap loans from the State Housing Bank. Moreover, hous-
ing cooperatives had access to land at below-market prices. In 1980, the pric-
es of cooperative dwellings were strictly regulated and these dwellings were 
allocated according to membership criteria (seniority). As a result of these pol-
icies, both the owner-occupied and the cooperative sector were rather strongly 
decommodified, which Stamsø interprets as a social-democratic trait. 
Between 1980 and 2005, the social-democratic characteristics of Norwe-
gian housing policies were largely replaced by liberal traits. Deregulation of 
the credit market and the abolition of large-scale subsidies for owner-occupa-
tion marked a major change in Norwegian housing policy. A publicly financed 
owner-occupation sector was transformed into a privately financed sec-
tor based on market terms. Housing policy expenditure decreased and pol-
icy measures became more closely targeted at lower-income groups. These 
measures mainly took the form of subject subsidies (housing allowances). In 
the cooperative sector, the principles of price regulation and rules of alloca-
tion were gradually abolished (Stamsø, 2008, p. 19). The liberal features of cur-
rent Norwegian housing policy contrast with the other pillars of the Norwe-
gian welfare state, which are still mostly social-democratic. 
 8.2.3  Conclusion 
Table 8.1 shows the relationship between the welfare state regime and the 
housing policy regime for the three countries under consideration. Although 
some correspondence between these two regimes is apparent, their interrela-
tionship is far from univocal. In several cases, the characteristics of the hous-
ing policy regime are different from those of the welfare state regime. This 
fact may be interpreted in three ways.
Interpretation 1: Housing as an isolated pillar of the welfare state?
First of all, it might be that housing, and therefore also housing policy, is not 
very well integrated in the welfare system. In that case, the housing system 
5 The cooperative sector provides an alternative to outright ownership and renting as it gives tenants an indi-
vidual right of use as well as a collective property right.
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would operate largely autonomously from the rest of the welfare state. Rath-
er than being a pillar, wobbly or not, supporting the roof of the welfare state, 
housing would be seen standing at some distance from the edifice of the wel-
fare state – as an isolated pillar. In my opinion, the relationship between the 
welfare state regime and the housing policy regime is too strong for this op-
tion to be very plausible. 
Interpretation 2: Different power distributions in different domains of the 
welfare state?
The second interpretation is related to Esping-Andersen’s observation that 
his welfare regime types are ideal typical constructs. He states that there is 
no single pure case and that elements of all three welfare state regimes can 
be found in most countries (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 49). This implies that 
not all pillars of the welfare state regime would necessarily have the same 
characteristics. For example, a social-democratic welfare state regime could 
well consist of three social-democratic pillars and one mainly corporatist pil-
lar. Kemeny (2006) also recognizes this when he talks about ‘sector regimes’. 
He argues that large differences can arise between welfare sectors in negoti-
ating the power balance between diverse interests. It may be that while labor 
interests are strong in one sector – for example, tenants in the housing sector 
or unions in the labor market sector – they can be weak in another, for exam-
ple ‘pensioners associations’ in the pension sector (Kemeny, 2006, p. 9). 
Interpretation 3: How to explain shifts in the housing policy regime?
The two interpretations outlined above explain why characteristics of the 
housing policy regime may differ from characteristics of the general welfare 
state regime. However, they do not offer a good explanation for sudden shifts 
in the housing policy regime, as have occurred in Norway and to a lesser ex-
tent in the Netherlands. The third interpretation might offer a suitable ex-
planatory alternative. The converse of the first one, the third interpretation 
stresses the interrelationship between housing policies and the other do-
mains of the welfare system. It is grounded in ideas of Stephens et al. (forth-
coming) and Stephens and Fitzpatrick (2007), who state that the relationship 
between welfare state regimes and housing systems is bilateral rather than 
unilateral. On the one hand, the welfare state regime clearly exerts an influ-
ence on the housing system; it defines the parameters within which housing 
systems and housing policies operate. On the other hand, the housing sys-
Table 8.1 The welfare state regime and the housing policy regime in the Netherlands, 
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tem is certainly not a passive victim of the welfare state regime but itself ex-
erts an independent influence on this regime. According to Stephens et al. 
(forthcoming), the functions that are carried out by the housing system partly 
overlap with those of the other sectors of the welfare state regime. Hence, the 
housing system may either accentuate or soften the outcomes of these oth-
er sectors. 
Housing allowances, for example, cushion the effects of policies in the field 
of social assistance and social security. This is clearly visible in the United 
Kingdom, which has a housing benefit scheme that provides up to 100 per-
cent of the rent costs. As a consequence, the social assistance benefits can 
be rather low. Thus, British housing policy measures partly compensate for a 
low decommodification in the social assistance and social security system. In 
most other countries, though, there is a general assumption that part of the 
social assistance benefit has to be used to pay the rent. This means that the 
social assistance benefit needs to be set at a higher level (Groves et al., 2007, 
p. 7). 
In the above example, the housing policy acts as a substitute for the defi-
cits (whether deliberately caused by the government or not) in other areas of 
the welfare state, thus softening the effects of policies in these areas. Howev-
er, it may also work the other way around. The decommodifying power of the 
social assistance and social security system may be such that a country can 
suffice with relatively limited expenditure on decommodifying housing poli-
cies. 
In that case, the other domains of the welfare state act as a substitute for 
the housing policies. Possibly, such processes would explain why the Norwe-
gian housing policy regime developed in a liberal direction between 1980 and 
2005, whereas the Norwegian welfare state regime as a whole largely retained 
its social-democratic features. In my opinion, future international compara-
tive housing research should pay more attention to the relationship between 
housing policies and policy developments in the other domains of the welfare 
state (see also Subsection 8.5.2).    
 8.3  From divergence theories and typologies to 
housing outcomes (research question 2)
 8.3.1 Welfare state regime, tenure, and dwelling type 
(Chapter 3)
Differences between national welfare and housing systems are expected to 
express themselves in differences in housing outcomes. According to Ke-
meny, two housing outcomes are of particular importance in this respect: 
tenure and dwelling type. 
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Welfare state regime and tenure
In Hoekstra (2005), I looked at the relationship between welfare state regime 
and tenure6 . 
Countries belonging to the Mediterranean or liberal welfare state regimes 
were found to have a relatively high homeownership rate. The picture is 
much more mixed for the corporatist welfare state regime. Some corporatist 
countries, such as Belgium and France, have a fairly high rate of homeown-
ership, whereas others, such as Germany and Austria, have a very substantial 
(mainly private) rental sector. As far as the tenure distribution is concerned, 
the social-democratic welfare state regime is a mixed bag as well. There are 
substantial social rental sectors in Denmark and Sweden but the social rental 
sector in Norway is very small.
Based on the above observations, some researchers, for example Groves 
et al. (2007), draw the conclusion that the Esping-Andersen typology is not 
a good framework for analyzing international differences between hous-
ing systems. In my opinion, such a conclusion is far too hasty. The housing 
system entails much more than the tenure distribution. It may therefore be 
misleading to equate the decommodification in the housing system with the 
size of the non-profit rental sector7. After all, housing that is provided by pri-
vate commercial parties may be partly decommodified, for instance through 
housing allowances and/or fiscal measures. Thus, decommodification and the 
reduction of income inequalities may also take place in the homeowning or 
private rental sector. In my opinion, the Norwegian example (see Subsection 
8.2.2) clearly illustrates this. 
Welfare state regime and dwelling type
Whereas researchers have devoted considerable attention to the relation-
ship between welfare state regime and tenure category, the relationship be-
tween welfare state regime and dwelling type has been left almost complete-
ly unexamined. Early on, Kemeny (1992) hypothesized that the dwelling type 
might constitute a key link between the welfare state regime and the hous-
ing system, with apartments being more important and appreciated in collec-
tivist unitary rental systems than in privatist dualist rental systems. Yet this 
hypothesis has never been tested in international comparative housing re-
search. This inspired me to investigate this topic in more detail. Using data 
from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), I have assessed how 
the incidence, the tenure category, the quality, and the appreciation of single-
family dwellings compared to apartments differ among the four welfare state 
6 That contribution is not included in this thesis. See also footnote 2 of this chapter.
7 Unfortunately this still happens in contemporary international comparative research: see for example Gran 
(2008) and Groves et al. (2007).
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regimes (social-democratic, conservative-corporatist, liberal, Mediterranean). 
Based on this analysis, I observed some striking differences between the 
Mediterranean welfare state regime and the other three (see also Table 8.2):
▪ In the Mediterranean welfare state regime, apartments are mainly owner-
occupied, whereas in the other three welfare state regimes they are mainly 
rented;
▪ In the Mediterranean welfare state regime, apartments are on average in 
better condition than single-family dwellings, whereas this is not the case 
(it is mostly the other way round) in the other three welfare state regimes; 
▪ In the Mediterranean welfare state regime, there are limited differences in 
size (measured as number of rooms) between apartments and single-family 
dwellings, whereas these differences are much greater in the other three 
welfare state regimes;
▪ In the Mediterranean welfare state regime there are no clear differences in 
housing satisfaction between residents of apartments and residents of sin-
gle-family dwellings, whereas in the other three welfare state regimes resi-
dents in single-family dwellings are more satisfied with their housing situa-
tion than residents in apartments. 
In the last section of Chapter 3, I speculated about the explanations for the 
above differences. I concluded that the following factors could be in play: the 
role of the family and the importance of having relatives and friends in the 
immediate vicinity; the position of homeownership and social renting within 
the housing system; and the degree of urbanization and suburbanization. Fu-
ture research is needed to shed more light on the importance of each of these 
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factors, as well as on other possible explanatory factors (see also Subsection 
8.5.4). In any case, the distinctive position of the Mediterranean welfare and 
housing systems that resulted from the analysis was an important reason to 
study these systems in more detail, using Spain as a case study (Chapters 6 
and 7). 
 8.3.2  Unitary and dualist rental systems (Chapter 4)
The aim of Chapter 4 was to subject Kemeny’s rental system typology to em-
pirical testing. One of the charms of this typology is that it covers the rental 
market as a whole. Thereby, it highlights the relationship between the social 
rental and the market rental sector. Kemeny (1995) distinguishes two main 
types of rental system: unitary and dualist. The differences between the so-
cial and market rental sectors are minor in unitary systems but major in the 
dualist type (see also Table 1.2 in Chapter 1). According to Kemeny, the dif-
ferences between the two types of rental system are to a large extent policy-
driven. They are the result of the long-term interaction between the economic 
development of rental housing stocks and the policy decisions regarding that 
development. The key question is whether housing policies allow the social 
rental sector to become ‘mature’ and ‘competitive’. (See Chapter 4 for more 
information on the political and economic processes that lie at the basis of 
unitary and dualist rental systems.) One would expect that the policy differ-
ences will manifest themselves in differences in housing outcomes, notably 
in the characteristics of the dwelling stock and the socio-economic profile of 
the tenants. However, systematic international comparative research on this 
issue is lacking. Consequently, it remains unclear whether the assumed dif-
ferences between unitary and dualist rental systems really do have an em-
pirical basis. By comparing the characteristics of the social rental sector with 
those of the market rental sector in three presumed unitary rental systems 
(the Netherlands, Denmark, and Austria) and three presumed dualist rental 
systems (United Kingdom, Ireland, and Belgium), I have attempted to eluci-
date this issue. For this purpose, I have translated Kemeny’s rental system ty-
pology into four hypotheses (see Table 8.3) that were tested with data from 
the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). 
Although no formal statistical tests have been carried out, the four hypoth-
eses were supported reasonably well by the empirical data (see Chapter 4 for 
more details). The housing outcomes in the presumed unitary rental systems 
are indeed different from those in the presumed dualist rental systems. This 
clearly suggests that Kemeny’s rental system typology makes sense, at least 
for the countries that were included in the analysis, although further research 
is needed before firmer conclusions can be drawn. 
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 8.3.3  Homeownership and housing satisfaction (Chapter 5)
In many countries, national housing policies encourage homeownership. This 
objective is based on the assumption that owning one’s house has a positive 
effect on both the individual and society as a whole. Homeownership is ex-
pected to lead to greater housing satisfaction and a greater self-esteem for in-
dividuals, besides more commitment to the neighborhood. It is interesting to 
note that the theories relating to the benefits of homeownership are usual-
ly formulated by observers in the English-speaking countries. Saunders (1990), 
for example, reports a natural preference for homeownership in the Anglo-
Saxon world. This means that such theories refer to dualist rental systems 
(see also Chapter 4). In such systems, rent regulation and tenant security in 
the market rental sector are limited, which makes market renting a very in-
secure option for tenants. Tenants are more secure in the social rental sec-
tor of dualist rental systems, but this sector tends to be only accessible to the 
lowest-income groups (safety net), and it often bears a negative stigma. Con-
sequently, for most households in a dualist rental system, basic security and 
social success can only be found in the homeownership sector. This generali-
zation also holds for Southern European countries8  
There, the preference for homeownership seems to be embedded in a 
financial family strategy rather than being solely an individual tenure choice 
(see also Chapter 7 of this thesis). 
In countries with a well-developed rental sector and sufficient security of 
tenure – the unitary rental systems, to use Kemeny’s term – the situation is 
expected to be different. Here, the rental sector (both social rental and market 
rental) tends to be substantial in size. Moreover, it offers good housing qual-
ity, tenant security, and affordable rents. Consequently, a rental dwelling is 
expected to offer a satisfactory alternative to homeownership for substantial 
segments of the population (Behring and Helbrecht, 2002). 
8 These countries are left out of Kemeny’s rental system typology
Table 8.3 Expected differences between unitary and dualist rental systems: four hypotheses
1.  Share of owner-occupancy  
     sector
2.  Level of housing quality
3.  Income distribution of  
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4.  Rent levels, corrected for 




Relatively small differences in 
Housing quality between the 
owner-occupancy sector and the 
social rental sector 
Relatively limited residualization 
(concentration of lower-income 
groups) in the social rental sector
Small differences between social 
rental and market rental dwellings 




Relatively large differences in 
Housing quality between the 
owner-occupancy sector and the 
social rental sector 
Relatively strong residualization 
(concentration of lower-income 
groups)  in the social rental sector
Large differences between social 
rental and market rental dwellings
UK, Ireland, Belgium 
Source: Chapter 4 (Table 4.1)
[ 176 ]
Based on the literature review summarized above, we (Marja Elsinga and 
I) hypothesized that the appreciation of homeownership depends on the 
national institutional context. In order to test this assumption, we have car-
ried out an international comparison of the relationship between homeown-
ership and housing satisfaction. The hypotheses that were formulated are 
presented in Table 8.4. 
The hypotheses were tested by performing a statistical analysis of the data 
from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). For this purpose, a 
multiple regression analysis was carried out. The dependent variable was 
housing satisfaction and the predictor variables were tenure category, hous-
ing quality, household characteristics, and housing costs. It proved that in all 
the selected dualist rental systems as well as in the Southern European coun-
tries, the type of tenure has an autonomous influence on housing satisfac-
tion, with homeowners being more satisfied than tenants. Thus, the hypoth-
eses that were formulated with regard to these two groups of countries were 
supported by the empirical data. 
For the unitary rental systems, the picture turned out to be diverse. In Aus-
tria, the type of tenure did not have an autonomous influence on housing sat-
isfaction, which is in line with our hypothesis. In the Netherlands and Den-
mark, however, homeowners were significantly more satisfied with their 
housing situation than tenants, also when correcting for differences in hous-
ing quality, household characteristics, and housing costs. 
 8.3.4  Divergence theories and typologies and housing 
outcomes: conclusion
The three articles summarized in Section 8.3 all tested to what extent the di-
vergence theories and typologies of Esping-Andersen and/or Kemeny offer a 
good explanation for the differences between countries with regard to meas-
urable housing outcomes such as tenure, dwelling type, housing quality, rent 
levels, income distribution of tenants, and housing satisfaction. The main re-






Natural preference for 
homeownership. Homeown-
ership provides security, 
freedom, and financial 
advantages. The rental sector 
is a second-best stigmatized 
tenure. 
Homeowners are more 




The rental sector is substan-
tial in size and offers good 
quality, affordable rents, and 
sufficient tenant protection. 
Consequently, renting is a 
good alternative to home-
owning for much of the 
population. 
Homeowners are not more 
satisfied with their housing 
situation than tenants.
Austria, the Netherlands, 
Denmark
Southern European countries
Homeownership is part of a 
family tradition. Social rental 
sector is poorly developed.
Homeowners are more 
satisfied with their housing 
situation than tenants.
Spain, Italy, Greece
Source: Chapter 5 (Table 5.1)
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sults of these articles are presented in Table 8.5. Based on this table, the fol-
lowing conclusions may be drawn with regard to the relevance of both frame-
works. 
The utility of Esping-Andersen’s typology for predicting housing outcomes 
depends on which housing aspect and welfare regime type one is looking at. 
For almost all housing aspects, the differences between the social-democratic 
and the corporatist welfare state regime turned out to be limited. 
As for the housing outcomes with regard to the rental market and, to a 
somewhat lesser extent, the share of the homeownership sector, the liber-
al welfare state regime showed different housing outcomes than the social-
democratic and the conservatist-corporatist regimes. The housing outcomes 
in the Mediterranean welfare state regime are similar to those in the liberal 
welfare state regime, except for one aspect. The quality and appreciation of 
apartments compared to single-family dwellings is much higher in Mediterra-
nean countries than in liberal countries. This research finding, which is possi-
bly related to some specific characteristics of the Southern European welfare 
and housing systems, was one of the reasons for analyzing these systems in 
more detail (Chapters 6 and 7 of the thesis).
Given the small differences in housing outcomes that were found between 
the social-democratic and the conservative-corporatist welfare state regimes, 
Kemeny’s rental system typology might offer a good alternative for the Esp-
ing-Andersen framework. After all, in this typology both the social-democrat-
ic and the corporatist welfare state regimes are seen as unitary rental sys-
tems with a collectivist ideology and corporatist power structures, as opposed 
to the privatist and non-corporatist dualist rental systems in the liberal wel-
fare state regimes. 
Table 8.5 Housing outcomes according to the typologies of Kemeny and Esping-Andersen
Welfare state regime 
(Esping-Andersen)
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Table 8.5 shows that the unitary versus dualist rental system dichotomy 
serves well as a predictor of outcomes on the rental market (see also Chap-
ter 4 of this thesis). Its utility is somewhat less pronounced when it comes to 
predicting differences in the tenure distribution. Finally, no empirical support 
was found for Kemeny’s hypothesis that the characteristics and the appreci-
ation of single-family dwellings compared to apartments differ between the 
different types of rental system. In both types of rental system, single-family 
dwellings were of higher quality and were more appreciated than apartments. 
Based on this finding, some people would argue that Kemeny’s hypothesis of 
a direct relationship between welfare state regime and dwelling type is a bit 
overstretched. However, I also observed that the quality and appreciation of 
apartments clearly differs between the Mediterranean regime and the other 
three, which suggests that the type of welfare state regime does matter after 
all. Certainly, any causal relationship between the welfare state regime and 
the characteristics and the appreciation of the different dwelling types runs 
through intermediary variables such as the degree of urbanization, the func-
tion and use of public spaces, the role of private and public transport, and the 
importance of having friends and relatives in the immediate vicinity. There-
fore, further research on such intermediary factors is needed to shed more 
light on this issue (see also the agenda for further research set forth in Sub-
section 8.5.4). 
Data limitations
All three articles discussed in this section have used the European Commu-
nity Household Panel (ECHP) as a data source. As indicated in Chapter 1 (Sub-
section 1.4.3), this database has a number of limitations. First of all, it is not 
specifically designed for housing research. Although the ECHP contains sub-
stantial information about housing, its primary focus is on the socio-eco-
nomic characteristics and practices of households. Possibly as a result of this 
some housing variables have turned out to be somewhat less reliable. Second, 
the sample sizes in the ECHP are such that refined analyses, in which the da-
tabase is split up in many subgroups, were not often possible. In this respect, 
the statistical possibilities of the ECHP are considerably less than those of 
censuses, in which the number of cases is many times larger.  
Third, as result of the combined effects of panel attrition and weighting 
procedures, the reliability of the ECHP - which is a panel survey that has run 
for eight years (between 1994 and 2001) - may diminish in the course of time 
(Vandecasteele and Debels, 2007). 
Given the above limitations, and also because of the exploratory charac-
ter of each of the ECHP-based articles, the statistical analyses that have been 
carried out were relatively straightforward and simple (analysis of bivariate 
relationships, cluster analysis, multiple regression analysis). In my opinion, a 
more advanced and refined statistical analysis, if at all possible, would only 
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have added real value if better data had been available. Let us hope that this 
drawback will be overcome in future data collection. 
 8.4  Southern European welfare and housing sy-
stems (research question 3)
 8.4.1  Spanish housing policies: a subsidized homeowner-
ship sector (Chapter 6)
Social housing is usually equated with social rental housing. Nevertheless, 
the example of Norway, mentioned earlier in this chapter (Subsection 8.2.2), 
shows that social objectives may also be pursued in the owner-occupancy 
sector. Social homeownership policies seem especially plausible in welfare 
systems in which there is a strong preference for homeownership, such as 
the Mediterranean and the liberal welfare state regimes.  
Chapter 6 of the thesis describes the policies towards subsidized homeown-
ership in the Mediterranean welfare state regime of Spain. In this country, 
the social rental sector is minimal and social housing is mainly provided in 
the owner-occupancy sector. Subsidized owner-occupancy housing is geared 
towards low- and medium-income households and may be provided by both 
public and private developers. The production of subsidized homeownership 
dwellings is coordinated through a complex financing system in which both 
house builders and homebuyers can receive financial support from the gov-
ernment. In return for this support, the house builders have to sell the sub-
sidized homeownership dwellings at a price that is considerably below mar-
ket level. Consequently, the demand for subsidized homeownership dwellings 
tends to be high. For most of these dwellings, distribution occurs by means of 
a housing allocation system, usually a lottery.
Dwellings developed with the help of public money are only considered as 
subsidized housing for a given period of time, called the qualification peri-
od. During this period, the dwellings can only be sold at prices that are deter-
mined by the government, with the aim of preventing speculation. When the 
qualification period expires, the dwellings lose their status as subsidized 
housing and are incorporated into the ‘normal’ housing stock, which implies 
that they can be sold at market prices. The typical qualification period for 
Spanish subsidized owner-occupancy dwellings used to be 20 to 30 years. 
Recently, however, there have been policy changes in some Spanish regions 
that make the qualification period much longer than it was before (for exam-
ple 90 years) and sometimes even permanent, as is the case in the autono-
mous region of the Basque country. Consequently, the Spanish subsidized 
homeownership sector seems to be turning into a permanent rather than a 
temporary tenure sector. This development might lead to a reduction of the 
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already low mobility rate and a stronger compartmentalization of the hous-
ing market.   
 8.4.2  The Spanish housing market: a high vacancy rate 
and rising house prices (Chapter 7)
The starting point for Chapter 7 of the thesis was an observation by my col-
league Cyrus Vakili-Zad. He noted that the Southern European EU countries, 
but especially Spain and Malta, are characterized by both high vacancy rates 
and rising house prices. We hypothesized that this phenomenon is related 
to the specific features of the Southern European welfare and housing sys-
tems. We explored this idea in a joint conference paper in which both Spain 
and Malta were included (see also Subsection 1.5.3). For the sake of feasibility 
and data availability, we later split the project into a journal article on Spain 
(Chapter 7 of the thesis) and one on Malta (submitted, under review).
According to standard economic theory, one would expect to find a nega-
tive relationship between the vacancy rate and the house price development. 
In a well functioning economic market, supply and demand are supposed to 
be in balance. For the housing market, this would imply that there is no over-
supply of dwellings and that the vacancy rate is low. However, various authors 
(Needleman, 1965; Priemus, 1978; Janssen, 1992) have argued that some char-
acteristics peculiar to the housing market make standard economic theories 
less applicable. Needleman (1965), for one, stresses the cyclical character of 
the housing market. He states that demand for dwellings tends to be more 
volatile than supply. He also argues that it takes some time before changes 
in the balance between supply and demand in the housing market are trans-
lated into changes in house prices. House prices will only start to decrease 
once demand drops below a certain threshold. As a result of these factors, 
the housing market is cyclical (see Figure 8.2). This cyclical pattern means 
that the exact ratio of vacancy rate to house prices depends on the particular 
phase in the housing cycle a housing market is in. 
At first sight, neither standard economic theory nor the housing cycle 
approach would seem to apply to the Spanish housing market. Although 
in different ways, both approaches assume that over a longer period of 
time there is a correlation between the development of house prices and 
the vacancy rate. In Spain, such a correlation seems to be absent altogeth-
er. From 1980 until 2007, the vacancy rate in Spain hovered around the 15% 
level. In the same time period, house prices increased tremendously. Thus, 
at the national level, there is no relationship between the vacancy rate and 
the house price development. Our more detailed analyses have shown that 
this also applies at the provincial and the municipal level. In Chapter 7, we 
used the term ‘Spanish paradox’ to indicate the lack of a correlation between 
vacancy rate and house price development in the Spanish housing market.
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We have tried to explain the ‘Spanish paradox’ from a welfare regime per-
spective, using the particular features of the Southern European housing sys-
tems as explanatory factors. Our tentative conclusion is that the relationship 
between vacancy rate and house price development on the Spanish housing 
market is fundamentally flawed because a substantial share of the vacant 
dwelling stock is actually not available for the housing market. In this regard, 
the following four factors, which are typical of Southern European housing 
systems, play an important role.
1 . Buying homes for investment reasons
For various historical and welfare state-related reasons (see Chapter 7 for an 
elaboration), the homeownership sector has been a favorite investment outlet 
for large segments of the Spanish population over a long period of time. Con-
sequently, the demand for dwellings was often much stronger than demo-
graphic developments (e.g., growth in the number of households) would jus-
tify, a situation that could lead to the creation of a speculative bubble on the 
housing market. In Spain, such a speculative bubble has indeed emerged in 
the first decade of the 21st century. Especially in the period 2000 till 2007, very 
sharp house price increases went hand in hand with a high housing construc-
tion rate. This trend was not curbed by a correction on the housing market. 
That is because many of the dwellings bought or developed for investment 
reasons were actually kept vacant without being on offer on this market. After 
all, as long as the house prices keep on rising considerably, there is no need 
for the owners of these ‘investment dwellings’ to put them up for sale. Un-
der such market conditions, merely possessing a dwelling is enough to yield 
a return that is attractive (albeit fictitious as long as the dwelling is not sold). 
Figure 8.2 The relationship between house prices (y-axis) and vacancy rate 





Source: Based on Priemus, 1978, p. 202
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Of course, letting the dwelling instead of keeping it vacant would have led to 
even higher profits. However, doing so is generally perceived as a risky busi-
ness in Spain because of the strict tenant protection. 
2 . Strong rural-to-urban migration 
For several decades, Spain has been characterized by a strong rural-to-urban 
migration. Due to the economic transition (less employment in agriculture, 
more in services), many people have left their rural villages in search of work 
in the cities, thus vacating their village dwellings. A substantial part of these 
dwellings are not offered on the housing market because their owners do not 
want to sell them for sentimental and/or nostalgic reasons9 . 
These houses usually remain in the possession of the family who had left 
the village. Also, a substantial share of these empty properties are in a bad 
state of repair. Thus, even if the owner wanted to sell, there would probably be 
very limited interest in the dwelling anyway. This applies especially to vacant 
dwellings in a remote village.  
3 . An important role for the family supporting access to housing
The familialism that characterizes the Southern European welfare and hous-
ing systems also contributes to the occurrence of the ‘Spanish paradox’. As 
a result of this familialism, dwellings are often family possessions, and they 
stay in the same family for a long time. Through inheritance, they are passed 
from grandparents to parents, from parents to children, and sometimes also 
between other family members. Even if there are no family members interest-
ed in occupying a dwelling that is in the family’s possession, these dwellings 
are often kept vacant instead of being sold or let, because family members 
may need them at a later stage. Furthermore, some Spanish households buy 
a house for their children or grandchildren with a view to their eventual de-
parture from the parental home. Often, such family-bought properties remain 
vacant until the children or grandchildren are ready to occupy them. Home-
ownership in Spain is often part of a family investment strategy. 
4 . A large number of second homes 
The number of second homes in Spain has increased considerably in recent 
decades. Many such homes have been built for the purpose of providing hol-
iday accommodation for relatively wealthy households from the Spanish ur-
ban areas or from other parts of Europe (sun seekers). The rise in affluence 
in the European Union in general, and in Spain in particular, the ageing pop-
ulation (pensionados), the increase in leisure time, and the improvement of 
infrastructure and transport systems (low-cost airlines flying to regional air-
9 Occasionally, such dwellings are also used as a second home (but then they don’t classify as vacant dwellings).
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ports) have all contributed to the growing demand for secondary dwellings. 
Moreover, just like primary dwellings, second homes were often seen as a safe 
and profitable long-term investment (Léal, 2006). 
Although Chapter 7 is about permanently vacant dwellings and not second 
homes (temporarily vacant dwellings), both phenomena are related to each 
other in Spain. This is because it is often difficult for the Spanish census-tak-
ers to determine whether a particular dwelling is permanently vacant or used 
as a secondary home. As a result, there are indications that in the Spanish 
census – the main data source used in Chapter 7 – some of the dwellings clas-
sified as vacant are actually second homes. If there indeed is such a bias in 
the Spanish census, this would imply that an increase in the number of sec-
ond homes would also result in an increase in the number of vacant dwell-
ings. In that case, the high vacancy rate in Spain may be partially caused by 
the rise in second-home ownership. 
Explaining the Spanish paradox
In short, we have concluded that the specific features of the Spanish hous-
ing system result in a relatively high share of vacant dwellings, but that 
these very factors also prevent vacant dwellings from actually being offered 
on the housing market. Thus, a high vacancy rate is not synonymous with a 
large supply. In our opinion, this explains why there is no clear relationship 
between vacancy rate and house price development in the Spanish housing 
market. This phenomenon is certainly not without some risk. In 2008, when 
the global economic crisis started, the oversupply – till then largely hidden 
– of dwellings on the Spanish housing market came to light. As a result, the 
Spanish property sector collapsed and Spain was hit extra hard by the eco-
nomic recession; property prices decreased strongly.  
 8.4.3  Conclusion 
International comparative research that includes the Southern European wel-
fare and housing systems has remained relatively scarce until now. This was 
an important reason for including two papers on the Southern European wel-
fare and housing systems in this thesis (Chapters 6 and 7). I think the find-
ings of Chapters 6 and 7 rather clearly suggest that the Southern European 
welfare systems result in specific housing policies and housing (market) out-
comes. Chapter 6 suggests that these welfare systems are very likely to stim-
ulate homeownership over and above renting, for example through social 
homeownership policies. Chapter 7 shows that the peculiar characteristics of 
the Southern European housing systems may break down the expected nega-
tive relationship between house price developments and vacancy rate. In my 
opinion, support for a distinct Southern European housing system may also 
be derived from the findings in Chapter 3 (the characteristics and apprecia-
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tion of apartments are different in Southern European EU countries than in 
the rest of the European Union). Additional support may be found in the work 
of other authors who have reported on this subject (Barlow and Duncan, 1994; 
Allen et al., 2004; Allen, 2006; Arbaci, 2007). 
However, I must also admit that the empirical analyses that I carried out in 
the chapters 6 and 7 only refer to a limited number of housing aspects (sub-
sidized homeownership policies, the relationship between house price devel-
opment and vacancy rate) in one country alone (Spain). Therefore, further 
research on this topic is definitely needed. In Subsection 8.5.4, I outline what I 
see as the main directions for such future research. 
 8.5  Agenda for further research
 8.5.1  Introduction
All the articles in this thesis take a rather broad and exploratory approach. 
Consequently, apart from attempting to provide answers to the research 
questions, each one also raises some new issues for future analysis. This is il-
lustrated by the fact that each article ends with a rather extensive agenda for 
further research. In this section, this research agenda is summarized, further 
refined, and updated according to my most recent insights. A separate sub-
section is dedicated to each research question. 
 8.5.2  Welfare state regimes and housing policy (research 
question 1)
In my opinion, the housing policy regime approach that I developed in Chap-
ter 2 provides a good starting point for further research. Such research may be 
carried out along the following lines.
Extend the approach to other countries
The application of the housing policy regime framework should be extend-
ed to other countries. Only by taking into account many more cases than the 
three countries covered in Table 8.1 could general conclusions be drawn on 
the applicability of the housing policy regime framework. 
Apply the modified framework to other domains of the welfare state and 
other countries
Based on my application of Esping-Andersen’s welfare state regime typology 
to the Dutch housing system, I developed a modified version this typology. 
The concept of modern corporatism is the main innovation. It should be not-
ed that this modified framework is predominantly derived from my analysis 
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of the Dutch housing policy regime. In that light, some questions arise. Does 
the modified framework also apply to other segments of the welfare state, 
such as social insurance, pensions, healthcare, or education? And does it also 
apply to housing policy regimes of countries other than the Netherlands? Re-
search into these issues is needed.   
Testing theories instead of typologies
In Chapter 2, I translated Esping-Andersen’s welfare state regime typology in-
to a housing policy regime typology. So doing, I assumed that the theory of 
power and class coalitions, which underlies the welfare state regime typology, 
would also apply to the housing regime typology. However, this assumption 
was not tested in my study. Therefore, I think that future research should give 
due attention to the power constellations and relations that underpin the for-
mation of housing policy. How do these shape a housing policy regime? And 
to what extent does this correspond to the developments in other fields of 
the welfare state? (See also the second explanation mentioned in Subsection 
8.2.3.) In short, it is not only the typology of Esping-Andersen that should be 
applied and tested; so should the theory of power relations that underlies this 
typology. This would require a more historical analysis that has much in com-
mon with the path dependence approach, as described in the next paragraph. 
Compare and combine my approach with the path dependence approach
It would be particularly interesting to compare my approach with the path 
dependence approach that has recently been applied in an internation-
al comparative research project on the housing systems of the Nordic coun-
tries (Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Iceland). In this project, path 
dependence is interpreted as a historical pattern where one event, which is 
more or less contingent, considerably changes the probability of subsequent 
alternative events or outcomes (Bengtsson and Ruonavaara, 2010, p. 3). The 
general idea is that if, at some point in time, the historical development takes 
one direction instead of another, some, otherwise feasible, alternative paths 
will be closed – or at least difficult to reach – at a later point (Bengtsson and 
Ruonavaara, 2010, p. 1). 
Bengtsson (2008, 2009) states that the process of path dependence has 
resulted in rather large differences between the housing regimes10 of the five 
Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland). That is strik-
ing since these countries have many similarities with regard to cultural, eco-
nomic, political, and welfare-state related aspects. According to Bengtsson, 
this divergence is due to the fact that in the formative period of the Nordic 
10 A housing regime is defined as a set of fundamental principles according to which a system of housing provision 
is organized (Bengtsson, 2004, p. 6). 
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housing regimes, between 1900 and World War II, different solutions were 
chosen in order to deal with the specific housing problems in each of the 
countries concerned. When more comprehensive housing policy programs 
were introduced after the war, it was generally deemed efficient to use exist-
ing organizations and institutions for their implementation (Bengtsson, 2009, 
p. 6). 
Given the findings of Bengtsson, one might wonder whether a welfare state 
regime approach, such as the approach that I have taken in Chapter 2, is real-
ly suitable for analyzing housing policies. In my view, the answer to this ques-
tion should still be ‘yes’. Indeed, it is true that the various Nordic housing 
regimes differ from each other substantially with regard to the tenure distri-
bution, the institutions on the housing market, and the housing policy instru-
ments that are applied. However, if one looks at the political objectives that 
underlie these variations, a fair amount of similarity also comes to the fore. 
In this regard, Lujanen typifies the various Nordic housing policy regimes as 
having “considerable differences with a common foundation” (Lujanen, 2004, 
p. 16). He underpins his statement by pointing to the fact that all five Nor-
dic countries seek to provide housing of a decent standard for the whole of 
their population (high decommodification). Furthermore, the differences in 
housing standards between low- and high-income groups are small compared 
to those in most other countries (low stratification). Finally, all Nordic coun-
tries are characterized by relatively extensive government intervention on 
the housing market (important role for the state in the state-market-family 
mix)11.
Thus, following Lujanen, one may hypothesize that on the three basic prin-
ciples of Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime typology – decommodification, 
stratification, and the mix of state, market, and family, the very same prin-
ciples that I have used to construct my housing policy regime typology – the 
differences between the Nordic countries are not so big after all. Possibly, 
although the basic ends of housing policy are largely the same in all Nordic 
countries, there is substantial variation, caused by path dependence and local 
circumstances, in the means and structures that are used to achieve these 
ends. It would be very interesting to apply my housing policy regime frame-
work to all five Nordic countries to see whether the hypothesis formulated 
above really withstands the test. 
In relation to the above observations, I think it is worth noting that there 
are some important differences between my housing policy regime approach 
and Bengtsson’s path dependence approach. Mine starts from a rather high 
level of analysis and looks at the basic characteristics of national housing pol-
11 One may wonder how this relates to the findings of Stamsø (2008), who concludes that Norwegian housing 
policy in 2005 mainly had liberal characteristics (see also Subsection 8.2.2).
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icies, structured around the concepts of ‘decommodification’, ‘stratification’, 
and ‘state-market-family mix’. Further, my analysis is largely irrespective of 
specific housing institutions and tenure patterns. Bengtsson’s approach, on 
the other hand, starts at a lower level of analysis and pays attention to specif-
ic housing actors and forms of tenure institutionalization. He analyzes histor-
ical processes in order to find out how these have come into being in particu-
lar countries. In my opinion, this difference in focus makes the two approach-
es complementary. It would therefore be very interesting to combine them in 
future international comparative research on housing policies. 
Connect housing policy to developments in the rest of the welfare state
Last but certainly not least, I think the analysis of housing policies should 
be more firmly embedded within the broader context of the welfare state. In 
Subsection 8.2.3 (interpretation 3), it was noted that the welfare system and 
the housing system may be connected through specific policy measures such 
as housing allowances. However, the relationship between welfare systems 
and housing systems may also run through the owner-occupancy sector. This 
connection has recently received considerable attention in the literature. It 
all started with Kemeny’s famous trade-off hypothesis that was formulated 
around 1980 and revisited in 1998 (Castles, 1998). It states that a high share 
of homeownership tends to go hand in hand with a poorly developed pen-
sion system. This is mainly due to the fact that as a result of the high housing 
costs for starters on the homeowning market, there will be strong resistance 
to the high taxes that are necessary for an extensive welfare state (Kemeny, 
2005; see Chapter 4 for more information on this hypothesis). 
Inspired by Kemeny’s ideas, various authors (Groves et al., 2007; Malpass, 
2008; Ronald, 2008; Toussaint and Elsinga, 2009) have analyzed the relation-
ship between homeownership and welfare state development in more depth. 
Their focus has been on the concept of (housing) asset-based welfare. This 
concept has recently gained considerable currency in the United Kingdom, 
and it is also an important feature of the East Asian welfare and housing sys-
tems (Ronald, 2008). The pivotal notion in housing asset-based welfare is that 
homeowners can employ the assets accumulated in their dwelling as a safe-
ty net. They can use these assets as a supplement to (or even a substitute 
for) other welfare state provisions. Consequently, governments may perceive 
these housing assets as a justification to cut back spending in key areas of 
the welfare state, specifically social security and social assistance, pensions, 
healthcare, and education12
Housing may thus act as a lever for welfare state restructuring, which is 
12 Whether this is desirable is another question. Malpass (2008, p. 17) notes that the outcomes of an asset-
based welfare system tend to be very uneven.
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why Malpass (2008, p.1) depicts it as an increasingly important cornerstone of 
the new welfare state. 
Given the strong relations between housing policies and policies in oth-
er segments of the welfare state, I think it is important to analyze hous-
ing policies as an integral part of the welfare system rather than as a sepa-
rate field. This means that future international comparative analyses should 
focus more on the interaction between housing policies, other welfare poli-
cies, tax systems (and possibly also policies such as regional policy and spa-
tial planning), housing outcomes, and other welfare outcomes. Ideally, the 
development of this entire system should be studied over time so that one 
could assess how welfare policies and housing policies develop in relation to 
each other. (In this thesis, Chapter 2 only analyzes the development over time 
of housing policies, whereas the other welfare policies, or in fact the wel-
fare state regime as a whole, are seen as given.) It should be realized, howev-
er, that such an undertaking is very time-consuming and can only be carried 
out by a team. Ideally, such a team should consist of housing researchers and 
specialists in other areas of the welfare state representing each of the coun-
tries under study.
 8.5.3  From divergence theories and typologies to housing 
outcomes (research question 2)
This thesis contains three articles that relate the divergence theories and ty-
pologies of Esping-Andersen and Kemeny to measurable housing outcomes 
(Chapters 3 to 5 of the thesis). Each of these articles gives rise to a number of 
topics for further research that are outlined below.  
Through which factors are welfare state regime and dwelling type related? 
(Chapter 3)
In Chapter 3, I looked at the correlation between the type of welfare state re-
gime, on the one hand, and the characteristics and appreciation of the differ-
ent dwelling types on the other. However, it should be noted that there are 
methodological reasons to question the value of such an approach. Rapaport 
(2001), for example, states that it is not very useful to directly relate a gener-
al and abstract concept such as a welfare state regime to something as con-
crete as a housing outcome. He suggests that a stepwise approach should be 
followed instead. First, there should be an investigation of how the nature of 
a particular welfare state regime reflects itself in intermediary concepts such 
as values, specific institutions, policies, rules, lifestyles, meanings etc. Subse-
quently, these intermediary concepts should be translated into hypotheses 
with regard to the housing outcomes. To a certain extent, Chapters 2, 4, 5, and 
7 of this thesis have indeed followed this stepwise deductive process. Howev-
er, such an approach is only possible if sufficient theoretical notions are avail-
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able that can be translated into measurable hypotheses. There should be the-
oretical constructs at the intermediate level that adequately reflect the differ-
ences between welfare state regimes. Moreover, one should be able to translate 
these constructs into measurable hypotheses regarding housing outcomes. 
For the relationship between welfare state regime and dwelling type, such 
theoretical notions were not available. That is due to the fact that Kemeny’s 
hypothesis on this issue was not underpinned by a substantive theory. Conse-
quently, Chapter 3 took a very exploratory and inductive approach and direct-
ly linked the concepts of ‘welfare state regime’ and ‘dwelling type’ to each 
other. With regard to the characteristics and the appreciation of apartments, 
clear differences emerged between the Mediterranean and the other three 
welfare state regimes (see also Subsection 8.3.1). The Mediterranean welfare 
state regime has a number of specific characteristics – including an important 
role for the family in the provision of welfare services, a not very extensive 
welfare state that started to develop relatively late, relatively little suburban-
ization, an intensive use of public spaces, a homeownership culture, a poor-
ly developed social rental sector, and a relatively warm climate. In that light 
it would seem logical to focus further research on how such factors – which 
can be seen as intermediate concepts, to use Rapaport’s terminology – influ-
ence the characteristics and appreciation of the different dwelling types in 
the Southern European EU countries. Ideally, such an analysis should analyze 
the relationship between economic growth, welfare state development, and 
urbanization patterns from a historical perspective, also taking into account 
the specific characteristics of individual countries. Furthermore, it should 
look into the differentiation within each of the dwelling types, since there are 
clear indications that in Southern Europe, single-family dwellings are inhab-
ited by both wealthy upper-class households (who tend to live on the fringe 
of the main cities) and lower-income households that live in rural areas and 
some poor urban peripheries. 
Unitary rental systems and economic competition (Chapter 4)
Chapter 4 provided an empirical test of Kemeny’s rental system typology. 
However, the theory in which this typology is grounded was not extensive-
ly tested. In order to test this theory thoroughly, one should analyze not only 
the housing outcomes but also the housing policies and the economic proc-
esses that underlie them. Do the factors in play correspond with the mecha-
nisms predicted in Kemeny’s theory, or are there other forces at work? 
Recently, some of my colleagues at OTB have carried out research in this 
field (Elsinga et al., 2005; Van der Heijden et al., 2008). On the basis of econom-
ic theories, they came to the conclusion that without state regulation or state 
support, non-profit social rental landlords will not be able to compete with 
profit-oriented market rental landlords in the long run. This is due to the var-
ious inefficiencies inherent in the non-profit sector – among other things, 
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productive inefficiency, an insufficient supply responsiveness, particularism, 
paternalism, and amateurism. Furthermore, as a result of isomorphism, non-
profit organizations may come to behave more like for-profit organizations in 
the course of time. 
If the economic theories that predict the above-mentioned inefficiencies 
are correct, this would imply that the last stage of Kemeny’s trajectory for 
the development of unitary rental systems – a rental market without state 
support or state regulation in which a mature non-profit social rental sec-
tor strongly competes with the profit-oriented market rental sector13, thereby 
keeping the general rent level relatively low (close to the cost price) – is not a 
viable vision. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to let the empirical facts determine which 
is right: Kemeny’s theory or the economic theories. After all, so far an unreg-
ulated unitary rental market has never existed in reality, which makes it very 
much a hypothetical construct. Even in the Netherlands, a country often seen 
as a classic example of a unitary rental system, there is still some state sup-
port for non-profit housing associations, as well as extensive and rather strict 
rent regulation. Possibly, these policies give the social rental landlords an 
indispensable helping hand in their competition with the market rental sector. 
Kemeny’s theory states that unitary rental systems are the result of a com-
plex interplay of both political and economic processes (maturation). With 
the economic processes being questioned, as indicated above, it might well be 
that the unitary rental systems that were observed in the Netherlands, Den-
mark, and Austria are primarily the result of political decisions rather than of 
economic processes. Further research should shed more light on this issue. In 
my opinion, such research should focus on the financial functioning of, and 
the investment decisions in, both the non-profit social rental sector and the 
profit-oriented market rental sector. Based on extensive empirical analyses, 
future research should assess whether social rental landlords are really less 
efficient than market rental landlords, as economic theory suggests. 
Chapter 4 ended with the observation that the EU regulations on state sup-
port and competition might pose a threat to the unitary rental systems, an 
observation that has also been made by other Dutch researchers (Elsinga et 
al., 2008; Gruis and Priemus, 2008). In the autumn of 2009, the Dutch govern-
ment finally reached agreement with the European Commission on what is 
often called ‘the Dutch case’. It was agreed that at least 90% of the social rent-
al dwellings with a regulated rent (rent level < € 64814), should be allocated to 
13 In Kemeny et al. (2005), such an unregulated unitary rental market is termed an integrated rental market; see 
also footnote 9 in Chapter 1.
14 This applies to the period July 1, 2009 till June 30, 2010. 
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households with a taxable yearly income below €33,00015. This target group 
covers 43% of all households in the Netherlands. The government has indi-
cated that a regional differentiation with regard to the 90% norm will be made 
possible in the future. Furthermore, households whose income rises above 
the target group’s income limit after the dwelling has been allocated to them 
are allowed to stay in their dwelling. The 90% target group norm thus only 
applies at the moment of housing allocation.  
But what does the above agreement imply for the future of the unitary rent-
al systems in the EU in general and that of the Dutch rental system in par-
ticular? I expect that this agreement will have serious consequences for the 
Dutch rental system. This is due to the fact that, at this moment, only 76% of 
the Dutch social rental dwellings are allocated to households that belong to 
the newly defined target group. It can be envisaged that especially the mid-
dle-income groups (with an income just above the income ceiling) will get 
into trouble. After all, their access to the social rental sector will be limited 
whereas an owner-occupied dwelling is often too expensive for these house-
holds, especially in the economic core areas of the Netherlands. 
However, the agreement may also have consequences for the unitary rent-
al systems in the EU in general. It shows that the European Commission is 
capable of setting conditions with regard to the target group for the allocation 
of social rental housing. In principle, any such conditions would be at odds 
with the whole idea of a unitary rental system. According to Kemeny, such a 
system should have a large social rental sector of sufficient quality to which 
all households should have access. Furthermore, the ‘solution’ for the Dutch 
case is the result of a negotiated agreement between the government of the 
Netherlands and the European Commission. In the negotiations, the Dutch 
minister of housing has fought hard to give the housing associations as much 
elbow room as possible. It remains to be seen what the outcome will be in 
other countries where the organization of the social rental sector is potential-
ly at odds with EU policy. This is an interesting area for policy-oriented inter-
national comparative research on rental systems. 
Explaining preferences for homeowning and renting (Chapter 5)
In my opinion, further research on the relationship between homeownership 
and housing satisfaction should focus on the processes that underlie the sta-
tistical relationships that we have observed (see Subsection 8.3.3). Denmark 
and the Netherlands are especially interesting cases; for these countries, the 
results of our research did not support our hypotheses. This mismatch might 
be due to housing policy and housing market developments that took place 
in the last decades. These developments have led to a declining share and an 
15 Each year, this income limit will be indexed with the development of the wages (CAO-loonontwikkeling).
[ 192 ]
increasing residualization (concentration of low-income groups) and stigma-
tization of the social rental sector in both countries. The fact that the Neth-
erlands and Denmark have fiscal policies that favor homeownership above 
renting might also play a role here. Qualitative research in the Netherlands 
has indeed shown that financial benefits and the freedom to adapt your 
home according to your own taste are the main reasons why most Dutch peo-
ple prefer an owner-occupied dwelling above a rented one (Toussaint and Els-
inga, 2007, p. 182). Also Voigtländer (2009) stresses the importance of the fi-
nancial treatment of homeownership. He asserts that the comparatively low 
German homeownership rate (43%) is mainly caused by the fact that, unlike 
other countries, Germany’s housing policies are largely tenure-neutral. This 
implies that households have a real choice between buying and renting, also 
in financial terms16 .
It should be noted, however, that the financial benefits of homeownership 
depend not only on housing policies but also on economic conditions. The 
current economic crisis has shown that these conditions might affect home-
owners adversely. Against this background, it would be interesting to repeat 
the research at the present time (2010). It could well be that the rental sec-
tor has gained popularity compared to homeowning as a result of the great 
financial insecurity that now prevails in the latter sector. The fact that the 
homeowning sectors in countries such as Spain and the United Kingdom are 
actually declining at the moment, whereas the rental sector is growing, points 
in this direction. 
 8.5.4  Southern European welfare and housing systems 
(research question 3)
Welfare systems and homeownership policies
Many welfare systems favor homeownership, but the way in which their 
housing policies do so may vary strongly. Fiscal deductions, social homeown-
ership dwellings, housing cooperatives, and state-subsidized housing loans 
are all instruments that can be used to this end, separately or in combination. 
As a follow-up to Chapter 6, it would be interesting to investigate more sys-
tematically whether there is a relationship between the way the welfare sys-
tem is organized and the particular configuration of homeownership policies 
that is deployed17. Is it possible to distinguish different models of homeown-
ership policies, just as one can distinguish different types of rental system? 
16 Based on this observation, one would expect few differences in housing satisfaction between tenants and 
homeowners in Germany (comparable to Austria). However, for reasons of data availability we could unfortu-
nately not test this assumption on the basis of the ECHP.
17 In Chapter 2 of the thesis, this aspect has been largely left out of consideration.
[ 193 ]
Quite a bit of international comparative research has been done on home-
ownership policies in general (see Boelhouwer et al., 2005; Doling and Elsinga, 
2006). Yet studies that explicitly link such policies to the characteristics of the 
welfare system are scarce, a conference paper by Poggio (2006) being a notable 
exception. There definitely is a gap to fill here.  
Broadening research on the Spanish paradox
Future research on the Spanish paradox (a follow-up to Chapter 7) should fo-
cus on broadening the geographical scope of the analysis. To what extent is 
the Spanish paradox also apparent in other countries? Since we assume that 
the phenomenon is related to the characteristics of the Mediterranean wel-
fare and housing systems, it seems plausible to expect similar trends in the 
other Mediterranean EU countries. Indeed, Hoekstra and Vakili-Zad (2006) 
have shown that Malta also has a high vacancy rate and rising house prices 
with a strong speculative component. 
However, a comparable phenomenon is apparent in the liberal welfare sys-
tem of Ireland too. In recent years, Irish housing production has been much 
higher than the increase in the number of households (Norris and Shiels, 
2007). This is related to the fact that new dwellings were not only developed 
and/or bought for the sake of meeting the housing need of the population 
but also for investment reasons. On the part of the government, such behav-
ior has been stimulated by the fiscally advantageous ‘buy-to-let scheme’. 
Furthermore, the common practice of speculative house building (i.e., start-
ing construction before the dwellings were sold) and the absence of a strict 
spatial planning system also contributed to the high housing production 
rate. At the same time, these very factors have also resulted in an increas-
ing share of vacant dwellings. Dol et al. (2010, p. 27) observe that many Irish 
buy-to-let dwellings are not actually occupied but have remained empty, 
which is a clear indication of speculative tendencies. It is estimated that Ire-
land currently has an oversupply of about 120,000 dwellings (Dol et al., 2010, 
p. 32). Just as in Spain, the speculative bubble on the Irish housing market has 
recently burst. House prices have dropped by about 20% and the number of 
transactions has strongly decreased. As a result of these developments, the 
Irish housing market has now been hit disproportionately hard by the current 
economic crisis. 
The Irish case described above suggests that the Spanish paradox is not 
solely a Mediterranean phenomenon. Rather, the same situation could 
occur in any country where there is a preference for homeowning, a strong 
demand for investment in property, and relatively little state intervention in 
the domain of spatial planning and housing production. In any case, the col-
lapse of the Spanish and Irish housing markets highlights the need for more 
detailed investigations into the relationship between the characteristics of a 
housing system and the vulnerability of such a system during times of eco-
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nomic crisis. 
Last but not least, it should be noted that Chapter 7, in which the Span-
ish paradox was analyzed, is rather exploratory and qualitative in nature. In 
order to quantify the relationships that were found, future research on this 
issue should also take a more quantitative and formal economic approach, 
possibly using modeling techniques. 
 8.6  Epilogue
This PhD thesis has taken a rather broad and exploratory approach. The first 
objective of the project was to test to what extent the divergence theories and 
typologies of Esping-Andersen and Kemeny offer a good framework for ex-
plaining international differences in housing policies, housing outcomes, and 
housing market developments. My overall conclusion is that both frameworks 
provide a good starting point for international comparative housing stud-
ies, particularly because there are no suitable alternatives. As this thesis has 
shown, there are rather large differences between the various European hous-
ing systems, which makes my choice to apply a divergence perspective a log-
ical one. At the same time, I have observed that the explanatory power of the 
Esping-Andersen and Kemeny frameworks very much depends on the coun-
try and the particular housing aspects one is looking at. Furthermore, I would 
like to stress that the typologies should not be applied in a rigid and dogmat-
ic manner. If possible, they should be adapted and/or fine-tuned according to 
the specific issue under study, just as I have done in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
In my opinion, constructing typologies is not an end in itself. Rather, these 
are theory-inspired devices that can be used to structure and facilitate inter-
national comparative analyses. I think this thesis demonstrates that when 
thus used, typologies can have considerable value.
A second objective of the thesis was to test to what extent the specific fea-
tures of the Southern European welfare and housing systems are also man-
ifest in specific housing policies and housing (market) outcomes. Based on 
the results of this thesis, I think the answer to this question should be ‘yes, 
but…’. My hesitation derives from the realization that more research is need-
ed before firmer conclusions on this issue can be drawn. 
Apart from providing answers to the research questions, although admit-
tedly in a somewhat tentative way, the thesis also introduces some new the-
oretical notions and concepts. In Chapter 2, a conceptual framework for ana-
lyzing the welfare system, with so-called ‘modern corporatism’ as a new ele-
ment, has been presented. The notion of the Spanish paradox, which has 
been developed in Chapter 7, is an addition to the existing literature as well. 
I hope these new concepts will form fertile grounds for further research and 
theory development. 
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Finally, this thesis has brought up many interesting new research ques-
tions; witness the extensive agendas for future research set forth in Section 
8.5. I think this shows how broad and complex the subject matter is. It also 
suggests that international comparative research on the relationship between 
welfare systems and housing systems is still pretty much in its infancy. In 
future research, I hope to be able to answer at least some of the new research 
questions that were formulated on the basis of this thesis. There still is a lot 
of work to be done….  
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  Samenvatting 
  Divergentie in Europese verzor-
gingsstaten en huisvestings-
systemen 
  Joris Hoekstra
 1.  Opzet van het onderzoek (hoofdstuk 1)
Het centrale thema van dit proefschrift is een internationale vergelijking van 
huisvestingssystemen. Een huisvestingssysteem omvat alle actoren (huishou-
dens, markt, overheid) die zich bezig houden met de productie, de regulering 
en de consumptie van huisvesting, evenals hun onderlinge relaties (Bourne, 
1981). De wijze waarop het huisvestingssysteem is ingericht varieert tussen 
landen. In dit proefschrift wordt nagegaan in hoeverre deze verschillen sa-
menhangen met de manier waarop de verzorgingsstaat is georganiseerd. 
De dissertatie bestaat uit een inleiding (hoofdstuk 1), zes gepubliceerde 
artikelen (de hoofdstukken 2 t/m 7) en een concluderend hoofdstuk (hoofd-
stuk 8). In elk van de artikelen wordt geprobeerd om de concrete kenmerken 
van nationale huisvestingssystemen (beleid, eigendomsverhoudingen, woon-
kwaliteit, woonlasten, woontevredenheid, werking woningmarkt) te verkla-
ren vanuit de kenmerken van de verzorgingsstaten waarin de desbetreffen-
de huisvestingssystemen zijn ingebed. Als theoretisch kader hierbij fungeren 
de verzorgingsstaattheorie en –typologie van Esping-Andersen (1990) en de 
huursysteemtheorie en -typologie van Kemeny (1992, 1995). Beide zijn zoge-
naamde divergentietheorieën. Dit zijn theorieën die proberen een balans te 
vinden tussen generalisatie enerzijds en aandacht voor landspecifieke facto-
ren anderzijds. Binnen de divergentietheorieën wordt vaak gebruik gemaakt 
van typologieën. 
De verzorgingsstaattheorie en –typologie van Esping-Andersen
Volgens de verzorgingsstaattheorie van Esping-Andersen bestaan er drie ty-
pen verzorgingsstaatregimes (zie tabel 1). De verschillen tussen deze drie ty-
pen zijn historisch gegroeid en hangen samen met (de interactie tussen) de 
volgende factoren: de manier waarop de arbeidersklasse is gemobiliseerd, de 
coalities tussen de verschillende politieke partijen en de mate waarin de ont-
wikkeling van de verzorgingsstaat wordt gesteund door de middenklasse. Vol-
gens Esping-Andersen zijn de verschillen tussen de drie verzorgingsstaatregi-
mes zo structureel, dat ze ook in de toekomst zullen blijven bestaan. 
Anders dan de typologie van Esping-Andersen, waarin huisvesting bui-
ten beschouwing blijft, richt de theorie en typologie van Kemeny (1992, 1995) 
zich specifiek op het huisvestingssysteem. Hierbij legt Kemeny echter wel 
een duidelijke relatie met de verzorgingsstaat. Volgens Kemeny is er een con-
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nectie tussen de politieke structuur en de ideologie van de verzorgingsstaat 
aan de ene kant, en de inrichting van het huisvestingssysteem aan de ande-
re kant. Zo worden landen met een niet-corporatistische politieke structuur 
en een ideologie van individualisme en privaat initiatief (de liberale verzor-
gingsstaatregimes in de typologie van Esping-Andersen) gekenmerkt door 
een zogenaamd duaal huursysteem (dualist rental system), terwijl landen met 
een corporatistische politieke structuur en een ideologie van collectivisme 
(de conservatief-corporatistische en de sociaal-democratische verzorgings-
staatregimes in de typologie van Esping-Andersen) worden gekarakteriseerd 
door een zogenaamd unitair huursysteem (unitary rental system). De verschil-
Tabel 1 De drie verzorgingsstaatregimes volgens de typologie van Esping-Andersen
Decommodificatie: mate 
waarin de verzorgingsstaat 
voorziet in een acceptabele 
levensstandaard voor 
mensen die niet (kunnen) 
werken 
Stratificatie: mate waarin 
de verzorgingsstaat de 
verschillen tussen groepen 
burgers vergroot of 
verkleint 











* De Nederlandse verzorgingsstaat is moeilijk te classificeren omdat deze zowel sociaaldemocratische als ook 
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Bron: Hoekstra, 2005; Vrooman, 2009
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len tussen unitaire en duale huursystemen worden veroorzaakt door verschil-
len in de wijze waarop de politiek reageert op de ontwikkeling van de soci-
ale huursector: wordt de ontwikkeling van deze sector gefaciliteerd of juist 
belemmerd? Tabel 2 geeft inzicht in de belangrijkste verschillen tussen beide 
typen huursystemen. Net als Esping-Andersen verklaart ook Kemeny de ver-
schillen tussen de typen vanuit historisch gegroeide machtsverhoudingen en 
coalities tussen de verschillende belangengroepen. 
Toepassing van de beide theorieën en typologieën 
Sinds de jaren negentig van de vorige eeuw hebben de theorieën en typolo-
gieën van Kemeny en Esping-Andersen een substantiële invloed gehad op het 
internationaal vergelijkend woononderzoek. Toen ik dit onderzoek startte in 
2002, waren er echter nog belangrijke gaten in de kennis omtrent de toepas-
baarheid en verklaringskracht van beide theorieën. 
In de eerste plaats had een systematische empirische toetsing van de des-
betreffende theoretische kaders op het terrein van huisvesting nog nauwe-
lijks plaatsgevonden. Discussies over beide theorieën binnen het internatio-
naal vergelijkend woononderzoek hadden vooral betrekking op conceptueel 
en theoretisch niveau, zonder dat er een koppeling werd gemaakt met concre-
te huisvestingsdata. 
Ten tweede was het onduidelijk in hoeverre de theorieën en typologie-
en van Esping-Andersen en Kemeny van waarde kunnen zijn bij de analyse 
van de Zuid-Europese huisvestingssystemen. In de door deze auteurs ontwik-
kelde theoretische kaders blijven de Zuid-Europese landen namelijk buiten 
beschouwing. Verschillende onderzoekers (Barlow en Duncan, 1994; Ferrara, 
1996) hebben op deze omissie gereageerd door een Mediterraan verzorgings-
Tabel 2 Kemeny’s typologie van huursystemen
Politieke structuur
Ideologie
Omvang van de huursector
Mate van competitie tussen de 
sociale huursector en de 
particuliere huursector
Huurniveaus
Functie van de sociale 
huursector
Subsidiëring en regulering
Landen (alleen Europese 





Individueel georiënteerd, veel 
ruimte voor privaat initiatief
Relatief klein
Geen directe competitie tussen de 
twee huursectoren
Grote verschillen in huurniveau 
tussen commerciële huurwonin-
gen (relatief duur) en sociale 
huurwoningen (relatief goedkoop)
Vangnet voor de laagste 
inkomensgroepen
Grote verschillen tussen een sterk 
gesubsidieerde en gereguleerde 
sociale huursector en een 
particuliere huursector met weinig 
of geen subsidies en regulering






Directe competitie tussen de twee 
huursectoren
Relatief beperkte verschillen in 
huurniveau tussen commerciële 
huurwoningen en sociale 
huurwoningen
Verschaft huisvesting aan brede 
lagen van de bevolking
Relatief kleine verschillen in 
regulering en subsidiëring tussen 
de sociale huursector en de 
particuliere huursector




staatregime te ontwikkelen. Het Mediterrane verzorgingsstaatregime ver-
toont veel kenmerken van het conservatief-corporatische verzorgingsstaatre-
gime. Het belangrijke verschil is dat de verzorgingsstaat minder sterk ontwik-
keld is en dat de rol van de familie nog groter is. Allen et al. (2004) hebben het 
Mediterrane verzorgingsstaatregime ‘vertaald’ naar een Mediterraan huisves-
tingsregime. Naar de specifieke huisvestingskenmerken (woonbeleid, huis-
vestingsuitkomsten, functioneren van de woningmarkt) van dit Mediterrane 
huisvestingsregime is echter nog nauwelijks onderzoek gedaan. 
Het is de ambitie van deze dissertatie om een bijdrage te leveren aan het 
vullen van de bovenstaande ‘gaten’. In dit kader zijn de volgende drie onder-
zoeksvragen geformuleerd. 
1. In welke mate biedt de theorie en typologie van Esping-Andersen een goed 
kader voor het analyseren en verklaren van de kenmerken en de ontwikke-
ling van het woonbeleid? Zijn er aanpassingen denkbaar die de verklarings-
kracht van dit theoretisch kader kunnen vergroten?
2. In welke mate bieden de theorieën en typologieën van Esping-Andersen en 
Kemeny een goede verklaring voor de verschillen tussen landen met betrek-
king tot meetbare huisvestingsvariabelen (eigendomsverhouding, woning-
type, woningkwaliteit, kenmerken van huurders, huurniveaus, woontevre-
denheid)?
3. Hoe komen de kenmerken van de Mediterrane verzorgingsstaten en huis-
vestingssystemen tot uitdrukking in het woonbeleid, de huisvestingsuit-
komsten en het functioneren van de woningmarkt?
 2.  Onderzoeksresultaten (hoofdstukken 2 t/m 7)
 2.1 De theorie en typologie van Esping-Andersen als 
verklarend kader voor de analyse van het woonbe-
leid (onderzoeksvraag 1)
Van verzorgingsstaatregime naar regime van woonbeleid (hoofdstuk 2)
In hoofdstuk 2 van dit proefschrift zijn de drie verzorgingsstaatregimes van 
Esping-Andersen deductief ‘vertaald’ naar drie regimes van woonbeleid. Ver-
volgens is deze woonbeleidstypologie gebruikt om de veranderingen in het Ne-
derlandse woonbeleid tussen 1980 en 2000 te interpreteren (zie tabel 3). Hier-
bij is geconcludeerd dat het Nederlandse volkshuisvestingssysteem in de jaren 
tachtig zowel sociaal-democratische als ook corporatistische trekken had, ter-
wijl in de jaren negentig de corporatistische kenmerken dominant waren. Op 
zichzelf is dit een plausibel resultaat, omdat ook de Nederlandse verzorgings-
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staat zowel sociaal-democratische als corporatistische kenmerken heeft. 
Niettemin is er één aspect van de typologie van Esping-Andersen dat min-
der goed toepasbaar is. Hoewel het Nederlandse woonbeleid in de jaren 
negentig veel corporatistische karakteristieken had – het beleid werd ontwik-
keld in samenwerking tussen de centrale overheid, lokale overheden en het 
maatschappelijk middenveld (woningcorporaties) - was het zeker niet conser-
vatief. Er was binnen de Nederlandse woonsector geen sprake van een expli-
ciete bevoordeling van de traditionele familie en/of van gefragmenteerd soci-
aal beleid dat tot doel heeft om de bestaande statusverschillen in de maat-
schappij in stand te houden. 
Ik heb de term ‘modern corporatisme’ gebruikt om het Nederlandse woon-
beleid in de jaren negentig te typeren. Door dit concept te combineren met 
Kemeny’s ideeën over corporatisme (volgens Kemeny is Esping-Ander-
sens sociaal-democratische verzorgingsstaatregime in feite ook corporatis-
tisch: labour-led corporatism), heb ik uiteindelijk een nieuw conceptueel model 
voor het analyseren van de verzorgingsstaat ontwikkeld (zie figuur 1). Nader 
onderzoek zal moeten uitwijzen in hoeverre dit model ook van waarde is voor 
andere beleidsterreinen dan de volkshuisvesting, en voor andere landen dan 
Nederland. 
Mijn woonbeleidstypologie is ook toegepast op België (Hoekstra en Reitsma, 
2002) en Noorwegen (Stamsø, 2008). Net als voor Nederland bleek er ook voor 
deze landen geen één op één relatie te bestaan tussen de kenmerken van de 
verzorgingsstaat en de kenmerken van het huisvestingssysteem. In België is 
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de verzorgingsstaat conservatief-corporatisch terwijl het woonbeleid zowel 
conservatief-corporatistische als ook liberale elementen bevat. In het sociaal-
democratische Noorwegen was het woonbeleid in oorsprong sociaal-demo-
cratisch maar heeft het in de loop der tijd steeds meer liberale trekken gekre-
gen. 
De geconstateerde discrepanties tussen de kenmerken van de verzorgings-
staat en de kenmerken van het woonbeleid hangen mogelijk samen het feit 
dat de functies van het woonbeleid deels overlappen met de functies van de 
andere domeinen van de verzorgingsstaat (sociale zekerheid, zorg, onderwijs), 
zeker waar het gaat om inkomensondersteuning. Enerzijds kan het woonbe-
leid de uitkomsten van de overige domeinen van de verzorgingsstaat verzach-
ten (in dat geval is de decommodificatie in het woonbeleid dus sterker dan 
de decommodificatie in de overige domeinen van de verzorgingsstaat). Ander-
zijds kunnen de overige domeinen van de verzorgingsstaat zo sterk ont-
wikkeld zijn dat de noodzaak om een uitgebeid woonbeleid te voeren min-
der groot is (in dat geval is de decommodificatie in het woonbeleid minder 
sterk dan de decommodificatie in de overige domeinen van de verzorgings-
staat). Om dergelijke samenhangen beter in kaart te kunnen brengen, is het 
van belang dat er in toekomstig onderzoek meer aandacht wordt besteed aan 
de wijze waarop het woonbeleid is ingebed in de bredere context van de ver-
zorgingsstaat.
 2.2 Divergentietheorieën en meetbare huisvestingsuit-
komsten (onderzoeksvraag 2)
Het proefschrift bevat drie hoofdstukken waarin de typologieën van Esping-An-
dersen en Kemeny worden gerelateerd aan meetbare huisvestingsuitkomsten.
Van verzorgingsstaatregime naar woningtype (Hoofdstuk 3)
In hoofdstuk drie van het proefschrift wordt onderzocht of er een relatie be-
staat tussen de kenmerken van de verzorgingsstaat en de rol van de verschil-
lende woningtypen binnen een maatschappij. Met behulp van een Europees 
databestand (European Community Household Panel) ben ik nagegaan in 
hoeverre het aandeel, de eigendomsverhouding, de kwaliteit en de waarde-
ring van appartementen ten opzichte van eengezinswoningen verschilt tus-
sen vier typen verzorgingsstaten (sociaal-democratisch, conservatief-corpora-
tistisch, liberaal, Mediterraan). Uit deze analyse komt naar voren dat het Me-
diterrane verzorgingsstaatregime wat dit betreft op een aantal punten afwijkt 
van de overige drie typen verzorgingsstaten:
▪ In het Mediterrane verzorgingsstaatregime zijn de meeste appartementen 
koopwoningen. In de andere drie verzorgingsstaatsregimes bevinden de 
appartementen zich daarentegen overwegend in de huursector. 
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▪ In het Mediterrane verzorgingsstaatregime zijn appartementen gemiddeld 
in een betere staat dan eengezinswoningen, terwijl dit niet het geval is (het 
is meestal juist andersom) in de andere drie verzorgingsstaatregimes. 
▪ In het Mediterrane verzorgingsstaatregime zijn er slechts beperkte verschil-
len in gemiddeld kamertal tussen appartementen en eengezinswoningen. 
In de andere drie verzorgingsstaatregimes hebben appartementen gemid-
deld genomen duidelijk minder kamers dan eengezinswoningen. 
▪ In het Mediterrane verzorgingsstaatregime bestaan er geen duidelijke ver-
schillen in woonsatisfactie tussen bewoners van een appartement en bewo-
ners van een eengezinswoning. In de overige drie verzorgingsstaatsregimes 
zijn bewoners van een eengezinswoning duidelijk meer tevreden over hun 
woonsituatie dan bewoners van een appartement. 
Mijn hypothese is dat de hierboven beschreven uitzonderingspositie voor het 
Mediterrane verzorgingsstaatregime kan worden verklaard vanuit een aantal 
specifieke kenmerken van de Mediterrane landen: een belangrijke rol voor de 
familie bij het verschaffen van verzorgingsstaatvoorzieningen, relatief weinig 
suburbanisatie, een intensief gebruik van de publieke ruimte, een sterk op ei-
genwoningbezit gerichte cultuur, een slecht ontwikkelde sociale huursector 
en een relatief warm klimaat. Om deze hypothese te kunnen toetsen is verder 
onderzoek noodzakelijk. 
Unitaire en duale huursystemen (Hoofdstuk 4)
In hoofdstuk vier van het proefschrift is getoetst in hoeverre Kemeny’s huur-
systeemtypologie wordt onderbouwd door empirische huisvestingsdata. Hier-
toe is de typologie uitgewerkt naar vier meetbare hypothesen (zie tabel 3) 
die zijn getoetst met behulp van data van het European Community House-
hold Panel. De volgende zes Europese landen zijn geïncorporeerd in de analy-
se: Nederland, Denemarken, Oostenrijk, Verenigd Koninkrijk, Ierland en Bel-
gië. Volgens Kemeny (2006) hebben de eerste drie landen unitaire huursyste-
men, terwijl de huursystemen in de laatste drie landen als duaal te classifice-
ren zijn. 
Tabel 3 Verwachte verschillen tussen unitaire en duale huursystemen: vier hypothesen
1.  Aandeel van de koopsector
2.  Woningkwaliteit
3.  Inkomens van huurders
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Uit de verrichtte analyse is gebleken dat de hypothesen in redelijke mate 
worden ondersteund door de empirische data. Met andere woorden, Kemeny’s 
huursysteemtypologie lijkt goed te kloppen (in ieder geval voor wat betreft de 
in de analyse opgenomen landen). Dit betekent echter niet noodzakelijkerwijs 
dat de theorie die aan deze typologie ten grondslag ligt ook juist is. Om deze 
theorie volledig te kunnen toetsen, moet men niet alleen kijken naar de huis-
vestingsuitkomsten, maar ook naar de politieke en economische processen 
die aan deze huisvestingsuitkomsten ten grondslag liggen. 
Eigenwoningbezit en woonsatisfactie (Hoofdstuk 5)
Hoofdstuk vijf van het proefschrift onderzoekt de relatie tussen eigendoms-
verhouding en woonsatisfactie. Hierbij worden drie typen landen onderschei-
den, waarbij voor elk type een hypothese is geformuleerd (zie tabel 4). De hy-
pothesen zijn getoetst met behulp van een multiple regressieanalyse op da-
ta van het European Community Household Panel. De te verklaren variabele 
was de woontevredenheid, terwijl de eigendomsverhouding, de woningkwa-
liteit, de huishoudenskenmerken en de woonkosten als verklarende variabe-
len fungeerden. 
In de duale huursystemen en het Mediterrane verzorgingsstaatregime bleek 
de eigendomsverhouding een autonome invloed op de woonsatisfactie te 
hebben, waarbij eigenaarbewoners meer tevreden over hun woonsituatie zijn 
dan huurders. Voor deze typen landen werd de geformuleerde hypothese dus 
geconfirmeerd door de analyseresultaten. 
Voor de unitaire huursystemen was het beeld meer gemengd. In Oosten-
rijk bleek de eigendomsverhouding geen autonome invloed te hebben op de 
woontevredenheid, wat in overeenstemming is met de geformuleerde hypo-
these. In de unitaire huursystemen van Nederland en Denemarken bleken 
eigenaarbewoners echter meer tevreden over hun woonsituatie dan huur-
ders. Mogelijk heeft dit te maken met recente ontwikkelingen op de woning-
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markt en in het woonbeleid in deze landen, die ervoor hebben gezorgd dat de 
sociale huursector in toenemende mate geresidualiseerd en gestigmatiseerd 
is geraakt. Het feit dat beide landen een fiscaal beleid kennen waarbij eigen-
woningbezit wordt bevoordeeld ten opzichte van huren speelt mogelijk even-
eens een rol, evenals de systematische verschillen in woningkenmerken tus-
sen huurwoningen en koopwoningen. 
 2.3 Mediterrane verzorgingsstaten en huisvestingssys-
temen (onderzoeksvraag 3)
Het proefschrift bevat twee artikelen waarin wordt nagegaan of de specifieke 
kenmerken van de Mediterrane verzorgingsstaten zich ook manifesteren in 
specifieke huisvestingsuitkomsten. In het eerste artikel (hoofdstuk 6 van het 
proefschrift) ligt de nadruk op de beleidsmatige aspecten, waarna het tweede 
artikel (hoofdstuk 7 van het proefschrift) aandacht besteedt aan de werking 
van de woningmarkt. Beide artikelen gaan in op de situatie in Spanje. 
Spaans woonbeleid: een gesubsidieerde koopsector (Hoofdstuk 6)
In Spanje wordt het overgrote deel van de sociale huisvesting gerealiseerd in 
de koopsector in plaats van in de huursector. Spaanse gesubsidieerde koop-
woningen richten zich op de lagere en middeninkomensgroepen en worden 
aangeboden door zowel publieke als private ontwikkelaars. De productie van 
de gesubsidieerde koopwoningen wordt gecoördineerd door een complex fi-
nancieringssysteem, waarin zowel bouwende partijen als ook huizenkopers 
financiële steun van de overheid kunnen ontvangen. In ruil voor deze steun 
moeten de woningen worden aangeboden tegen prijzen die veel lager zijn 
dan het marktniveau. Het gevolg hiervan is dat de vraag naar gesubsidieerde 
koopwoningen in de regel veel groter is dan het aanbod. Daarom worden der-
gelijke woningen vaak toegewezen met behulp van een loterij. 
Spaanse gesubsidieerde koopwoningen houden hun speciale status meestal 
voor een periode van 20 tot 30 jaar (de zogenaamde kwalificatieperiode). Gedu-
rende deze periode mogen de woningen alleen worden doorverkocht tegen 
door de overheid vastgestelde prijzen, zodat speculatie kan worden voorko-
men. Nadat de kwalificatieperiode is verstreken, zijn de woningen weer ‘nor-
male’ koopwoningen en kunnen ze tegen marktprijzen worden verkocht. 
Recent hebben enkele Spaanse regio’s echter besloten om de kwalificatiepe-
riode veel langer te maken dan voorheen het geval was (bijvoorbeeld 90 jaar). 
In de autonome regio Baskenland is zelfs gekozen voor een permanente kwa-
lificatieperiode. Door deze ontwikkelingen verandert de Spaanse gesubsidieer-
de koopsector van een tijdelijke in een permanente specifieke eigendomscate-
gorie. Deze ontwikkeling kan leiden tot een segmentering van de woningmarkt 
en een verdere vermindering van de nu al lage verhuismobiliteit in Spanje. 
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Mijn veronderstelling is dat de wijze waarop het Spaanse beleid ten opzich-
te van de gesubsidieerde koopsector is vormgegeven samenhangt met de spe-
cifieke karakteristieken van de Mediterrane verzorgingsstaten (voorkeur voor 
eigenwoningbezit, betaalbaarheidsproblemen voor lage en middeninkomens-
groepen). Om deze veronderstelling te kunnen toetsen is meer systematisch 
internationaal vergelijkend onderzoek naar de relatie tussen de kenmerken 
van de verzorgingsstaat enerzijds, en de vormgeving van het beleid ten aan-
zien van koopsector anderzijds, noodzakelijk. 
De Spaanse woningmarkt: veel leegstand en stijgende huizenprijzen 
(Hoofdstuk 7)
Het startpunt voor hoofdstuk 7 van het proefschrift was een observatie van 
mijn collega Cyrus Vakili-Zad, die vaststelde dat verschillende Zuid-Europese 
landen worden gekenmerkt door zowel een hoog leegstandscijfer als ook door 
stijgende huizenprijzen, hetgeen in strijd is met de gangbare economische 
theorie. We besloten om dit fenomeen nader te onderzoeken aan de hand van 
de Spaanse casus. 
In Spanje is er geen relatie tussen het leegstandscijfer en de huizenprijs-
ontwikkeling; een verschijnsel dat we hebben aangeduid met de term ‘Spaan-
se paradox’. De Spaanse paradox is niet alleen van toepassing op het nationa-
le schaalniveau, maar speelt ook op provinciaal en gemeentelijk niveau. Vol-
gens ons wordt de Spaanse paradox veroorzaakt doordat veel Spaanse leeg-
staande woningen niet beschikbaar zijn voor de woningmarkt. Dit kan wor-
den verklaard uit de volgende vier factoren, die specifiek zijn voor het Spaan-
se huisvestingssysteem: 
▪ De groei van de woningvoorraad is de afgelopen decennia veel groter 
geweest dan de groei van het aantal huishoudens. Dit komt doordat veel 
woningen zijn gekocht vanuit investeringsmotieven. Woningen die als 
investering zijn gekocht staan dikwijls leeg – zonder dat ze te koop worden 
aangeboden – omdat verhuur als een te groot risico wordt gezien als gevolg 
van de strikte huurbescherming. 
▪ De sterke trek van het platteland naar de stad heeft geresulteerd in veel 
leegstaande woningen in dorpen in het landelijk gebied. Dikwijls worden 
deze woningen niet aangeboden op de woningmarkt, omdat de eigenaren 
ze niet willen verkopen omwille van sentimentele en/of nostalgische rede-
nen. 
▪ Woningen zijn dikwijls familiebezit. Leegstaande woningen die in het bezit 
zijn van de familie worden vaak niet te koop of te huur aangeboden, omdat 
familieleden ze op een later tijdstip weer nodig kunnen hebben. 
▪ Het tweedewoningbezit is sterk gestegen. Hoewel tweede woningen niet tel-
len als leegstaande woningen is de grens tussen beide in de praktijk niet 
altijd even makkelijk te trekken. 
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Onze conclusie is dat de specifieke kenmerken van het Spaanse huisvestings-
systeem zorgen voor relatief veel leegstaande woningen, maar dat deze zelf-
de kenmerken er eveneens voor zorgen dat een belangrijk deel van deze wo-
ningen niet wordt aangeboden op de woningmarkt. Oftewel: een hoog leeg-
standscijfer is niet per se synoniem aan een groot aanbod van woningen. Dit 
verklaart waarom er op de Spaanse woningmarkt geen duidelijke relatie be-
staat tussen de omvang van de leegstand en de huisprijsontwikkeling. Verder 
onderzoek zal moeten uitwijzen of dit verschijnsel specifiek is voor Spanje, of 
dat het ook opgeld doet in andere Mediterrane verzorgingsstaten (en mogelijk 
ook in bepaalde liberale landen zoals Ierland). 
 3. Eindconclusie
Dit proefschrift kenmerkt zich door een brede en verkennende benadering. 
Het project had twee hoofddoelstellingen. Het eerste doel was om na te gaan 
in hoeverre de theorieën en typologieën van Esping-Andersen en Kemeny een 
goed kader bieden voor het verklaren van internationale verschillen in woon-
beleid, huisvestingsuitkomsten en woningmarktontwikkelingen (onderzoeks-
vragen 1 en 2). Het antwoord op deze vraag is genuanceerd. Eén en ander 
hangt in sterke mate af van de landen en de aspecten die in de beschouwing 
worden betrokken. Niettemin stel ik vast dat zowel Esping-Andersens als ook 
Kemenys typologie een goed startpunt vormen voor internationaal vergelij-
kend woononderzoek, al is het maar omdat er vooralsnog geen geschikte al-
ternatieve theoretische kaders beschikbaar zijn. 
Wel benadruk ik dat de typologieën niet op een rigide en dogmatische 
manier toegepast moeten worden. Ze zouden zoveel mogelijk afgestemd 
of aangepast moeten worden op/aan het onderwerp van studie, net zoals 
gebeurd is in hoofdstuk 2 van dit proefschrift. Naar mijn mening moeten 
typologieën vooreerst worden gezien als theoretische onderbouwde handvat-
ten die gebruikt kunnen worden om internationaal vergelijkend onderzoek te 
structureren en te faciliteren. Wanneer ze op deze manier worden toegepast, 
kunnen ze een aanzienlijke toegevoegde waarde hebben, zoals dit proefschrift 
heeft laten zien. 
Het tweede doel van dit proefschrift (onderzoeksvraag 3) was om na te gaan 
in hoeverre de specifieke kenmerken van de Mediterrane verzorgingsstaten ook 
tot uitdrukking komen in specifieke karakteristieken voor wat betreft woonbe-
leid, huisvestingsuitkomsten en woningmarktontwikkelingen. De resultaten 
van dit onderzoek suggereren dat dit inderdaad het geval is. Om stevigere con-
clusies te kunnen trekken is echter meer onderzoek nodig, waarbij niet alleen 
gekeken wordt naar Spanje maar ook naar andere Mediterrane landen. 
In dit proefschrift wordt niet alleen getracht om antwoord te geven op de 
geformuleerde onderzoeksvragen, maar worden eveneens enkele nieuwe the-
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oretische noties en concepten geïntroduceerd. Zo is in hoofdstuk 2 een con-
ceptueel kader voor het analyseren van de verzorgingsstaat gepresenteerd, 
met het zogenaamde moderne corporatisme als nieuw element hierin. Ook 
de notie van de Spaanse paradox, en de koppeling van dit verschijnsel aan 
de kenmerken van het Mediterrane verzorgingsstaatregime (hoofdstuk 7 van 
dit proefschrift), vormt een aanvulling op de bestaande literatuur. Ik hoop dat 
deze nieuwe concepten een goede basis zullen vormen voor verder onderzoek 
en voor verdere theorieontwikkeling. 
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